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Introduction
The concept of co-production of public services has experienced a true revival in the last 
decade. Whereas the term received some scholarly attention in the beginning of the 1980s 
(e.g. Brudney and England, 1983; Parks et al., 1981; Whitaker, 1980), it has lately become 
a mainstream topic (Pestoff et al., 2012). The expectation is that when citizens are actively 
involved as co-producers of public service delivery, it results in better quality, but also in 
a better relations among citizens and between citizens and government (Bovaird, 2007; 
Brudney and England, 1983; Levine, 1984; Ostrom, 1996; Pestoff, 2009; Verschuere et al., 
2012). The economic malaise as a result of the credit crisis in 2007 increased the salience of 
co-production even more. Because of shrinking budgets, governments had to prepare citi-
zens for upcoming, rigorous cutbacks in the quantity and quality of public services. Citizens 
could no longer expect the government to provide all the services that were developed during 
better times. In order to uphold a comprehensive welfare state, the government would need 
the support of the local level – including citizens, local organizations and decentralized 
governments. The UK government was perhaps the first to communicate this idea explicitly 
under the umbrella of the ‘Big Society’ in 2010 (Cameron, 2010). In 2013, the Netherlands 
followed with revitalizing the notion of the ‘participation society’, emphasizing same themes 
such as more responsibility for citizens and room for citizen initiatives (King’s speech, the 
Netherlands, 2013). Not only in Europe, but also in the United States and Asia, there is 
a call for more citizen involvement in the delivery of public services (Sociaal Cultureel 
Planbureau, 2014).
Although the diminishing size of public budgets is clearly one of the reasons that concepts 
such as co-production have been embraced by policy-makers, other arguments for citizen 
involvement in service delivery play a role too. The idea of the ‘Big Society’ can actually 
be traced back long before the financial troubles started. The voter turnout for the British 
national elections in 2001 had reached a stunning post war low, whereas local elections 
attracted even less citizens. This led to concerns about legitimacy of democratic institutions 
and public trust in decision-making processes (Jochum et al., 2005: 9). The solution brought 
forward for so-called ‘Broken Britain’ was ‘civic renewal’: stimulating citizens to take part 
in governance, such as the management and scrutiny of public services. In other words, 
to restore trust of citizens in public service delivery and governmental institutions, citizen 
participation needed to increase, specifically in concrete, local issues rather than in abstract, 
political settings.
The idea that co-production can be an avenue to foster public trust was already put 
forward in 1984 by Charles Levine (1984), who regarded this as one of the ‘promises of 
co-production’. He argued that if citizens and public service staff share responsibility and 
take decisions together during service delivery, this will lead to more responsiveness towards 
and more commitment among citizens (Levine, 1984: 185). As a result, the trust attitude 
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of citizens towards public service delivery and government is expected to improve. Further-
more, Ostrom (1996: 1083) argued that ‘the experience of co-production also encourages 
citizens to develop other horizontal relationships and social capital’. In other words, the 
positive experience of cooperation will also lead to an improved relation between citizens – 
potentially increasing levels of so-called ‘generalized trust’.
However, Levine (1984) also explicitly warned the public sector that ‘if the use of citizens 
in service delivery is treated as a marginal activity by public agencies, then we should not 
expect co-production to be a very effective instrument for improving the competence or 
commitment of citizens’ (Levine, 1984: 185). Nowadays, one may indeed wonder whether 
governments, in time of austerity, use co-production as a cover for cost reductions instead of 
treating it as a way to genuinely integrate service users into design and delivery procedures. 
The classic ‘ladder of participation’ of Sherry Arnstein comes into mind: when citizens are 
asked to participate, but virtually lack the power to influence any decision-making, partici-
pation comes close to nonparticipation and manipulation in the worst case (Arnstein, 1969).
The attractiveness of the concept of co-production (and other related terms) appears to 
have won the battle against these early warnings. Think thanks, especially in the UK but 
also elsewhere in Europe, inform policy makers about the high potential of co-production 
and help to implement new, co-productive forms of service delivery. Here too, the expec-
tation that co-production will be able to increase trust and social cohesion is frequently 
addressed (Boyle and Harris, 2009; Löffler et al., 2012; Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het 
Regeringsbeleid, 2012). Meanwhile, academic research picks up and analyses local, innova-
tive examples of co-production that seem to confirm this thesis (Bovaird and Löffler, 2012; 
Needham, 2008). Yet, regardless of their value, these small case studies often lack solid 
theory as well as empirical rigor. It seems to be that co-production is being implemented 
at a larger scale without knowing how it exactly affects the relation between citizens and 
public institutions. Specifically, little is known about the mechanisms and conditions that 
could explain if and why there is a relation between co-production and trust. Therefore, it is 
necessary to critically assess the expected relationship between co-production and trust in service 
delivery, trust in (local) government, and generalized trust. This is the main goal of this study, 
which leads to the main research question of this study: to what extent does co-production of 
public service delivery by users lead to trust in service delivery, trust in (local) government and 
generalized trust; and by which mechanisms and conditions can this relationship be explained?
Before describing the added value – in terms of theoretical, methodological, and practical 
relevance – of this study and the research design in more detail, the concept of co-production 
will first be put in historical context. By looking at the shifting role of public service users in 
the past century, the puzzle that is under scrutiny in this study will become clear.
11
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The role of public service users
The involvement of citizens in the delivery of public services has always been present. For 
instance, in the early modern period (1588-1795), a part of the Dutch citizenry was obliged 
to make rounds as night watches twice per month (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 2014). 
Also, every household had to provide one individual that helped with so-called ‘ice-biting’ 
(i.e. keeping the city canals ice free) in the winter. In the same vein, Dutch residents have 
always been responsible for the maintenance of waterways that cross their land. In many 
countries including Belgium, Germany and Canada, citizens are still expected to keep 
adjoined public pavements and private pathways clean from snow by law. And the long his-
tory of volunteering at the local fire brigade and military (i.e. the French reserve army) can 
perhaps be regarded as examples of co-production too. There are definitely numerous cases 
in recent history where citizens participate in the delivery of public services. But then the 
question can be raised: if co-production is something of all times, why now all the attention?
This has everything to do with the development of comprehensive welfare states during 
the 20th century and specifically with changes in the way the associated inclusive welfare ser-
vices are managed and governed. Osborne (2006) argues that these changes can be captured 
in three consecutive dominant modes of Public Administration and Management (see also 
chapter 2). First, a longer era of ‘traditional’ Public Administration (PA) during the period 
from the nineteenth century to the early 1980s; then a ‘transitory’ stage of the New Public 
Management (NPM) until the beginning of the 21st century; and a new, ongoing mode of 
the New Public Governance (NPG). PA can be described as a hierarchical mode of gover-
nance, where the ‘rule of law’ and administration of set rules and guidelines dominate, and 
the bureaucracy and the professional have a central role in public service delivery. This mode 
of governance prevailed especially in the post-war period, characterized by the idea that 
government needed to take care of citizens ‘from the cradle to the grave’. As a consequence, 
citizens were not expected to actively take part in the delivery of services, but they were 
regarded as passive consumers.
The role of public service users changed when the NPM became the dominant mode of 
governance. This was a reaction to criticism on the ‘old’ PA, including the ineffectiveness 
of ‘Big Government’, high density of rules, limiting the freedom of public officials, and a 
lack of attention to incentives to perform (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994). The NPM entails 
inter alia that the public sector would benefit from adapting private-sector management; 
more emphasis on input and output control, including performance management; and the 
introduction of the use of markets, competition and contracts for the delivery of public 
services. Ideally, the role of users in the NPM would be that of a rational customer: one who 
can chose the service that seems to be performing best for the lowest price. Interestingly, the 
introduction of reforms based on the New Public Management was also fed by concerns 
about public trust and responsiveness of public services (O’Flynn, 2007) (see chapter 2). 
Chapter 1 | Introduction
12
Governments, so critics claimed, would have to regain trust through providing more choice, 
democracy, and transparency (OECD, 2010).
However, the NPM also had to withstand severe criticism, for instance about its 
theoretical basis, about the benefits of its practical implementation, and about its intra-
governmental focus. Importantly, NPM-style changes included mechanisms such as control 
and compliance that are essentially an expression of distrust (Van de Walle, 2010). Specifi-
cally, empirical research is also unable to find effects of NPM-induced reforms on quality 
of services and levels of trust (Kettl, 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Rather, in some 
sectors, such as health, policies inspired by the NPM movement may actually have led to 
decreased trust (Taylor-Gooby, 2008). Osborne (2006: 384) argues that the NPM does not 
take into account that current society is increasingly characterized by ‘a plural state, where 
multiple inter-dependent actors contribute to the delivery of public services and a pluralist 
state, where multiple processes inform the policy making system’. In contrast, the New 
Public Governance (NPG) focuses on interorganizational processes (instead of the policy 
system or interorganizational management); emphasizes service processes and outcomes 
(rather than policy implementation or service inputs and outputs), and focuses on trust or 
relational contracts as main governance mechanism (and not on hierarchy or market). In 
this framework, there is more attention for the role of society and specifically, the role of 
service users, who are an inevitable part of the service process. Instead of passive customers 
or rational consumers, they are now regarded as active co-producers, who play a crucial role 
in the provision of services in a relation with staff of public service organizations. This focus 
on personal interaction would help to build trust, as it takes into account the affective side 
of trust, rather than solely focusing on the cognitive, rational side of trust (Taylor-Gooby, 
2008).
In this study, the focus is on the NPG and specifically on the role of users as co-producers. 
The question is, of course, whether this change in the mode in governance towards the NPG 
will indeed be more effective in constituting an affective bond between citizens as service us-
ers and public institutions, or better in creating social cohesion in society. There are reasons 
to remain sceptical about this claim. An often heard critique on the idea of co-production 
is that it is used as a cover for budget cuts: as long as co-production means cost reduction 
for government, it is embraced, but other than that, there is no real urge of governments 
to involve citizens in service delivery. Still, even when co-production is not driven by the 
absence of governmental provision of services, co-production does entail an increase in ef-
fort by citizens in the delivery of public services. Moreover, this increased effort does not 
automatically mean an improvement in the quality of services. This leads to the following 
puzzle: why would co-production increase trust when it often means that citizens have to do 
more effort for receiving public services compared to other forms of service delivery?
In order to research the relation between co-production and trust, it is necessary to pro-
vide some background on the two concepts. Although they are discussed and defined in an 
13
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elaborate fashion in chapter 2, it is useful to shortly discuss the concepts at this point, which 
will be done in the next section.
Defining co-production1
The definition of co-production has been a focal point of many discussions. The study’s am-
bition is not to provide the definition that makes all other superfluous. It is useful however 
to position the definition in this study within the broader spectrum of different usages of the 
concept of co-production.
Ostrom and her colleagues were the first to coin the term co-production in the context of 
public service delivery. They defined co-production as follows:
…the mix of activities that both public service agents and citizens contribute to the 
provision of public services. The former are involved as professionals, or ‘regular produc-
ers’, while ‘citizen production’ is based on voluntary efforts by individuals and groups to 
enhance the quality and/or quantity of the services they use (Parks et al., 1981).
This definition is fairly broad, but it does provide some first clarifications about the 
meaning of co-production. First of all, the definition makes clear that co-production is 
about collaboration between citizens and public agencies. This differs from literature that 
focuses on ‘co-production’ between organizations and public agencies, also referred to as 
co-management and co-governance (Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006). Secondly, the definition 
mentions a contribution on the part of the citizens to the service, which seems to indicate 
active involvement. This makes it different from clientelism or consumerism, where the role 
of the user remains passive, and the service is delivered by the staff of the public service 
organization. This also implies that the user directly benefits from co-production, although 
there may be circumstances where co-producers participate for the sake of others, such as 
co-production by family members of children or elderly (Pestoff, 2009). Finally, the defini-
tion mentions the production or provision stage of public service delivery. Co-production, as 
interpreted in this study, refers to direct contributions to the implementation of a delivered 
service, and not to participation through deliberation or advocacy, e.g. on representative 
councils. There are two reasons to use this former, narrower interpretation. The first is that, if 
advocacy is included, co-production cannot be distinguished from any kind of participation 
in a professional context. Second, the activities, experiences and skills involved in advocacy 
differ quite strongly from those in the direct production of a service.
1. This section is based on Brandsen & Honingh (forthcoming), with permission.
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These choices can be illustrated using the example of activation services for unemployed 
welfare recipients – which will be the case under scrutiny in chapter 4 and 5.
•	 If	individual	welfare	recipients	or	groups	of	recipients	work	with	the	staff	of	the	public	
service organization responsible for the activation service, it is co-production. If the 
organization works together with other organizations, it is not.
•	 If	welfare	recipients	are	actively	involved	in	the	implementation	of	the	activation	pro-
gramme – for instance, by being involved in the organization – it is co-production. If 
they only passively receive job training, it is not.
•	 If	welfare	recipients	are	actively	involved	in	the	implementation	of	the	activation	pro-
gramme, it is co-production. If they sit on a representative council of welfare recipients, 
it is not.
There are some other considerations about the definition of the concept of co-production, 
which will be discussed in chapter 2.
Co-production and trust
Trust in this study is defined as ‘the belief that others, through their action or inaction, will 
contribute to my/our well-being and refrain from inflicting damage upon me/us’ (Offe, 
1999: 47). There could be very different reasons for people to trust others – it could be based 
on previous experiences, on reputation, on dispositions, etcetera (Rousseau et al., 1998). In 
chapter 2, it is argued why co-production would be beneficial for trust.
However, when co-production is presented as a tool to improve citizens’ trust in govern-
ment and society, the underlying assumption is that it is indeed possible to find an effect of 
experiences of service delivery on trust attitudes. In his dissertation, Van de Walle (2004) 
concludes that we should actually abandon this ‘micro-performance’ hypothesis. He pres-
ents a number of arguments for this conviction. For instance, people have opinions about 
government and institutions even if they had no bureaucratic encounters. It is more likely 
that the image of public institutions, for a large part formed by media, influences people’s 
attitudes. Also, the experiences people do have do not necessarily have a causal relation with 
people’s assessment of government and institutions. People might have a predisposition that 
is either positive or more negative towards public institutions (Kampen et al., 2006), which 
might be better explained by social-historical context than by actual experiences with public 
services. Does it then make sense to expect that co-production has any effect on trust?
Recent work on the relation between the process of service delivery and trust seem to 
indicate it does make sense. Van Ryzin (2007: 532) states that ‘traditional performance 
measures do not necessarily capture the dimensions or features of service quality that matters 
most to citizens’. In his subsequent work, Van Ryzin (2011, 2015) argues that (perceived) 
performance might actually have little influence on trust. To the contrary, processes might be 
15
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much more important for citizens’ trust than actual outcomes. Specifically, beneficial aspects 
of process, such as fairness, participation, equity, respect and honesty might matter to people 
as much as outcomes. Empirical research indeed shows support for this thesis (Kumlin and 
Rothstein, 2005; Van Ryzin, 2011, 2015).
Thus, in order to assess the impact of co-production on trust, it is necessary to focus 
on how co-production changes the process of service delivery, instead of (solely) focusing 
whether the outcome is influenced by co-production. Chapter 2 (theoretically) and chapter 
5 (empirically) will specifically deal with this issue.
Theoretical, methodological and practical value of this study
In their article ‘Co-production: The State of the Art in Research and the Future Agenda’ 
Verschuere et al. (2012) discuss the challenges for future co-production research. They see 
both theoretical and methodological shortcomings of past research on co-production. How 
current study copes with these challenges is discussed in the next two sections. In the third 
section, it will be discussed what kind of practical implications can be expected of this 
research.
Theoretical value
The expectation that co-production leads to trust is rarely supported by theoretical argu-
ments, and it seems therefore driven by ideological motives. This study attempts to move 
beyond these motives and aims to develop solid theoretical arguments for the relation 
between co-production and trust in service delivery, trust in government and generalized 
trust. To a large extent, this means opening the ‘black box’ that now exists between these 
two variables. In other words, which conditions and mechanisms could explain a change in 
trust as a consequence of co-production? Finding these conditions and mechanisms requires 
a perspective that takes the entire public service system into account (Osborne, 2010), which 
includes different stages of public service delivery (initial, process and evaluation phase; see 
chapter 2) as well as different levels of actors (users, organizations, institutions; see chapter 
3). In order to comprehend the factors that play a role in each phase and at each level for 
the relationship between co-production and trust, this study integrates different strands of 
literature.
The starting point is literature on Public Governance and co-production, specifically the 
work on the NPG (Osborne, 2010) and traditional co-production literature (Brudney and 
England, 1983; Parks et al., 1981). As Verschuere et al. (2012) remark, co-production is a 
key element of this ‘emerging paradigm’. Services can no longer rely on hierarchical service 
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delivery by professionals and staff of public agencies, but are increasingly co-produced by 
citizens and communities. This means that within the NPG, the unit of analysis is not 
exclusively public policy implementation (as it was in the ‘old’ PA), or on public service 
organizations (as it was in the NPM), but on the whole public service system – including the 
role of individual users and communities as co-producers of services.
Three stages of public service delivery are important to understand the effect of co-
production on trust at the individual level. To understand the effect of these three stages, 
this study makes extensively use of insights from different strands of psychological theory. For 
each service delivery phase, different psychological theories are relevant. For the initial phase, 
theory on human motivation (Ryan and Deci, 2000) will be used, while social learning 
theory (Bandura, 1997) will be employed to formulate testable expectations for the process 
stage, and attribution theory (Bendapudi and Leone, 2003) is eventually used to formulate 
hypotheses for users’ attitudes in the evaluation phase. To understand the effects of collec-
tive co-production, theories on collective action will be used in addition to psychological 
theories. For this, this study mostly builds on work from Ostrom (2000; Pestoff, 2014) and 
Tilly (2005b). These theories will also provide insights to possible unfavourable conditions 
for creating trust, such as extrinsic motivation and free-riding behaviour.
Furthermore, three levels of actors are important to understand the effect of co-production 
on trust. Because of its emphasis on the existence of a plural and pluralist state, the NPG is 
explicitly concerned ‘with the institutional and external environmental pressure that enable 
and constrain public policy implementation and the delivery of public services’ (Osborne, 
2010: 9). As a consequence, this study does not focus on individual level mechanisms only, 
but also on processes that take place at the organizational and institutional level. In other 
words, a multilevel approach is adopted to provide the best understanding of the process of 
co-production. This approach will be informed by organizational and institutional theories, 
which are useful to gain insight in how public service organizations act in a context where 
they have to cope with influences at the institutional level, as well as with the involvement of 
citizens and communities. Therefore, this study employs insights from Contingency Theory 
(Thompson, 1967) and Neo-Institutional Theory, in particular the idea of isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Applying these theories to the study of co-production reveal 
some crucial problems for organizations dealing with co-production, which might negatively 
affect the possibility to foster trust among users.
These issues are empirically assessed using different methods (see next section). This 
empirical research will also lead to other factors that may determine how co-production 
affects trust. On the basis of these new insights, the study will provide input towards a more 
sophisticated model to test the relation between co-production and trust in service delivery, 
trust in government and generalized trust.
17
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Methodological value
Verschuere et al. (2012) find that most of the research on co-production is based on case 
studies, limiting the scope of the findings. Partly as a result of these case study designs, mostly 
qualitative data have been collected. This obstructs comparative work, especially because the 
concept of co-production is used so differently. Thus, Verschuere et al. (2012) conclude 
that research on co-production would benefit from larger methodological diversity. The past 
few years, scholars have started answering this call by introducing a variety of methods to 
the field of co-production, such as Q-methodology (Van Eijk and Steen, 2014), natural 
experiments (Jakobsen, 2013) and large-N surveys (Bovaird et al., 2015; Clark et al., 2013). 
The research for this study, which took place during the upcoming of these new approaches, 
adds further diversity to the methods applied to the study of co-production.
This study adopts a mix of quantitative, hypothesis-testing research and qualitative, 
hypothesis-building research (Haverland and Yanow, 2012). A large part of the research 
(chapter 4 and 5) is based on a specific case – a co-produced activation programme in the 
Netherlands. The focus on this case helps to understand the context and mechanisms of co-
production in detail. Small-N survey research is used to test whether theoretical mechanisms 
may indeed provide an explanation for the relation between co-production and different 
types of trust. In addition, qualitative research, based on an interpretative approach, is ap-
plied to see whether there are factors that have not been identified by the theoretical chapters 
(2 and 3). Following the study on the activation programme, an experimental vignette study 
is used to test attribution effects (i.e. self-serving bias) in co-production, by comparing 
non co-produced services with co-produced services (chapter 6). Van Ryzin (2011: 757) 
argues that such experiments are the ‘only way to know for sure’ whether citizens judge civil 
servants on the service process or on service outcomes. Furthermore, an experimental design 
is perfectly suited for exploration, as it assures high internal validity. If the effect is not found 
in such a controlled setting, it is unlikely to be found in reality.
In conclusion, the methodological approach taken in this study aims for high internal 
validity, albeit at the expense of external validity.
Practical value
Expectations of co-production are high. For some, it is mainly a way to make effectively 
use of the resources – including time, money and behaviour – of service users in order to 
maintain the same quantity and quality of public services. But to others, co-production also 
has an inherent value: regardless of the outcome, citizens should be involved in the way they 
receive public services. Co-production is then regarded as an alternative to other forms of 
political participation and as an extension of contemporary democracy (Eriksson, 2012; 
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Pestoff, 2009). By gaining more influence on the public services they receive, citizens will 
ideally build a more responsive relation with public service agencies and (local) government. 
However, there is still too little known about the potential risks of user participation in 
service delivery (cf. Needham, 2008). For practitioners, it is therefore crucial to understand 
under which conditions co-production might lead to better relations between users and 
service providers – and what might happen when these conditions are not satisfied.
In order to investigate relevant conditions, some basic (policy) assumptions about 
co-production will be critically assessed in this study. One of those assumptions is that 
citizens are motivated to co-produce (see chapter 2 and 3). Often, it is taken for granted 
that users are motivated to be involved in service delivery, or at least that they should be 
motivated – whereas in practice, lots of different motivations might exist (Alford, 2009a). 
When practitioners do not understand this variety of motivations, policy instruments may 
be used without or even with reverse effects – for instance, monetary incentives may crowd 
out intrinsic motivation (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Another assumption is that everybody gets 
involved in co-production equally (see chapter 4). There seems to be an assumption that co-
production is able to improve democratic governance by involving a more representative 
part of society (Pestoff, 2009). However, research on the background characteristics of co-
producing citizens show strong biases (Clark et al., 2013; Jakobsen and Andersen, 2013). A 
third assumption is that organizations always desire users to co-produce (see chapter 3 and 5). 
Even if it is acknowledged that citizens might not always want to co-produce, it is at least 
assumed that public service organization will benefit from it and are eager to involve citizens 
in service delivery. Co-production might also be very risky for organizations and could pro-
duce organizational uncertainty (Etgar, 2007; Osborne and Strokosch, 2013). This might be 
one of the least theorized and investigated assumptions about co-production and demands 
critical scrutiny. A last assumption is that co-production will always lead to more satisfaction 
and trust than no co-production, when holding the outcome constant (see chapter 6). This relates 
to the assumption that every user would like to co-produce. It might be more realistic to 
assume that some are not eager to co-produce and would rather opt for ‘classical’ service 
delivery by public agencies. This could mean that even if co-production is successful, these 
citizens still will be less satisfied with the service. For example, an elderly care organization 
in the Netherlands had to deal with fierce criticism when they started with an experiment to 
point family members of patients at their responsibility to become active in the organization 
(Stoffelen, 2013). Alternatively, the situation might occur that the process of co-production 
is actually quite successful, but that positive outcomes are, unexpectedly, not attained. For 
example, welfare recipients actively participate in the delivery of an activation service, aim-
ing at a return to the labour market, but no jobs are found. Who is then responsible for this 
outcome? Citizens can be disappointed that all their efforts were for nothing, or they can 
be angry with the public service organization for not facilitating the process well enough. 
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Therefore, it would be good for practitioners to understand how citizens react to different 
outcomes of co-production.
A critical assessment of these assumptions will provide valuable information for policy 
makers and staff of public service organizations about the potential gains and risks of imple-
menting co-production. They will be systematically addressed in the form of a set of ques-
tions in the final section of this study (chapter 7). These questions could be used to guide 
the efforts of governments and PSOs in designing and organizing co-production of public 
service delivery.
Sub questions and outline
The main question of this study is to what extent does co-production of public service delivery 
by users lead to trust in service delivery, trust in (local) government and generalized trust; and 
by which mechanisms and conditions can this relationship be explained? In order to provide a 
satisfactory answer to this question, both theoretical and empirical work is required. Five 
sub questions have been formulated, which together represent the main body of this study 
(see Table 1). The first two sub questions are theoretical studies, whereas the last three are 
Table 1. Sub-questions and outline
1. What are mechanisms that can explain the relation between co-production and trust? (Chapter 2)
Published in Public Management Review as: Restoring trust through the co-production of public 
services: a theoretical elaboration.
2. What compels organizations and users to pursue co-production? (Chapter 3)
Published in Public Policy and Administration as: User Co-production of Public Service Delivery: an 
Uncertainty Approach.
3. What are the characteristics of users involved in co-production? (Chapter 4)
Forthcoming in International Review of Administrative Sciences as: Why people co-produce within 
activation services: the necessity of motivation and trust. An investigation of selection biases in a 
municipal activation programme in the Netherlands.
4.  What are mechanisms and conditions that explain the relation between co-production and trust? 
(Chapter 5)
Published in International Journal of Public Sector Management as: Building Trust Through Service 
Co-Production
5.  To what extent does the evaluation of co-produced services depend on the result of the service? 
(Chapter 6)
Published in International Journal of Public Administration as: Does user co-production of public 
service delivery increase satisfaction and trust? Evidence from a vignette experiment.
Chapter 1 | Introduction
20
empirical studies. It should be noted this study represents a collection of articles. All chapters 
have been or are to be published in international, peer-reviewed journals. This brings the 
advantage that all chapters could be read independently. The disadvantage is however that 
there may be some redundancy: the reader will find definitions and arguments repeated 
throughout the study.
The first sub question deals with the mechanisms that can be distilled from literature that 
potentially explain the relation between co-production and trust (chapter 2). The starting 
point of this theoretical elaboration is the assumptions made in co-production literature, 
after which it is tried to support these assumptions with logical explanations. It proposes 
a three phase model to investigate the effect of co-production on trust. Also, some first 
arguments are brought forward that point at the possibility that the relation between co-
production and trust is not as straightforward as often thought. In other words, chapter 2 
sets the agenda for the rest of the study.
Sub question 2 unravels the assumption that public organizations will always desire us-
ers to have the possibility to co-produce (chapter 3). Again, this is a theoretical chapter. 
Here, it will be argued that for public service organizations co-production might very well 
result in an increase in uncertainty. The strategies that organizations choose to deal with this 
uncertainty will have an influence on building trust. This chapter emphasizes the importance 
of adopting a multilevel approach to the study of co-production, consisting of the user, the 
organizational, and the institutional level.
Sub question 3 is engaged with the question: what are the characteristics of users who 
are involved in co-production? In this empirical chapter (chapter 4), the focus will be the 
initial phase of service delivery. In two ways, this chapter is important. First, in order to 
know whether co-production leads to trust, it is necessary to know what the initial levels of 
trust are before co-production commences. Second, for policy makers and professionals, it is 
important to know the motivations and characteristics of co-producing users (in comparison 
with non co-producers), in order to make more effectively use of policy instruments to 
encourage (or perhaps discourage) citizens to co-produce. In order to study this, the case 
of work corporations, a co-produced activation programme for long term unemployed is 
introduced.
Sub question 4 is an empirical question: what are mechanisms and conditions that explain 
the relation between co-production and trust (chapter 5)? It deals with the process stage of 
public service delivery. In the previous chapter, the baseline of trust – i.e. the level of trust 
before co-production has started – is investigated. In chapter 5, it is analysed whether there 
has been a change in the initial levels of trust among participants of work corporations. Also, 
it aims to find out whether these changes can be explained by the mechanisms described in 
chapter 2. Some of the conditions mentioned in chapter 3 will also be investigated. Fur-
thermore, through more interpretative, qualitative research other important conditions for 
building trust through co-production will be extracted from the data.
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The final sub question emphasizes the evaluation phase of co-production: to what extent 
does the evaluation of co-produced services depend on the result of the service (chapter 
6)? To answer this question, it is necessary to have a research design which allows variation 
in outcome, but holds the process of co-production constant. Because this is difficult to 
arrange in real life settings, an experimental vignette study was constructed. The theoretical 
framework of this chapter builds heavily on self-attribution theory and in particular on the 
psychological effect called self-serving bias.
The final, concluding chapter (chapter 7) will provide an answer to the main research 
question. Also, it will explicitly discuss the theoretical and methodological contributions 
of the study: which new insights did the study give? Furthermore, it discusses limitations 
of the research and paves the way for future research: which direction(s) should research on 
co-production be heading? The chapter ends with elaborating on the practical implications 
of the study and provides practitioners with important factors that need to be considered 
when implementing co-production.

2 
Restoring trust through the co-production of public 
services: a theoretical elaboration
Published as: Fledderus, J., Brandsen, T. & Honingh, M. (2014). Restoring trust 
through the co-production of public services: a theoretical elaboration. Public 
Management Review, 16(3), 424-443.
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Abstract
Co-production, the involvement of clients in the delivery of public services, is believed to 
foster trust. However, there is insufficient research on this topic to prove what is at present 
merely an assumption. This chapter gives theoretical insights into this relationship. First, 
it is identified that co-production relates to identification-based trust. Second, the most 
important theoretical mechanisms are identified that link the two concepts: increasing 
self-efficacy and the creation of trust networks. A third step is to move towards a more 
contingent perspective. This involves not only favourable conditions, but also obstructions 
to trust-building, such as crowding-out motivations and free-riding.
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Introduction
The (debated) decline in public trust in government during the 1980s and 1990s fed concerns 
about the responsiveness of public services (Misztal, 1996; Nye et al., 1997). Governments, 
so critics claimed, would have to regain trust through providing more choice, democracy, 
and transparency (OECD, 2010). In many countries, governments tried to bridge the gap 
with citizens through public sector reforms which were often based on the New Public 
Management (NPM) paradigm. Governments would benefit from a more market-oriented 
approach and private-sector styles of management, treating citizens as ‘consumers’ rather 
than clients (Hood, 1991). Ironically, reforms inspired by NPM included mechanisms such 
as control and compliance that are essentially an expression of distrust (Van de Walle, 2010). 
Research is also unable to show that these kinds of management transformations lead to an 
increase in trust levels (Kettl, 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004).2 More recently, alternative 
approaches to service delivery have been introduced that move away from the self-interested 
consumerist approach of NPM and towards a different conception of the user. For example, 
Public Value theory acknowledges that ‘[t]he social values inherent in public services may 
not be adequately addressed by the economic efficiency calculus of markets’ (Hefetz and 
Warner, 2004: 174), while the New Public Governance paradigm emphasizes partnership 
and collaboration instead of competition (Osborne, 2010). At the heart of these discussions, 
there is a notion that citizens should no longer be treated as passive clients or consumers, but 
as (potentially) active co-producers of the services they receive. Examples of co-production 
can be found in diverse sectors: residents unite with the police in neighbourhood watch 
schemes to combat crime and tackle antisocial behaviour (Fleming, 2005); tenants plan and 
manage social housing through housing cooperatives (Brandsen and Helderman, 2012); 
volunteers in care services supplement the resources of professional staff, such as parents in 
child care; patients actively engage in making decisions about their preferred lifestyles and 
medical treatment (Hyde and Davies, 2004).
Making users an integral part of the service delivery process would, according to this view, 
be more effective in restoring trust in governments, but also in increasing social cohesion 
and raising levels of social capital (Barker, 2010; Bovaird and Löffler, 2012; Ostrom, 1996; 
Pestoff, 2009), a claim already made in the early 1980s (Brudney, 1984: 479; Levine, 1984: 
130). The basic assumption is that the change in the nature of the relationship will result in 
a change in attitude, specifically towards more trust (or less distrust).
2. These authors agree that it is very hard to show the (causal) relationship between public reforms and citizens’ 
attitudes towards government with available data, but do argue that there is no evidence that these reforms were able 
to restore public trust. Besides methodological explanations, only few others are given for the absence of an effect. 
One is that the citizens have apparently a preference for service provision by public bodies instead of private parties; 
therefore, privatization did not lead to an increase in trust.
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However, empirical research to support these propositions is scarce. Such effects are de-
sired, sometimes assumed, but largely unproven. This is at least partly because of the lack of 
a systematic theoretical basis to clarify causal relationships and test the presumed effects. This 
is probably because such ‘social’ effects are often treated as a by-product of co-production 
rather than the main outcome. Therefore, harsh though it may sound, it is probably fair to 
say that in its present form the relationship between co-production and trust remains an 
ideological assumption. Moreover, the two concepts are often not clearly defined, at least not 
when confronted directly. The term co-production has been employed in different contexts 
and for different events, and its use appears to differ along the geographical lines (Pestoff, 
2012). The concept of trust, too, has been described as ‘elusive’ (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 
1994), with much confusion over its exact definition (McKnight and Chervany, 2001). 
To move beyond this stage, it is necessary to address a number of theoretical issues that, at 
least with regard to co-production, have received little systematic treatment in the literature 
(cf. Verschuere et al., 2012). Specifically, it is important to specify (a) the concepts of co-
production and trust and (b) the social and psychological mechanisms that link the two. 
Hence, the above-mentioned empirical gap will not be solved here, but a first theoretical 
framework is presented to pave the way for future systematic research.
Accordingly, this chapter will first discuss the two main concepts. For the sake of clarity, 
it is necessary to be precise and narrow in our scope. We will briefly touch upon three 
questions. Who is defined as a co-producer? What is trust? And why is it important? Then we 
will argue, in line with Van de Walle (2010), that co-production of public services is based 
on a different form of trust from other approaches to service delivery. This is followed by an 
elaboration on two mechanisms that could explain the relation between co-production and 
trust. Finally, a simple model is described in the end which provides a starting point for an 
empirical study.
Defining co-production
The term co-production was coined by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues in the 1970s. 
Originally, they developed the term to describe the possible relationship that exists between 
the ‘regular’ producer (street-level police officers, schoolteachers, or health workers) and 
‘clients who want to be transformed by the service into safer, better-educated or healthier 
persons’ (Ostrom, 1996: 1079; see also Parks et al., 1981, for an overview). At that time, 
the involvement of users in all sorts of services often appeared to go unnoticed (Parks et 
al., 1981; Whitaker, 1980). From an economic perspective, it was argued that the ‘clear 
distinction between consumption and production underlying most economic theory is not 
easily applied to the service delivery process’ (Brudney and England, 1983: 60). Neverthe-
less, in practice, the market logic of NPM was preferred to the alternative of co-production. 
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Recently, however, there has been a steep increase in scholarly and practical interest in the 
concept of co-production. Needham and Carr (2009) summarize the developments that 
explain this renewed attention:
•	 A	decline	in	support	of	target-based	and	process-driven	models	of	service	delivery
•	 A	wish	for	higher	service	efficiency	because	of	fiscal	pressure
•	 An	increase	in	the	awareness	of	‘user-generated’	knowledge
•	 A	desire	to	strengthen	local	democracy
•	 A	tendency	to	personalize	social	services	through	the	effective	participation	of	the	people	
who use them
The academic interest generated some important publications which have led to the emer-
gence of a mature research field (Alford, 2009a; Bovaird, 2007; Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006; 
Pestoff et al., 2012). These works include a lot of different usages, contexts, and settings of 
co-production. The relationship with trust will be dependent on particular choices in defini-
tion. For example, talking about co-production and trust at the governance level clearly 
diverges from the individual level of clients. This is the first delineation we make.
Co-production is defined here as an arrangement where both clients and ‘regular’ producers 
contribute a mix of activities at the point of delivery of public services. Following Alford (2002), 
we distinguish clients from volunteers and citizens. Clients would like to receive private 
value from services, i.e. the benefits of service provision are directly consumed by the user. 
Therefore, the motivations of clients to co-produce are different to those of volunteers and 
citizens, who receive public rather than private value. Volunteers do not necessarily benefit 
from putting effort into an organization. They are suppliers rather than consumers. Citizens 
also differ from clients. Where a client’s relationship with the provider is constituted by 
service encounters, a citizen’s relationship with government is through all sorts of rights, 
obligations, and accountabilities, such as voting and other forms of political participation 
(Alford, 2009a). Hence, individuals who can only exercise partial citizenship rights, such as 
asylum seekers or children, can act as co-producers too (Strokosch, 2013).
Clients may be paying customers, beneficiaries (such as welfare recipients), or ‘obligatees’ 
(such as taxpayers or prisoners). They usually perform a mixture of these roles (2009a). It is 
contested whether an obligatee could fall under the definition of co-production. Brudney 
and England (1983) maintain that co-production is regarded as cooperation, which should 
be voluntary and not be forced upon citizens. This implies that compliance should not be 
regarded as co-production. Alford (2009a: 22) argues, however, that scholars confuse compli-
ance with compulsion. He maintains that ‘compliance is where people act in accordance with 
agency requirements. They can do so either voluntarily or because of compulsion’ (emphasis 
in the original). Importantly, by delimiting the concept to strictly voluntary behaviour, an 
important group of clients will be excluded, especially if trust is the topic of interest. Just 
as it has been shown that people who start to volunteer already have high levels of trust 
(Stolle, 1998), co-production could be more common among high-trusters. This could be 
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particularly the case when co-production is presented as a choice. Therefore, we should also 
look at clients who co-produce through compulsion, because trust building can take place 
mainly here.
What is more, we delimit co-production to the stage of service delivery, also described as 
co-delivery (Bovaird, 2007) or the ‘responsive’ and ‘operational’ levels of public policy (Klijn, 
2010). We do not discuss co-production of the formulation process. According to some, 
this limitation actually denotes the real nature of co-production as it ‘is the antidote to the 
idea that we endlessly need to ask people’s opinion, before handing the service back to the 
professionals to deliver, since people will be involved in delivery as well’ (Boyle and Harris, 
2009: 17; see also Brudney and England, 1983). To others, co-delivery should complement 
other stages of participation (Percy, 1984; Pestoff, 2009).
Within co-production, the service delivery process plays a crucial role in evaluating the 
service as a whole. Since users are actively engaged in the process, the perception of it becomes 
much more important. Take for example IKEA, the well-known Scandinavian furniture 
manufacturer, where customers are expected to assemble at least a part of the product, such 
as a bookcase, themselves. Not only the looks and sturdiness of the bookcase count, but also 
how long it took to construct it yourself. Therefore, management theories argue that low 
levels of trust can be restored by improving the (perception of ) quality of services – which 
comprises much more than the actual output (Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2003).
Finally, we focus on public services. Public services refer to all services, regardless of the 
actual provider, that are financed at least partly by public funds. Hence, it also includes 
private companies that are carrying out certain services, or third sector organizations that 
collaborate with government. Increasingly, nonprofit or so-called hybrid organizations are 
involved in service provision too (Evers, 2005).
Obviously, treating users as co-producers represents a ‘radical reinterpretation’ (Bovaird, 
2007) of their relation with ‘regular’ providers. Where the traditional Public Administration 
(PA) framework posits the public sector as a sole provider of services, co-production ac-
knowledges the importance of efforts of users (and organizations) too. In contrast to NPM, 
co-production emphasizes the inseparability of production and consumption of services, 
and thus processes above ready-made products (Klijn, 2010). Such a fundamental shift in 
the user-provider relationship has implications for the way trust in society is built. Before 
addressing this, we need to clarify precisely what we mean by trust and why we find it 
important to investigate.
Defining trust
There seem to be at least two important elements of trust (Rousseau et al., 1998: 394–395): 
benevolent expectations and the willingness to be vulnerable. Offe’s definition captures both 
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elements: ‘trust is the belief that others, through their action or inaction, will contribute to 
my/our well-being and refrain from inflicting damage upon me/us’ (Offe, 1999: 47). At 
least two conditions should be present for trust to be meaningful. First, if there is no risk of 
betrayal, there is no need for trust (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). Service delivery usually 
entails some vulnerability for users. For users of enduring services in particular, stakes are 
high: faulty health care may have a negative effect on a patient’s well-being; unresponsive 
public housing services may result in homelessness; and failing reemployment programmes 
could lead to despair among jobseekers. The second condition refers to interdependence, 
where the interests of the truster will not be met without reliance upon another (Rousseau 
et al., 1998). Because the degree of interdependence differs between types of service delivery 
(hierarchical, market, co-production), the nature of vulnerability and trust alters as well 
(Sheppard and Sherman, 1998). This, in turn, has implications for the way clients and 
organizations try to develop trust. We will return to the differences in interdependency 
between types of service delivery in the next section.
On the one hand, trust is a ‘risky investment’, as it inevitably ‘extrapolates from the avail-
able information’; and on the other hand, it is a mechanism which fulfils a crucial function 
in every interaction (Luhmann, 1979: 24, 26). Indeed, not locking your bicycle in the city 
centre because you trust all citizens not to steal it is a very risky action (at least in the Neth-
erlands). Blind trust can be risky or even naïve. Yet, absence of trust would eventually lead 
to social isolation (Yamagishi, 2001). Without trust, transaction costs increase substantially 
in the form of contracts and supervision (Williamson, 1983). Thus, a certain level of trust 
would ease cooperation between citizens and increases social cohesion in communities (Os-
trom, 2000; Seligman, 1997). The merits of trust for society have been shown repeatedly. In 
high-trusting societies, people are happier and healthier, economies are more prosperous and 
governments more responsive (Fukuyama, 1995; Inglehart, 2001; Knack and Keefer, 1995; 
Putnam et al., 1994; Uslaner, 2002). Trust also seems a good remedy against corruption and 
crime (Bjørnskov, 2006; Buonanno et al., 2009). Furthermore, governments will not have 
to use coercion or force for each decision when they enjoy enough trust (Gamson, 1968). 
A lack of trust in government leads to tax evasion and unlawful activity, which will have 
an impact on the extent of monitoring and enforcement (Tyler, 1990). Therefore, it seems 
legitimate to believe that, at least at the community level, trust has positive connotations.
With these encouraging effects of trust in mind, NPM-style reforms were expected to 
increase trust in service delivery by increasing its poor performance which, in turn, would 
lead to more trust in government. In the same vein, co-production would help alleviate the 
alleged democratic deficit, on the national as well as at the local level (Bovaird, 2007; Pestoff, 
2009). However, expectations appear to be even more ambitious. Parallel to New Public 
Governance, where public services are regarded in a ‘holistic way to address complex needs 
and as an instrument for social inclusion’ (Osborne and Strokosch, 2013), Public Value 
Theory maintains that co-production of service delivery could lead to public value, which 
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could be expressed in trust (Alford, 2009b). These claims could be traced back to Ostrom’s 
argument that ‘the experience of co-production also encourages citizens to develop other 
horizontal relationships and social capital’ (Ostrom, 1996: 1083). Where trust in service 
providers and trust in government is a form of particularized trust, aimed at a particular per-
son, organization, or institution, the trust described here is often called generalized trust, i.e. 
trust in people in general, or strangers. Generalized trust is often regarded as an important 
feature of social capital (Offe, 1999: 51). It is especially this type of trust which would drive 
people to interact with each other without the necessity of high transaction costs that would 
be made in a low-trust environment (Fukuyama, 1995). Hence, co-production is expected 
to lead to trust at different levels. Going from the more specific to the more general, we can 
distinguish, in addition to trust at the service and government levels, trust at the generalized 
level.
The bases of trust
Where does trust comes from? Lewicki and Bunker (1996) distinguish three foundations 
of trust: calculus-based trust, knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust. Calculus-
based trust is rooted in a calculation of another’s rewards for being trustworthy (such as job 
promotion) and costs of not being trustworthy (such as loss of reputation). Knowledge-
based trust is based on the amount of information one has to predict future behaviour and 
intentions. The more and better the information, the more likely trust will evolve. Lastly, 
identification-based trust forms when both parties (the truster and trusted) identify with 
each other’s goals and effectively understand and value the other’s wants. It is therefore not 
essentially cognitive, like calculus- and knowledge-based trust, but emotional.
Van de Walle (2010) argues that although at first sight NPM-induced reforms drove 
trust out of traditional bureaucratic interactions because they were based on distrust, such as 
contracts, fragmentations, performance targets, and audit and control instruments, this has 
not necessarily been the case. According to Sheppard and Sherman (1998), market systems 
are characterized by ‘shallow’ dependence relations: the service provider is responsible for 
the service delivery, and the role of the user is restricted to receiving the service; and the 
importance, range, and number of points of contact between the user and provider are lim-
ited. Grounded in public choice theory, NPM treats the service providers as self-interested 
maximizers and brings about a sceptical view on the ‘public service ethos’. Moreover, it 
assumes that interests of two actors are never the same. Hence, it would be too risky for 
service users to trust officials to act on their behalf and provide high quality services, so users 
should control public service delivery through different instruments. According to Van de 
Walle (2010), these instruments or mechanisms created calculus- and knowledge-based trust 
instead of identification-based trust. Controlling, short-term contracts and competition 
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increased calculus-based trust relationships, while knowledge-based trust relationships were 
improved by performance management and more transparency through disaggregation. 
Ideally, dissatisfaction with services could be made visible by citizens through withdrawal 
– i.e. choosing a better service provider. These penalizing instruments are necessary for trust 
production in market systems (Sheppard and Sherman, 1998: 428). Organizations could 
also gain trust by deepening their relations with users (becoming less ‘shallow’).
Traditional bureaucratic service delivery emphasizes highly formalized rules and stan-
dardization of practices. Clients are confronted with a lack of information about the motives 
and actions of service providers. Arguing from Weberian theory that public officials work in 
the public interest, people can trust them to do their best to follow the rules and help out. 
Likewise, professionals such as teachers and health care workers could be trusted on their 
distinct knowledge and skills due to expert education and training (Kremer and Tonkens, 
2006). Honesty and integrity are important attributes for public officials in order to gain 
trust (Sheppard and Sherman, 1998: 427). For clients themselves to improve service de-
livery in the traditional model, they would have to follow standard complaint procedures. 
Although Van de Walle (2010) maintains that NPM-style reforms may have diminished 
identification-based trust that was rooted in traditional service systems, we rather argue that 
this trust was based on what Zucker (1986: 65) calls process-based trust and characteristic-
based trust. In the case of the former, the truster believes that the trustee will act as he/she did 
before. In other words, trust is based on a high level of predictability. Bureaucratic service 
delivery tries to ensure predictability through the use of routines, rules, and standardization. 
The latter relates to the assumption that ascribed characteristics are a good reason for trusting 
someone. Professionalism relies on this form of trust. The fact that someone is a professional, 
should say enough about his or her skills and qualities.
Following Sheppard and Sherman (1998), such a hierarchical relationship can be char-
acterized by its deep dependence. One particular risk associated with this relational form is 
that of cheating, which could occur because of the knowledge gap between professionals and 
clients. For example, a doctor could have a preference for a particular treatment and does 
not consider other therapies which are unknown to the patient. Another risk entails the 
possibility of abuse, which arises because deep dependence creates an environment where 
an authority can determine the fate of the clients (‘fate control’). This risk has been made 
painfully clear by numerous incidents of child abuse in youth care, child care, and religious 
institutions in several European countries. These shocking events have undoubtedly led to 
a decrease in trust in those services. We observed that after a major child abuse case in the 
marketized sector of child care in the Netherlands, the involvement of parents in the delivery 
of child care has become increasingly important.3 Improving the market or professional skills 
3. Based on interviews done in the field of child care in Amsterdam and Nijmegen as part of the FP7 research 
project Welfare Innovations at the Local Level in Favour of Cohesion (www.wilcoproject.eu).
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was thought to be insufficient to gain the trust of parents. This leads us to the third base of 
trust.
With the introduction of the framework of co-production of service delivery, identifica-
tion-based trust becomes the most important form of trust. As said, recent theories on public 
service delivery and management reject the notion of self-interested provider and maximiz-
ing consumer and, building upon network theory, move towards trust-based steering and 
collaboration (Van de Walle, 2010). Within the framework of New Public Governance, 
clients of public services are no longer seen in a top-down relationship but as partners who 
co-deliver services in an interactive way (Osborne, 2010). This interdependency puts interac-
tions between the provider and users as the primary means of achieving trust (Klijn, 2010).
Sheppard and Sherman (1998) note that the risks of interdependence are poor coordina-
tion and misanticipation. The efforts of both the service provider and the clients must be 
effectively coordinated. Tasks should be clearly divided. When citizens assist the police for 
the sake of a safe neighbourhood, the former are required to keep an eye on suspicious 
behaviour and report any instances in a clear fashion, while the latter have to provide an 
efficient information system where these reports can be submitted. Misanticipation refers to 
‘the risk that, without specific instructions, one will not be able to anticipate the other’s needs 
or actions’ (Sheppard and Sherman, 1998: 425). For the public agency as well as the client 
the expectations and goals of co-production should be clear. For example, a neighbourhood 
watch volunteer might expect that the police force will provide assistance whenever he or she 
asks for it. A volunteer could act on this expectation – e.g. threatening suspects with police 
assistance – even though the police may only give backup in certain circumstances. This mis-
anticipation could lead the volunteer to distrust the police and refrain from notifying them 
at all. Sheppard and Sherman (1998) therefore state that communication plays a crucial role 
for developing trust in interdependent relationships. Indeed, when clients co-produce, trust 
is built during the process, where users should be able to communicate their values, goals, 
and wants to the providers through direct participation. This gives users (partial) control 
over the services they receive.
It should be noted that risks related to hierarchical and market types of service delivery 
are not absent in the context of co-production, although they might be less relevant. Lewicki 
and Bunker (1996) argue that identification-based trust only develops after calculus- and 
knowledge-based trust has been formed – in other words, it takes time. Hence, also within 
co-production, instruments such as professionalization and monitoring might be useful, es-
pecially at the start of the process. For example, citizens should be able to rely on professional 
guidance when they (at the time) are lacking the capacities themselves. When co-production 
depends on the involvement of a group of users, monitoring could rule out free-riding 
behaviour, increasing trust among the group. However, monitoring has the risk of crowding-
out intrinsic motivation and obstructing trust-building (Frey and Jegen, 2001; see below).
Table 1 shows how different modes of governance relate to different forms of trust.
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It is clear by now that co-production alters the relationship between a service user and 
the provider of that service and therefore the way in which trust is built. The exact mecha-
nism that could explain this needs clarification, however. In the next section, we will do 
so by distinguishing two main mechanisms, self-efficacy and trust networks. The former 
is exclusively related to the relationship between the single user and the provider, whereas 
the latter also takes relationships among (networks of ) individual clients into account (cf. 
Bovaird, 2007). These mechanisms will be theoretically linked to the trust-building capacity 
of co-production.
Trust-building mechanisms: self-efficacy and trust networks
Increasing self-efficacy
One of the mechanisms that theoretically explains the relationship between co-production 
and trust is through increasing users’ perception of self-efficacy. Co-production would be 
better suited to achieve the merits of participatory democracy, as described by Pateman 
(1970) and others. Drawing on the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill, 
they emphasize the benefits of participation in terms of self-actualization. Through direct 
participation in politics, citizens learn to recognize a public interest, in addition to private 
self-interest. Moreover, the experience of participation in decision making itself would at-
tach the individual to his or her society and increase the feeling among individual citizens 
that they belong in their community. Very important in this respect is that ‘the individual’s 
actual, as well as his sense of, freedom is increased through participation in decision making 
because it gives him a very real degree of control over the course of his life and the structure of 
his environment’ (Pateman, 1970: 26). This sense of freedom is known as (internal) political 
efficacy, i.e. the sense of being capable of influencing the political sphere.
The main hypothesis here is that if citizens have the feeling that their actions have no 
effect at all, alienation and a loss of trust in political institutions will be the result (Dalton, 
1999). More generally, a lack of efficacy is expected to have a negative effect on trust, whether 
Table 1. Modes of governance and bases of trust
bureaucracies/ professionalism marketization New Public Governance
role of clients customer consumers co-producers
base of trust process, characteristic calculus, knowledge identification
maintained by authority, rules, 
standardization, routines, 
voice through formal 
procedures
contracts, control, exit networks, interactions, 
voice through direct 
participation
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it is political trust, trust in service delivery, or generalized trust. Increasing a person’s control 
over life will make him or her less vulnerable to risks. People who feel many events in their 
lives happen outside their own span of control (through luck or faith, for example) will feel 
more vulnerable and are less inclined to take risk in trusting. Individuals who think their 
own actions have an effect on their daily lives will feel less risk in trusting others because 
they feel they are less dependent on the conduct of others. Empirical research supports that 
low self-efficacy leads to a lower propensity to trust (Mishra, 1996; Whitener et al., 1998).
According to Pestoff (2009), service users have indeed become alienated from daily life 
politics. Conventional forms of participation leave many people cynical about their abil-
ity to change or control policies and services (1984: 479). Co-production would help ‘to 
fulfil classic democratic functions of inducing responsibility on the part of public officials, 
communicating citizen preferences to government, educating the citizenry, and maintaining 
the political system’ (Brudney, 1984: 479). The process of co-production ‘would promote 
greater face-to-face interaction between the staff and consumers of major welfare services. 
This would also allow for greater citizen influence over their own life-politics, as well as 
over the welfare services that are most important to them and thereby could contribute to 
creating trust and social capital’ (Pestoff, 2009: 115). Hence, it is the high level of interac-
tion which increases users’ feeling of efficacy. The mechanism here is that experience and 
outcomes are ‘negotiated’ between the client and the deliverer instead of being dominated 
by the regular provider alone. Therefore, the client becomes a ‘key arbiter of service quality 
and performance’ (Osborne and Strokosch, 2013: S38). This will increase the provider’s 
responsiveness and the client’s sense of control, and reduce the client’s feeling of risk.
Particularly in business studies, the relationship between involvement, sense of control, 
and trust has been studied. Rajah et al. (2008) find that co-production increases the buyer-
seller relationship through frequent interactions and higher levels of customization and 
personalization. Teichert and Rost (2003) maintain that customers reduce the experience 
of risk through high involvement, which has a positive effect on their trust. In health care, 
it appears that encouraging patient involvement indeed increases patients’ sense of control 
over their illness condition, builds effective relationships with physicians, and improves the 
perception of patients of professional support, which all positively affects trust in the physi-
cian (MacStravic, 2000; Ouschan et al., 2006; Pontes and Pontes, 1997).
Alford (2009a) argues that the need to feel competent and self-determining (i.e. intrinsic 
motivations) indeed motivates people to co-produce. Political research shows, however, that 
people with low levels of political efficacy, are less likely to vote (Pattie and Johnston, 1998; 
Powell, 1986), while studies on job search behaviour relate lack of efficacy to less intense job 
seeking (Vansteenkiste et al., 2005). This could imply that precisely the group of users who 
benefit from co-production (by gaining more control and more trust) may be difficult to 
reach. However, the urge for personal control is not the only reason why clients co-produce. 
Alford (2009a) distinguishes three other motivations to co-produce: material self-interest 
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(tangible benefits), sociality (an individual’s desire for a sense of belonging), and expressive 
values (norms and values). Moreover, co-production can be elicited by providers through 
motivators, such as sanctions, material rewards, and non-material rewards. The effect of these 
motivators depends on the orientation of clients beforehand. For example, sanctions are 
often used to compel less-willing beneficiaries to participate in reemployment programmes 
(which also tends to cause their role to change from being a beneficiary to an obligatee). 
Yet, intrinsically motivated clients, who want to do everything to get out of their precarious 
situation, do not need to be forced into those activities (but voluntarily comply with the 
programmes provided). It could be that, for those clients, the threat of sanctions will reduce 
their trust in the service provider and eventually their sense of control. This phenomenon is 
known as the crowding-out effect (Frey and Jegen, 2001).
Related to the problem of motivation is that in the case of co-production, risk is actu-
ally shifted towards the user. He/she becomes partly accountable for outcomes (Vancop-
penolle and Verschuere, 2012). Not everyone may want to bear the burdens of responsibility 
(Bandura, 2001: 13). This may particularly affect trust when outcomes are not satisfactory. 
Because the co-producer himself or herself is part of the process, he/she cannot solely blame 
the public servant (Vamstad, 2012). Hirschman (1982: 43) notes this too, pointing at the 
case of psychotherapy, where the patient must complement the psychotherapist’s services 
with some input of his or her own. If the symptoms do not disappear, it could well be 
attributed to the inadequacy of his or her own contributions. In this case, Hirschman argues 
that ‘the disappointment the purchaser feels could well be turned against himself ’. Studies 
in the field of marketing however, suggest that co-producing clients rather blame the service 
provider for disappointing outcomes, while in the case of better-than-expected outcomes, 
clients give more credits for themselves. This is known as the self-serving bias (Bendapudi and 
Leone, 2003). Hence, the role of motivations and accountability is important in building 
trust through co-production.
Building trust networks
Networks could be seen as a form of governance which mainly takes place when multiple 
actors are mutually dependent (Kickert et al., 1997). Again, just as with the first mechanism, 
intensive levels of interaction within a network are believed to foster trust (Klijn, 2010). 
In networks, cooperation is crucial, and so there is the need to build trust (Considine and 
Lewis, 2003; Klijn, 2010). The fact that co-production entails that actors are reliant on each 
other to achieve outcomes they cannot reach alone, makes it very similar to the concept of 
networks. According to Tilly (2005b), trust can be best understood within networks. A trust 
network arises when there is a relationship between at least three actors and
a. this relationship is named and known to all participants;
b. participation in the relationship provides actors with some degree of shared rights and 
obligations;
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c. there are means to be able to communicate and represent their shared connection;
d. there are boundaries which are developed and preserved by participants and separate 
outsiders from the relationship.
The characteristics of a trust network indeed apply to several analysed cases of co-production 
where groups of users come together. Cooperative initiatives are the most illustrative ex-
amples. Research demonstrates that parental cooperatives in Swedish child care achieve high 
levels of parental involvement. These centres show dense networks which include rights 
and obligations for engaged parents (Vamstad, 2007, 2012). Although there are no visible 
boundaries in terms of rules of participation, parents in these cooperatives are generally 
higher educated, have better salaries, and are more often living in two-parent families. In 
Germany, housing cooperatives exist, which are able to actively engage their residents in 
and around their near living environment (Brandsen and Helderman, 2012). They could 
be described as integrated communities where, particularly in the older cooperatives, social 
bonds and family ties still play a role. Successful cooperatives clearly control their boundaries 
by maintaining a closed membership. But also outside cooperatives, trust networks arise 
in the context of co-production. In the United States, young felons could do community 
work within the concept of time banking. Time banking means the creation of a social 
network in which members exchange services, both receiving and providing them (Cahn, 
2000; Marks, 2009, 2012). While these young offenders often were obliged to participate in 
the programme, time banking was able to form intimate social groups, consisting of family 
members, staff, and people from the community. As a consequence, a sense of safety and 
trust was established (Marks, 2009).
The main problem with the mechanism of creating trust through networks is to explain 
how trust could expand beyond the level of the network. It may only lead to ‘bonding’ in-
stead of ‘bridging’ trust (Putnam et al., 1994; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Tilly (2005b: 
37) argues that the higher the stakes and the more intimacy, the higher the level of trust 
involved. Yet, through sharpening boundaries with other communities, trust in others may 
even decline (Marschall and Stolle, 2004). A good example is the study of Bekkers and Mei-
jer (2010; see also Meijer, 2012) of a Dutch policy called ‘Citizens Net’ (Burgernet). Citizens 
Net is a network of citizens who signed up by providing information about their telephone 
number and address. When a crime occurs, the police can contact citizens immediately to 
ask for information. According to the location of the offence, the nearest participants are 
called for information. It appeared that people trusted the police as well as the municipality 
more after they participated in Citizens Net. A majority of the participants felt they were 
more in control over their safety than before. Nevertheless, Bekkers and Meijers (2010: 139) 
also paraphrase a politician who said in a reaction to the pilot that ‘[Citizens Net] stimulates 
greater social control between citizens and, in turn, stimulates distrust among them and 
decreases social cohesion’. The project leader of Citizens Net indeed acknowledged that ‘the 
police too are aware of the risk that citizens spy on other residents and an unwanted form 
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of social control develops’. The potential to strengthen insider-outsider dynamics could be a 
‘dark side’ of co-production.
Another particular problem of the creation of trust networks is the risk of free-riding. Of-
ten, within networks, participation is motivated by the access to a common-pool resource, 
such as affordable housing or high quality child care (Brandsen and Helderman, 2012). A 
risk exists that some members would like to benefit from this access without putting any 
effort in. This could have a detrimental effect on the trust of other users (Frey and Jegen, 
2001). As Percy (1984) acknowledges, there is a direct relationship between resources com-
mitted and benefits received. When benefits are received by the co-producer individually, 
involvement in co-production is more likely. Therefore, it can be difficult to develop a trust 
network in the context of co-production.
Discussion: the agenda for empirical research
Theoretically, as we have shown, it is possible to identify specific types of trust that are 
fostered through co-production, through specific mechanisms, which operate under specific 
conditions. There are also conditions which may hinder rather than encourage these mecha-
nisms. Identifying and testing such contingencies constitutes the next important step in 
the debate on co-production, following a phase in which concepts were first identified and 
refined (Verschuere et al., 2012). We will here briefly describe the requirements that such 
research should meet.
Empirical research on the relation between co-production and trust can be described in 
terms of three consecutive phases. These are illustrated in figure 1. Following our definition 
of co-production, this model is based on the processes at the individual level. Furthermore, 
since the creation of identification-based trust almost certainly takes time (Lewicki and 
Bunker, 1996), the model should be read as a longitudinal design.
Participation in 
co-production
Self-efficacy
Trust networks
Trust
- service delivery
- (local) government
- generalized
Motivations
Self-efficacy
Ex-ante Ex-durante Ex-post
Initial phase Process Outcome
Trust
- service delivery
- (local) government
- generalized
Figure 1. A three-phase model of co-production of service delivery and trust
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In the ex ante situation, the following question should be answered: what are the charac-
teristics of co-producers? As noted earlier, levels of trust and efficacy may affect the particular 
motivations of users to co-produce. This is in line with earlier work on the dynamics of 
collaboration that has identified trust as one of the key conditions for collective action (Os-
trom, 1998; Yamagishi and Cook, 1993). A selection of relatively high trusters may be the 
result. Therefore, the backgrounds of users would have to be mapped in a first phase. At this 
stage, organizations could manipulate the motivations of clients through the use of certain 
motivators, such as incentives or sanctions. Left out of the model are other factors that may 
refer to capabilities of clients to co-produce, such as education, employment, health, or 
social contacts. These elements could very well have an influence on feelings of efficacy and 
trust too. This brings up the question whether it is required to facilitate or empower people 
to hand them the means to co-produce.
The ex durante phase is the process of co-production. The main question at this point 
is: what kind of trust-building mechanisms can we observe? In this phase, it should be 
assessed whether indeed efficacy is experienced and/or trust networks are built through the 
experience of co-production.
Finally, the ex post stage can be depicted as the outcome of the process. The question ad-
dressed here is whether initial trust levels have changed as a consequence of co-production. 
Does the process of co-production affect trust in service delivery, trust in government, and/
or generalized trust?
Obviously, the model is not complete. More causal relationships could potentially be 
identified, for example to point out the relationships between different levels of trust, and 
more concepts could be added, for example organizational characteristics such as dura-
tion of service use (i.e. short term vs. long term). Nevertheless, the model illustrates the 
main hypotheses formulated in this chapter and it could be used as a starting point for 
empirical research. It also shows the need for a sophisticated methodology. On the one 
hand, to understand the effects of co-production, collecting data in a large N setting is 
necessary (Verschuere et al., 2012); on the other hand, since these hypotheses have not been 
tested systematically before, only qualitative data could make clear whether there are other 
unobserved, influencing factors which are not included in the model. Finally, the causal 
relationship between the performance of public service delivery and trust is very difficult 
to assess (Van de Walle and Bouckaert, 2003). Therefore, it is crucial to have a longitudinal 
methodology to deal for a large part with this problem (cf. Allison, 1994).
Conclusion
This study has examined the theoretical relationship between the concepts of co-production 
and trust, thus addressing a repeatedly noted gap in the literature (Barker, 2010; Löffler, 
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2009). One of the steps has been to identify more precisely what type of trust is being 
discussed. Theoretically, co-production relates to identification-based trust, rather than the 
calculus- and knowledge-based trust which was so predominant in NPM. A second step 
has been to identify the most important theoretical mechanisms that link the two concepts. 
Increasing self-efficacy and the creation networks both potentially contribute to this type of 
trust, in different ways. A third step has been to move away from the absolute statement that 
more co-production leads to more trust towards a more contingent perspective, in which 
certain conditions must be present for the mechanisms to come into play. This includes not 
only favourable conditions, but also obstructions to trust-building, such as crowding-out 
motivations, accountability problems, free-riding, and reinforcing insider-outsider bound-
aries. There is absolutely no reason to take for granted that the co-production of service 
delivery automatically leads to more trust among clients. Nevertheless, expectations are high, 
in academia as well as in practice, especially as co-production is increasingly presented as a 
direction for the reform of public services and for the restoration of trusted government. 
This is why it is important to examine the empirical relationship between co-production and 
trust more systematically. This chapter has given a suggestion how such empirical research 
could be designed.
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Abstract
Engaging public service users as co-producers is expected to lead to more efficient services 
and better outcomes. What has been missing so far, however, is a solid theoretical basis 
for explaining what compels actors to pursue co-production, or not, and what strategies 
they adopt in this pursuit. Building on established theories, it is argued that whereas co-
production of public service delivery decreases uncertainty for users, it seems to increase un-
certainty for organizations. The main conclusion is that the need of organizations to reduce 
this uncertainty might diminish the possibilities for users to co-produce. The consequences 
of this conclusion for future research are discussed in this chapter.
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Introduction
Users of public services can take on different roles. They can be regarded as consumers, 
which became a popular view in the 1980s (Vidler and Clarke, 2005), but nowadays the 
perspective of service users as co-producers of public service delivery has gained attention 
(Brandsen et al., 2012). The contribution of users to the delivery of public services, such as 
parent participation in child care (Vamstad, 2012), citizen co-production of safety (Meijer, 
2012), or patient involvement in health care (Newman and Vidler, 2006), is believed to 
improve the efficiency and outcomes of those services.
Current research focuses for a large part on the motivations and characteristics of co-
producing users (Fledderus and Honingh, forthcoming; Parrado et al., 2013; Van Eijk and 
Steen, 2014), and on specific, often successful cases (Bovaird and Löffler, 2012; Cepiku 
and Giordano, 2013). What has been missing so far, however, is a solid theoretical basis for 
explaining what compels actors to pursue co-production, or not, and what strategies they 
adopt in this pursuit. In particular, the role of organizations remains relatively understudied 
in the current literature. In this chapter, we will define such a theoretical basis, building on 
established theories. A central hypothesis that emerges from the theoretical analysis is that 
whereas co-production of public service delivery decreases uncertainty for users, it seems 
to increase uncertainty for organizations. Therefore, it might not be so easy to realize co-
production as it is sometimes assumed.
This raises the question how organizations deal with these uncertainties and importantly, 
whether they are eager to allow users to co-produce or not. We argue that organizations may 
employ ‘closed’ or ‘open systems’ approaches to uncertainty, but that the choice for one or 
the other depends on the institutional context. In the final section of this chapter we will 
discuss the implications of our theoretical analysis for future research on co-production.
Uncertainty for service users and organizations
Users of public services and the organizations providing those services would not have to deal 
with uncertainty when they would be able to see and know everything. In reality, both par-
ties have incomplete information about possible solutions and their ultimate consequences. 
For instance, when a patient is in need of treatment, both the patient and the doctor will 
be confronted with some uncertainty about the effectiveness of the proposed treatment – 
the patient because s/he does not possess the required professional knowledge; the doctor 
because s/he has limited knowledge of the patient’s body and mind. Both service users and 
public service organizations (PSOs) have to bear with ‘cognitive costs’ of decision-making 
because of their incapacity to retain, process and collect all relevant information (Ingram 
and Clay, 2000: 528).
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These cognitive costs are substantially higher for providing and receiving services than 
for producing and purchasing goods. This is because (1) the quality of services is less easily 
assessed because of their intangibility; (2) services cannot be produced in standard, homo-
geneous ways as products can; (3) and because with services, production and consumption 
cannot be separated, but this occurs during the interaction between the user and service staff 
(Parasuraman et al., 1985). Because of these features, the delivery of services is characterized 
by interdependence between the user and the service provider. An effective service depends on 
synergy between the actions of the user as well as those of the provider (Ostrom, 1996). This 
interdependence constitutes the main source of uncertainty for both parties.
Both individuals and organizations are likely to benefit from reducing uncertainty. 
Uncertainty at the individual level has been related to all sorts of aversive outcomes (e.g. Sor-
rentino and Roney, 1986) as it leads to a sense of reduced control over one’s life (Hogg, 2000). 
Personal control, on the other hand, has been associated with, inter alia, stress reduction, 
sense of ownership and responsibility (Deci et al., 1999; Mills and Krantz, 1979). For orga-
nizations, lack of control and uncertainty may lead to less satisfied employees (Greenberger 
et al., 1989), but also to sub-optimal decision-making (Simon, 1979).
Uncertainty can be reduced by increasing the predictability of behaviour, for instance, 
by simplifying processes through established routines, rules, and habits. When services are 
relatively simple and require little personal interaction, simplification can be a useful strat-
egy. Renewing a passport can be done easily because clear procedures and rules can prescribe 
the expected behaviour of both the citizen and the municipal worker. However, when the 
environment becomes more complex and less predictable, more active strategies may be 
needed to reduce uncertainty (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Such complexity is inherent 
to enduring social services, such as education, health care, and social housing. Here, the 
problems and their solutions are often defined less clearly, the preferences of users are more 
diverse, and the range of potential service providers and/or particular services is more varied. 
A health issue is obviously more complex than renewing a passport; residential care is more 
intricate than putting your garbage at the curb side.
The types of uncertainties that come along with this interdependence and complexity 
differ between users on the one hand and PSOs on the other hand. The specific strategies 
that might be used to cope with these uncertainties might also differ therefore.
For users, uncertainty predominantly relates to service outcomes. Gaining more influence 
over the way the outcome is reached can reduce feelings of uncertainty. Hirschman (1970) 
distinguished two mechanisms to influence service delivery: through the use of voice and 
exit. Co-production can be added to this model as an alternative way to perceive some kind 
of control over the service outcome.
With regards to organizations, there are two ways of looking at uncertainty, one based 
on a contingency theory, and the other on institutional theory. In the first view, uncertainty 
is a technical problem, which hinders the production of outputs. Uncertainty is then the 
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‘critical contingency’ with which organizations have to deal with in order to be effective 
(Katz and Kahn, 1978; Thompson, 1967). Lack of information about technology and 
uncertainty about financial support are typical forms of organizational uncertainty (Argote, 
1982; Hasenfeld, 1983). Important is the notion that when users become co-producers of 
services, they become also a source of uncertainty. Within contingency theory, this is known 
as input uncertainty (Larsson and Bowen, 1989). Using this concept, we are able to discuss 
organizational strategies that deal with such input uncertainty.
What we will argue, is that the choice for these specific strategies to cope with uncertainty 
depends on the institutional context. Institutional theory gives important input to this state-
ment. Institutional theory also takes coping with uncertainty as a starting point, although 
here, it entails uncertainty about the legitimacy of organizations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Yet, before addressing the organizational and institutional context, the strategies to reduce 
uncertainty for individual users are described first.
Uncertainty reduction by users: beyond exit and voice
The importance of uncertainty reduction for users
There are different strategies for users to influence the way public services are provided. At a 
fundamental level, being knowledgeable about several aspects of services may reduce uncer-
tainty (Averill, 1973). Being well informed helps to understand service characteristics and 
procedures and contributes to a sense of control. However, available information may not 
always be complete, or inadequate. Some users are more capable of understanding complex 
information about possible choices, or are better in finding the channels to express their 
concerns, than others. This tends to be socially stratified, where the lower class is worse-off 
(Taylor-Gooby, 1999). Information is thus insufficient to decrease uncertainty. Hirschman’s 
(1970) well-known mechanisms of exit and voice might provide some alternatives then. Exit, 
however, will not always reduce uncertainty, as it is not given that the desired outcome 
will be reached with another provider. Also, alternatives are not always present, or high 
transaction costs are involved. Voice only reduces uncertainty when the organization is able 
to modify its current service provision, and often, this will take time (Hirschman, 1970: 
33). In general, it seems to be very hard for users to notice the effectivity of being consulted, 
involved or engaged (Simmons et al., 2012).
Important is the notion that exit, choice, voice and knowledge only provide indirect influ-
ence over the service outcome. Within each strategy, the user is, theoretically, placed outside 
the service provision; in other words, there is a clear demarcation between consumption of 
the service and production of the service. Within the service dominant approach however, 
this logic is strongly contested (e.g. Osborne et al., 2013). We now turn towards this ap-
proach, which leads to co-production as an alternative way of reducing outcome uncertainty.
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Co-production: an alternative logic
Osborne et al. (2013) states that consumers are too often conceived as passive users during 
the production processes. This is a fundamental problem as the logic of producing and 
consuming differs. In other words, if the production and consuming phase cannot be re-
garded as separate, consumers need to be able to say something or be informed about the 
production and the consumption. Otherwise they will only gain partial control over the 
service outcome. Getting control over the consumption of services implies that clients are 
able to shape the service directly through their actions during the interaction with service 
professionals, which is in fact co-production. Such behavioural control directly influences 
or modify the characteristics of the service (Averill, 1973: 287), and might even be able to 
prevent organizations from delivering poor quality.
Co-production is not a steady state, but rather a continuum (Osborne and Strokosch, 
2013). At a basic level, co-production is inherent to the logic of service provision (Osborne 
and Strokosch, 2013). Every service experience is shaped and defined by the behaviour and 
perceptions of users. Service organizations can only ‘promise’ a certain process or experience 
– the actual service delivery is a result of the collision between users’ expectations and their 
experience. Yet, some services require more intense levels of co-production, and others less. 
Organizations may also be able to provide room for more or less client participation. Thus, 
co-production can be understood as an arrangement to which both clients and PSOs actively 
contribute a mix of activities at the point of delivery of public services (Fledderus, Brandsen, et 
al., 2014). Please note that this narrow definition excludes forms of collaboration between, 
for instance, non-profit organizations and government, and it also leaves out forms of user 
involvement in other stages of service delivery, such as design or prioritization (Bovaird, 
2007).
Important to stress is that co-production goes ‘beyond’ traditional forms of voice 
(Dunston et al., 2009). Traditionally, ‘giving users a say’ in enduring social services means 
the constitution of a representative body, where a small sample of users communicates 
complaints and/or suggestions within formal arrangements. Here, users do not bear any 
responsibility in the actual service delivery. During co-production, users become (sometimes 
literally) ‘partial’ employees (Kelley et al., 1990). They do not only supply ideas to the service 
creation, but also behaviour, time, and other resources, taking over a portion of the service 
delivery functions (Hsieh et al., 2004). Thus, co-production might be described as the most 
direct way of influencing public services and their outcomes.
However, there are also barriers for undertaking co-production. The more demanding the 
act of co-production, the more resources of the user are required, in terms of time, physical 
work or money (Jakobsen, 2013). Users would not only have to be able to contribute these 
resources, they also have to be motivated to do so (Alford, 2009a). Moreover, recent research 
has shown that self-efficacy, i.e. the belief citizens can make a difference, is an important 
determinant of co-productive efforts, especially of collective co-production (Bovaird et al., 
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2015; Parrado et al., 2013). As ability, willingness and self-efficacy might be lacking amongst 
the most vulnerable group of users, co-production could lead to marginalization (Fledderus 
and Honingh, forthcoming). Importantly, when users are required to co-produce, but they 
are unable or unwilling, this will unlikely lead to the expected perception of influence that is 
supposed to decrease feelings of uncertainty.
Another barrier arises when co-production represents a collective act. Here, groups of 
users participate and cooperate in the delivery of public services. Because cooperation is 
the precondition for successful collective co-production, trust within the group becomes an 
important factor (Fledderus and Honingh, forthcoming). There are several possibilities for 
this trust to arise. When users are known to each other, the building of trust is easier than 
when they are relative strangers. Residents who unite and co-produce neighbourhood safety 
within community policing are likely to know each other, or have some sense of common 
interest as they live in the same area. However, when such linkages do not exist, there should 
be other factors than group identification that facilitate trust. Strangers are less likely to trust 
each other because they have no information about each other’s intentions. When there are 
doubts whether other users are motivated to co-produce, and when there is indeed a chance 
that people deflect from their duty to provide efforts in the service delivery, the collective co-
production process is negatively affected (Pestoff, 2014). The perception that others might 
contribute fewer efforts in the co-production than you are contributing increases feelings 
of outcome uncertainty. Hence, features that assure that free-riding is impossible, costly, or 
strongly discouraged, will decrease uncertainty about the behaviour of others, and therefore 
uncertainty about the expected outcome.
Table 1 shows the different strategies that users could use to cope with outcome uncertainty. 
We have argued that co-production differs from other uncertainty reducing mechanisms be-
cause it provides the possibility for users to directly influence service outcomes. Nevertheless, 
as co-production by definition involves at least two parties, it remains impossible for users to 
gain complete control over the service outcome by acting as a co-producer. PSOs remain to 
play an important role in the service delivery process. An important question is then: what 
is the impact of co-production for organizational uncertainty?
It could be argued that when users become integrated into the service process, service 
staff becomes more familiar with the preferences, attitudes, and behaviour of their clients. 
This increases the predictability of the actions of users, which would decrease uncertainty. 
However, such integration will not take place from one moment to another. This will require 
an enduring relationship between user and service provider, effective communication, and 
mutual understanding (Fledderus, Brandsen, et al., 2014). Before such a relationship is built, 
it remains unknown for PSO how users will behave when they are involved as co-producers. 
Hence, users may benefit from co-production by reducing some uncertainty over the service 
outcome, but it remains the question whether organizations are eager to include users in 
service delivery.
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To better understand the implication of engaging users as co-producers in service delivery 
for PSOs, we need a theory that describes how organizations respond to external influ-
ences. A logical starting-point is contingency theory, which primarily deals with external 
factors (‘contingencies’) that moderate the effect of specific organizational characteristics on 
organizational effectiveness (Donaldson, 2001). Uncertainty is regarded as one of the most 
important contingencies organizations are faced with. Therefore the theory is eminently 
suitable for the analysis of how organizations respond to the uncertainties inherent to co-
production. In the next section, we will give a brief introduction to contingency theory and 
on that basis identify specific strategies that organizations employ to reduce uncertainties.
Contingency theory, uncertainty and co-production
Contingency theory was formulated in the 1960s and extended years after (Argote, 1982; 
Thompson, 1967). The core element of contingency theory is instrumental rationality (while 
Table 1. Different strategies of users to cope with uncertainty
Strategy Description Intended effect Barriers for users
Knowledge Gaining knowledge 
about service process and 
outcomes
User is better prepared 
for service process and 
potential outcomes
User is dependent on 
information given 
by PSO; processing 
complex information 
might be difficult
Exit/choice Leaving the PSO for 
another / choosing a 
PSO, a service within a 
PSO or directions within 
a service
PSO that suffers from 
exit will try to improve, 
alternative may lead to 
successful service; user 
is able to choose the 
service that fits his/her 
preferences best
Uncertainty about 
alternative options; 
exit might be costly or 
no choice is available; 
information that is 
needed to make a good 
choice is often lacking
Voice Communicating 
preferences or 
dissatisfaction through 
formal or informal 
channels
PSO alters the service 
according to user’s 
wishes
Requires communicative 
skills; organization needs 
to be responsive
Co-production Participation in the 
service delivery process
Direct influence of users’ 
behaviour on service 
outcome
Requires the ability and 
motivation of users to 
co-produce; collective 
co-production requires 
cooperation among users
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recognizing the limits of this rationality) and follows a logic of consequences: it assumes 
that ‘organizations analyse their technical environment and plan appropriate strategies in 
anticipation of beneficial consequences’ (Entwistle, 2011: 661). When organizations take 
their specific context into consideration, which includes internal and external contingencies 
(such as task uncertainty and size), they will be able to adapt their coordination by designing 
specific standards and procedures. Contingency theory attempts to answer the question: 
which type of practice works best in a particular situation (Gupta et al., 1994)? So, for 
instance, within an environment of high task uncertainty (referring to the variability and 
difficulty of work methods) organic structures (flexibility, joint responsibilities, employee 
discretion) are believed to perform best, whereas mechanistic structures (hierarchical, cen-
tralized decision-making, little discretion) are thought to fit low task uncertainty environ-
ments better (Donaldson, 2001: 121).
Thompson (1967) tries to bridge the conflict between the ‘closed systems’ and ‘open 
systems’ approaches to organizations. Closed systems models do not account for external 
influences, whereas open systems models neglect the more controllable factors. Thompson 
tries to integrate the two views, perceiving complex organizations ‘as open systems, hence in-
determinate and faced with uncertainty, but at the same time subject to criteria of rationality, 
and hence needing determinateness and certainty’ (Thompson, 1967: 10). He further notes 
that a closed systems approach may well be applied to technical functions of the organiza-
tion, whereas an open systems approach suits the broader institutional environment. To be 
able to retain the ‘technical core’ as a closed system as much as possible, organizations would 
try to ‘seal off’ the technical core from environmental influences (Thompson, 1967: 19). 
These influences create uncertainties, which may hinder the ‘technical rationality’, i.e. the 
achievement of desired outcomes against a minimum of costs.
Chase and Tansik (1983) argue that the involvement of users in the service process are a 
source of uncertainty for organizations. Thus, following Thompson, they argue that the less 
contact users have with the service provision, the higher the efficiency of that service will be. 
This would mean that, in general, involving users as co-producers is unattractive for organi-
zations, and should be discouraged in favour of efficiency. Rather, client behaviour should be 
as little variable as possible – the less autonomous clients can act, the more predictable their 
behaviour will be (Blau and Scott, 1962).
Thompson (1967) argues that the overall ‘organizational rationality’ is not restricted to its 
technological rationality. Organizational rationality also involves the input and the output 
activities surrounding the core technological activities. Because input, output, and technol-
ogy are interdependent, it becomes impossible to completely ‘seal off’ the technological core. 
Argote (1982) therefore regards service users as the inevitable, but main source of uncer-
tainty for organizations. Within PSOs, this input uncertainty already starts at informing the 
professional (e.g. a welfare worker) about his/her problems, needs and capacities (Llewellyn 
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and Saunders, 1998). In other words, by minimizing the co-productive efforts of users, 
PSOs may actually decrease the quality of their services.
This leads to the conclusion that the attitude of PSOs towards co-production may be 
ambiguous: on the one hand, it increases uncertainty, on the other hand, PSOs are to a large 
extent unable to exclude users from their technical core (Thompson, 1967), and moreover, 
their involvement might be necessary for the quality and effectiveness of the service (Mills et 
al., 1983). Thus, the challenge for organizations becomes then how to manage user input and 
the uncertainty that is inevitably attached to it. In order to distinguish different responses 
of organizations to uncertainty, we will draw on the framework proposed by Brown and 
Osborne (2012). They argue that organizations can adopt either more closed or more open 
systems approaches. In the next section, we will elaborate on these two ways of responding 
to uncertainty.
Organizational responses to input uncertainty
Organizational responses to uncertainty with respect to co-production can be based on a 
variety of more closed or more open systems models. A closed systems approach tries to 
minimize risk and uncertainty – which are interpreted as negative conditions – as much as 
possible. Uncertainty is regarded as an internal problem that can be managed by changing 
processes within the organization (Brown and Osborne, 2012). Brown and Osborne (2012: 
196) argue, however, that more complex service arrangements require ‘an open systems ap-
proach that acknowledges the fragmentation of both the knowledge base and the task, as 
well as the need for iterative interaction across a range of partners for successful implementa-
tion’. Such an approach focuses on the involvement of the most important stakeholders of 
a service. This will be explained in more detail after a description of more closed systems 
approaches, which include selection of users, the use of motivators, and professionalization.
Closed systems approaches to input uncertainty
Input uncertainty depends on two factors: the diversity of user demand and the tendency of 
users to participate in the performance of the service (Larsson and Bowen, 1989). On the 
one hand, organizations face uncertainty about the exact problems and the diversity of those 
problems as perceived by users. On the other hand, uncertainty exists because it is unknown 
whether or why the user wants to be involved in the service process. For instance, they 
could be willing because they are intrinsically motivated to co-produce, i.e. they enjoy their 
personal involvement. Alternatively, they could feel their active involvement is necessary 
to guarantee quality. Not knowing the actual motivations of users could have detrimental 
consequences. A teacher could assume that students recognize that they should participate 
actively in class and that they enjoy their engagement in discussions. When, however, the 
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students are passive and uninterested, the quality of the class will probably be low (Porter, 
2012). A co-produced neighbourhood safety project in a Dutch municipality failed partially 
because some of the volunteers that were supposed to keep watch in the area were more busy 
with acting as a police officer than with giving residents a safe feeling (Fledderus, Broersma, 
et al., 2014). The motivations of the participants were not adequately understood.
Following Larsson and Bowen (1989), organizations could focus on altering the diversity 
of user demand on the one hand, and on changing the tendency of users to co-produce on 
the other hand. What does this mean practically?
Organizations could employ a selection procedure for the clients who they serve, control-
ling the variability of user demand (Katz and Kahn, 1978: 130). Selection could take place 
through eligibility criteria (selecting only those with particular capacities), or by providing 
information selectively (for instance, by inviting particular users to participate). The risk 
from selection is that only the clients that are the easiest to serve are involved – a practice that 
has been called ‘creaming’ or market segmentation (Fountain, 2001). As a consequence, this 
could result in a selection of advantaged clients, and marginalizing those who are actually 
alienated from public institutions (Fledderus and Honingh, forthcoming).
In order to influence the tendency of users to co-produce, so-called motivators could be 
used: incentives for users to engage in service production (Alford, 2009a). These could take 
shape in the form of financial rewards, punishment in the case of deterrence, but also in the 
form of non-material rewards, such as social recognition or group identity. The effectiveness 
of these motivators then depends on the characteristics of the users and the type of co-
produced activity. For instance, time-consuming and complex activities are less likely to be 
encouraged through monetary rewards than easy, ad-hoc actions (Alford, 2009a).
In this reading, selection and motivators are used to curb high levels of user involve-
ment. Although these mechanisms might result in excluding less-advantaged users (who 
would benefit the most from higher quality services), they could have positive effects at 
the wider system level. For instance, there could be clear reasons to involve a particular 
group of residents in a neighbourhood watch programme. As volunteers might be exposed to 
confrontations with suspects, selection on certain criteria might be necessary. It is likely and 
understandable that those who are responsible for selecting participants (e.g. police officers, 
public officials) will pick out willing, intrinsically motivated and cooperative citizens to join 
the neighbourhood watch (considering they might be confronted with violence). Likewise, 
in the case of health care, it is not unlikely that a doctor will refrain from giving a patient 
the room to get involved in the treatment, if he or she thinks this patient lacks particular 
skills (e.g. because of mental disabilities). In these cases, selection might actually improve 
the outcome (safety, health) for disadvantaged individuals too. Furthermore, selection might 
be crucial for collective forms of co-production. As mentioned, the success of collective 
co-production is dependent on the willingness of users to cooperate. In order to increase the 
likeliness of this cooperation to happen, organizations could use ‘recruitment and selection 
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processes designed to bring into the system individuals whose values are congruent with 
those of current organizational members’ (Robertson and Tang, 1995: 71). Yet, this may 
lead to a biased composition of users. For instance, parental cooperatives in Sweden attract 
mainly highly educated parents with a concern about the quality of child care (Vamstad, 
2012). Although such a selection might have positive outcomes for the people involved in 
co-production, it could also lead to rather closed communities and the exclusion of other 
citizens (Brandsen and Helderman, 2012).
Finally, professionalism within public service delivery can serve as a way of decreasing 
uncertainty that comes along with co-production. Through specific, expert knowledge 
professionals are more easily able to recognize the problems and needs of users. The role 
of service users is to then to trust the advice of experts, to accept hierarchy, and to comply 
with the directions given by the professionals (Ewert and Evers, 2014). Indeed, Vamstad 
(2012: 1177) argues that as a consequence of the professionalization of the Swedish public 
sector, less room was left for volunteering amateurs, because the ‘superior knowledge’ of 
professionals would provide the highest service quality. In Dutch school boards the number 
of parent board members decreased over the last couple of years due to policy initiatives to 
professionalize boards (Honingh and Hooge, 2012). Hence, within a closed systems ap-
proach the knowledge of professionals can be classified as ‘mystical’, limiting the access of 
users to public services (Brandsen and Honingh, 2013). Involving users would only be risky, 
as they are uneducated and unskilled to take part in the delivery process (Vamstad, 2012; 
Whitaker, 1980). Only when they feel that users are capable enough, professionals may 
decide to allow them to take over some tasks. Professionals are then responsible for ‘match-
ing’ the capabilities of users to the many intermediate levels and types of contributions by 
users that are possible. For instance, some jobseekers may be left free in starting up their own 
social enterprise, whereas for others following a job application course might be already a 
huge contribution.
However, professionals may take upon a different role when a different approach is fol-
lowed. In an open systems approach, it is understood that the knowledge of professionals is 
not mystical, but that it is more dispersed. Thus, in order to upkeep legitimacy, they need 
to engage users more actively in the provided service (Brandsen and Honingh, 2013). This 
may demand a more open systems approach to uncertainty. What this exactly entails will be 
described in the next section.
Open systems approaches to uncertainty
As mentioned above, closed systems approaches to uncertainty seek to decrease uncertainty 
and risks as much as possible. Morgan (2000: 17) mentions that such traditional responses 
to risk and uncertainty, which are negative and restrictive, ‘only serve to confirm users’ suspi-
cions, and increase their distance from professionals and thus the chance of risks occurring.’ 
They put too much emphasis on the negative side of risks (while certain organizational 
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risks could be beneficial for users) and on professional knowledge about risks (as users can 
interpret these risks completely differently) (Brown and Osborne, 2012). Therefore, ‘posi-
tive’ risk-taking must be preferred, which refers to involving ‘collaborative working, based 
on the establishment of trusting working relationships, whereby service users can learn from 
their mistakes based on taking chances, just like anyone else’ (Morgan, 2000: 17).
Such an open systems approach has eye for the potential benefits of risk-taking, and 
focuses on the involvement of important stakeholders of the service. With respect to co-
production, users can be regarded to be the most important stakeholders. An open systems 
approach entails then that users should be involved in a dialogue about how they perceive 
risks they take when co-producing; what level of risk the PSO as well as the users are prepared 
to take; and for what price (costs versus benefits) they are willing to take risks (Brown and 
Osborne, 2012). This means transparent and inclusive management of uncertainty, allowing 
a plurality of voices to discuss and negotiate which and how risks are to be taken.
In particular, such a transparent, negotiated style of uncertainty management may be 
preferred when new needs are addressed, or when there are contested views about needs 
and risks. In the Netherlands, for example, there are a few parental child care cooperatives. 
However, national regulations restrict such co-produced child care initiatives: they cannot 
fulfil the ‘three face criteria’, which states that children are not allowed to see more than three 
caretakers at the facility. Here, parents and government disagree about the need for and the 
risk involved with co-production. Brown and Osborne (2012) argue that in such a case, two 
important stages need to be followed. First, it requires the establishment of ‘a collaborative 
process that can enable negotiation to take place with the broad range of stakeholders, to reach 
a shared understanding of acceptable levels of risk, including acknowledging and attempting 
to resolve contested views’ (Brown and Osborne, 2012: 202). This implies that co-production 
should not be restricted to the delivery phase, but also to prior phases, such as consultation 
and decision-making (Bovaird, 2007). After this stage, accountability needs to be build into 
the process. Who is responsible for which risks? Some aspects are in control of the PSO. As 
said, users often remain dependent on the skills or resources of the PSO. Without adequate 
support and facilitation, leaving too many tasks to users will foster alienation from the public 
service. Users might then feel exploited and left alone by the PSO, which may result in lack of 
control and uncertainty. When the PSO is clear in what the PSO does to make co-production 
happen, users might also be more prepared to take responsibility for eventual risks.
To summarize, organizations are faced with uncertainty when users co-produce, and there 
are different approaches to manage this uncertainty (see Table 2). Closed systems approaches 
focus on internal organizational processes, such as selection mechanisms and incentive struc-
tures. Open systems approaches involve users in discussing risks and responsibilities that are 
related to co-production. The question that remains is when organizations opt for closed 
approaches to uncertainty, and when for open approaches. In the final part of the chapter, it 
is argued that this depends for a large part on the institutional environment.
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Institutional theory and uncertainty
As mentioned, uncertainty plays a central role in institutional theory too, albeit in a different 
form. Here, the argument is that uncertainty about stakeholder support leads organizations 
to respond to ‘overarching social forces such as norms, standards and expectations held 
by relevant stakeholders and common to all inhabitants of the organization field’ (Kraatz 
and Zajac, 1996: 821). This idea was supported by the finding that organizations within a 
particular field tend to become rather similar with regards to structure, goals and practices 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
Institutional theory explains that organizations that are dependent upon the government 
have the disposition to adopt a bureaucratic form of control, because this is the prescript 
within government: bureaucracy is the ‘taken-for-granted’ form of organization (Gupta et 
al., 1994). Hasenfeld and Powell (2004) show that English non-profit organizations, being 
involved in the delivery of reemployment services, adopted their original practices to the 
dominant institutional norms, rules and cognitive schema of the policy that was designed by 
government. They conclude that this downplayed the unique character of these non-profit 
organizations (such as providing individual-tailored services and innovation): for instance, 
they started using coercive (rather than participatory) instruments, and focused on per-
formance targets, rather than more broad goals such as empowerment. This turn from the 
original social purpose to an economic one is known as the problem of ‘mission drift’ (Rees, 
2014).
In the same vein as social forces may frustrate the work modes of non-profit organi-
zations, institutional pressures could lead to less involvement of users as co-producers. 
The hierarchical mode of governance that results from these pressures tends to focus on 
accountability through the measurement of outputs. This may distract organizations from 
values that may be important but difficult to measure, in particular those activities that are 
potentially delivered through user co-production at the input or throughput stage of the 
service delivery. Even though the critique on performance standards in terms of outputs is 
known, the practice is persistent (Aiken and Bode, 2009; Lodge and Gill, 2011). In the UK, 
Table 2. Organizational responses to uncertainty and co-production
Approach Description Strategies
Closed systems Emphasis on minimizing uncertainty
PSO staff determines levels and types of 
user contributions
Selection procedures
Use of motivators
Professionalism
Open systems Emphasis on the benefits of uncertainty
PSO staff and users negotiate levels and 
types of user contributions
Negotiation about risks between PSO 
staff and users
Discussing accountability with PSO 
staff and users
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there have been attempts to move to outcome evaluation, in particular in the case of micro-
commissioning. However, in a review, Williams et al. (2012: 84) note that commissioning is 
often still assessed in terms of activities and outputs, and it remains ‘unclear how outcomes 
are being incorporated into the procurement processes subsequent to commissioning deci-
sions’. Moreover, the focus on targets often decreases the discretion for both service profes-
sionals and users to act. For professionals, it leaves less room to give attention to specific 
personal problems, or to invest in personal relations with users (Bonvin, 2008). It therefore 
also decreases the possibility to negotiate and discuss about uncertainties of co-production, 
increasing the chance that closed systems approaches will be adopted.
For users, aspects of bureaucratic control such as standardization hinder the input of 
additional activities, which may be needed to improve the service, or which may even be 
intrinsically desired by users (Bettencourt, 1997; Larsson and Bowen, 1989). Moreover, 
fixed-term funding on the basis of over-specified contracts tends to undermine the long-
term trust between professional organizations and communities, disrupting the motivation 
and engagement of the latter to provide input in the service (Milbourne and Cushman, 
2013). Thus, as a result of institutional pressures, there may be less space, time, and resources 
for users to fulfil their co-producer role. When service organizations indeed are guided and 
controlled by norms, rules and ideas from their main stakeholder – (local or national) gov-
ernment – it could thus be expected that co-productive efforts are minimized.
This view assumes that government is the main stakeholder from which organizations 
gain their legitimacy. An alternative view is that users also express particular expectations 
and needs, which could, when not met by service organizations, reduce the legitimacy of 
those organizations severely. In fact, this is the argument when scholars refer to a ‘crisis of 
trust’ (Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrahi, 2014: 2) between citizens and government. In order to 
‘restore’ the assumed decrease of public trust, governments should focus on the governance, 
management and organization of their public services (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Van 
de Walle and Bouckaert, 2003). For instance, the market-type reforms at the end of last 
millennium (with the focus on ‘empowering’ instruments such as exit and choice) have been, 
according to some, proven to be insufficient to gain the support of citizens (see Van de Walle, 
2010). It is argued that these reforms have paid too less attention to the co-productive role 
of citizens (Osborne et al., 2013), and thus new modes of service delivery should focus on 
the involvement of users in the service process, possibly resulting in improved legitimacy 
of democratic governance (Pestoff, 2009). Hence, when citizens are perceived as the most 
important stakeholders, and their involvement is important for the legitimacy of service 
organizations, it could be expected that organizations will indeed provide structures for co-
production and more open systems approaches of uncertainty management.
Yet, this co-production could remain symbolic, rather than a true cooperation between 
users and professionals to improve the quality of the service. Royo et al. (2011) use institu-
tional theory to explain the need for governments to adopt citizen participation initiatives. 
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They would adopt them ‘as a symbol of responsiveness and good management, expecting 
them to be interpreted by citizens as improvements in transparency and accountability, but 
without necessarily incorporating citizens’ opinions in decision-making processes’ (Royo et 
al., 2011: 141–142). Such behaviour is known as ‘decoupling’, a separation between formal 
structure and actual activities (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The empirical analysis of Royo et 
al. (2011) also shows that citizen participation initiatives are encouraged by (German and 
Spanish) local governments predominantly because of coercive forces, and not because they 
are eager to actually use the views of citizens in their decision making. Legislative pressures 
appear to be stronger determinants of policy implementation than the perceptions of users.
Another way of organizations to symbolically embrace co-production is to use it in order 
to shift their own responsibility for reaching outputs or outcomes towards individual users 
or collectives. This is the main critique on programmes such as the Big Society in the UK, 
or the ‘participation society’ in the Netherlands: the emphasis on citizen participation and 
self-reliance is believed to be synonym for cutbacks, and not for any genuine change in 
policies. Viewed in this way, responsibilities are not negotiated according to an open systems 
approach, but rather imposed on citizens. Nevertheless, normative forces could sometimes 
lead to actual change in user behaviour. For instance, there has been a major shift in the 
field of social security, where a focus on rights and duties has been replaced with a notion of 
citizens as active and responsible human agents (Borghi and Van Berkel, 2007). The increase 
in active labour market policies, engaging citizens in their own reemployment, shows that 
normative changes could be combined with actual changes in policy, and in fact could foster 
co-production.
To summarize, institutional theory predicts that PSOs tend to adapt to governmental 
pressures, resulting in bureaucratic and output oriented practices. This leads to more closed 
systems approaches to dealing with uncertainty and co-production. High levels of co-pro-
duction and the additional benefits of co-production too, could therefore be thwarted. An 
alternative prediction is that organizations adapt to the desires of users, who want to become 
involved, although this might be symbolic, instead of real change of internal organization.
Conclusion
Our theoretical analysis shows that PSOs might be less compelled to pursue co-production 
than commonly thought. The involvement of users as co-producers implies an increase in 
uncertainty for PSOs. Whether co-production will be realized in the first place depends 
on the way PSOs react on the challenges that come with this uncertainty. The strategies 
employed by PSOs to cope with uncertainty, in turn, seem to be dependent on the institu-
tional environment of PSOs. Strategies that are designed to minimize uncertainty as much 
as possible may lead to the exclusion of particular groups of users. They can also frustrate 
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the possibility of users to have an influence in the service outcome. Ultimately, this lack of 
inclusion and influence perceived by users could lead to a decrease of trust in public service 
delivery and government (Fledderus, Brandsen, et al., 2014). Thus, in order to organize 
co-production in a way where both users and PSOs benefit, PSOs will have to accept certain 
uncertainties that come along with co-production.
This analysis has several implications for future research on co-production of public 
services. We will provide three suggestions, related to the initial stage, the process stage, and 
the outcome stage of service delivery (Fledderus, Brandsen, et al., 2014). With regards to 
the initial phase of service delivery, our analysis shows that the behaviour of organizations 
influences the extent to which citizens will be engaged in co-production. Therefore, research 
needs to take into account which and why users are not involved in co-production. The cause 
of exclusion may be found in organizational strategies to cope with co-production, but it 
may also be the result of a lack of self-efficacy or trust at the individual level.
At the process stage of service delivery, future co-production research should focus on 
the interaction between the motives and behaviour both at the user and the organizational 
side. Are users indeed able to influence the service process or does their participation remain 
‘symbolic’? Are professionals given the space to go discuss and negotiate the role of users in 
the service delivery? These questions automatically require an analysis of the institutional 
environment, including the pressures of important stakeholders, which might limit the abil-
ity of PSOs to deal with uncertainty.
Finally, at the outcome stage of service delivery, it would be interesting to investigate how 
users respond to disappointing outcomes. If users feel that any risk related to co-production 
is a responsibility of the PSO, disappointing outcomes will likely result in low levels of 
satisfaction (Fledderus, 2015a). However, when there are clear agreements on accountability 
issues (e.g. in an open systems approach), one would expect that co-producing users may 
also be prepared to take some responsibility for negative outcomes. As a result, users might 
be less pessimistic in their evaluation of the service.
Verschuere et al. (2012: 1096–1097) have argued that ‘for systematic advancement, it will 
be necessary to link the study of co-production more explicitly to general theories widely 
accepted in the social sciences’. By the use of well-established theories, our analysis has con-
tributed to the improvement of our knowledge on co-production of public service delivery. 
Most importantly, we have shown that the realization of co-production may encounter 
serious organizational and institutional resistance.
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Abstract
Activation services that aim at reemployment of jobseekers often suffer from ‘creaming’, i.e. 
selecting those who have the best qualifications to re-enter the labour market. New ways of 
delivery, such as co-production, are supposed to be less subject to selection mechanisms. To 
analyse whether co-produced activation programmes suffer from selection biases, partici-
pants of a local innovative activation programme (n=60) were compared to non-participants 
(n=18). Participants are more motivated in general and showed higher levels of generalized, 
municipal and interpersonal trust. Moreover, high general motivation relates to high levels 
of trust and perceived control. This indicates there is indeed a selection bias within co-
produced activation programmes. Therefore, it remains uncertain whether co-production is 
more successful in dealing with creaming than common types of service delivery.
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Introduction
These days, users of public services are invited to get actively involved in the delivery of 
public services. This notion of co-production emphasizes partnership and collaboration 
and is considered to be a promising concept in providing services of better quality and in 
increasing service satisfaction and public trust (Verschuere et al., 2012). It is often regarded 
as a solution to at least some of the problems related to ‘traditional’ Public Administration, 
where clients are passive and loyal to the service provider, and to New Public Management 
(NPM), where clients are a consumer within a marketized arena, ideally having the ability 
to choose between providers, but where they are not actively involved in the service delivery 
(Fledderus, Brandsen, et al., 2014; Torfing and Triantafillou, 2013).
Also within the provision of activation policies, which aim to get welfare recipients back 
into the labour market, there is an emergent ‘New Public Governance’ (NPG) framework, 
‘characterized by a broader range of delivery actors, diverse processes of service delivery, and 
a greater emphasis on co-producing services in collaboration with end users’ (Lindsay et al., 
2014: 4). Over the past decades, however, the delivery of activation services in many Euro-
pean countries has been inspired by NPM. One of the problems of competition between 
private providers of such services was ‘creaming’, i.e. selecting those who have already good 
qualifications in order to retain high success rates (Bruttel, 2005: 401–402). The question is: 
does the problem of selection disappear when activation services are based on co-production?
Two types of selection might occur. Creaming is a form of organizational selection, which 
might be stimulated not only by competition, but also by performance management. The 
second type of selection relates to the role of the jobseeker. Some welfare recipients do not 
want or are not able to enter activation programmes for different reasons and will therefore 
try to avoid getting involved. For instance, low trust in public institutions, low self-esteem, 
disappointing previous experiences with services or poor (mental) health might hold people 
back from participating.
Activation programmes provide an interesting case of co-production since they often 
entail a mandatory element, whereas normally, co-production is considered to be a voluntary 
act (Brudney and England, 1983). By the use of (the threat of ) sanctions clients are com-
pelled to collaborate and take up particular activities. Those who are unmotivated and have 
low self-esteem and low levels of trust might actually be reached when sanctions are used. 
This leads to a supplementary question: does the use of compulsion have an effect on the 
(possible) selection biases within activation programmes?
A recently introduced activation policy in the municipality of Nijmegen, the Nether-
lands, will be used as a case. This policy allows organizations, so-called ‘work corporations’ 
(werkcorporaties), to offer work-learning programmes to social assistance recipients. They 
could be understood as a specific type of ‘Work Integration Social Enterprises’ (WISEs) 
(Davister et al., 2004). In the next section, we will first briefly introduce activation services 
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and co-production. Moving on from there, self-selection and organizational selection will be 
explained. Then, the case, methods and sample are described. The results of a comparative 
survey study are presented in turn, and the paper concludes with the implications of the 
findings.
Policy background
Activation services are expected to promote ‘the (more or less obligatory) participation of 
people dependent on unemployment benefits or social assistance in work’ (Van Berkel and 
Borghi, 2008: 332). Activation programmes could help to minimize the marginalizing ef-
fects of unemployment – such as a decline in social contacts, well-being, agency, perceived 
control and trust (Andersen, 2008; Fryer, 1997; McKee-Ryan et al., 2005). In the field of 
activation policies, there is increasingly room for interagency cooperation, the involvement 
of third sectors and social innovation (Van Berkel and De Graaf, 2011). Municipalities more 
often cooperate with non-profit and/or voluntary organizations, a trend that can be wit-
nessed in other countries too, such as the UK (Lindsay et al., 2008) and Denmark (Lindsay 
and McQuaid, 2009). These collaborative partnerships are believed to be less focused on 
competition, and are supposed to emphasize the role of users as co-producer.
Let us clarify what we mean by co-production of activation services. There are at least 
two interpretations of co-production (Porter, 2012). The first is that there are services which 
cannot be effectively produced without some involvement of the user. Education and activa-
tion services are examples of such inherent, inescapable co-production (Alford, 2009a). In 
the second usage, user input is added to enhance qualities and quantities of a public service. 
In this paper, we acknowledge the first interpretation of the concept of co-production, but 
we will use the second as our definition: although activation will never work without some 
involvement from users, there are different ways to deliver such services. According to our 
view, there is co-production when users are actively engaged in the delivery of the activation 
service. In WISEs, such active participation is required because users need to cover the ex-
penses for their own reemployment through productive activities. Through these activities, 
they generate income, which is used to deliver the activation service. In this sense, users 
become co-producers of their own service.
The involvement of non-profit organizations on the one hand and engaging users as 
co-producers in the delivery of activation services on the other hand have both been related 
to democratization and inclusion, often by contrasting them with market solutions (Pestoff, 
2009). The question is, however, whether activation programmes in which users co-produce 
are indeed better able to reach social inclusion. Two selection mechanisms might still be 
in place: self-selection and organizational selection. In the following section, the concepts 
needed to understand these mechanisms are introduced.
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Theoretical background
Self-selection
Not everybody is eager to join activation programmes – especially when they entail much 
effort and devotion, as might be the case when users are considered as co-producers. There 
could be clear circumstances which restrict a person’s participation, for instance when 
someone’s health is poor or when a sick child needs to be taken care of. Such factors relate 
to people’s capabilities and resources. However, there are also other factors which could 
determine participation, such as motivation, trust and perceived control (consisting of self-
esteem, self-efficacy and internal control), which will be described below.
Motivations
Motivation to co-produce can be extrinsic or intrinsic. If motivations are based on the 
expectation of material rewards or punishments from an external party (such as cutting 
one’s benefit), one needs to speak of extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation refers to the 
idea that somebody participates in certain activities because he or she finds the activities 
themselves interesting, worthwhile and enjoyable (Deci, 1972).
Next to intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, sociality might also be a motivation to get 
involved. This refers to the pleasure of associating with others: ‘people may contribute even if 
it disadvantages them financially, because they enjoy the company, fellowship and esteem of 
others’ (Alford, 2009a: 27). Especially for people without a job, gaining social contacts could 
be an important driver. Finally, people may participate out of normative considerations, 
which may also conflict with material self-interest. Alford (2009a) gives the example of a 
rich person supporting progressive taxation out of a sense of fairness. Similarly, when people 
receive welfare benefits, they might find it appropriate to do something in return for this 
allowance.
Whereas extrinsic motivations are often found in simpler, transactional services, more 
complex or relational services require in addition intrinsic motivation. Since co-produced 
activation programmes consist of enduring and demanding activities, it is likely that a selec-
tion occurs on the part of the welfare recipients. Those who are only motivated by rewards 
(or sanctions), and not by their urge for a new job, will not enter these programmes as readily 
as those who are eager to become employable.
Trust and perceived control
Trust is recognized as one of the key conditions for collaboration (Yamagishi and Cook, 
1993). People with low levels of trust in (local) government and/or the service provider, will 
probably be less convinced by the benefits of the programme than individuals who have high 
levels of trust. This relates to the perception of external efficacy: ‘is the service able to help 
me?’ (Calzada and Pino, 2008). Moreover, when the programme involves working together 
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with a group of participants, having trust in fellow citizens (generalized trust) may also be 
an important precondition.
Furthermore, perceiving control over one’s life will increase the chance of participation. 
Being happy about yourself (self-esteem), thinking that your actions (like joining an activa-
tion programme) have positive consequences (self-efficacy) and thinking that reemployment 
is the result of hard work rather than luck (internal control) all contribute to this feeling 
of perceived control (Skinner, 1995). The expectation of success greatly determines the 
likelihood of conducting particular behaviour (Feather, 1992). Therefore, people who feel 
incapable of changing their situation will be less inclined to search for a job, and therefore 
will show little job-searching behaviour (Taris, 2002). Or, to put it another way: because 
people with a high sense of control tend to select challenging tasks (Bandura, 1989), they 
are more likely to get involved in activation programmes.
Hence, activation programmes are likely to suffer from self-selection. However, it is 
conceivable that organizational selection plays a role too.
Organizational selection
Creaming refers to the practice of selecting the most qualified candidates for participation 
in order to increase programme success (Van Berkel, 2010: 30). This includes selecting on 
so-called ‘hard’ characteristics, such as educational background, language proficiency and 
work experience, but it could also involve ‘soft’ characteristics, such as social skills, appear-
ance and motivation. It is thought that creaming is especially a risk when contracting out 
services to private companies (Van Berkel and Van der Aa, 2005). The process underlying 
this phenomenon could be described as market segmentation. Firms identify what the main 
demographic and psychographic characteristics of potential clients are and differentiate accord-
ing to customer segments (Fountain, 2001: 13). Creaming is believed to be stimulated when 
fierce accountability measures are in place. The effective spending of resources on activation 
services is increasingly managed by the use of performance targets (Van Berkel, 2010). Thus, 
activation services are often evaluated on the basis of their capacity to increase labour market 
participation. A lack of effectiveness will result in a weak position in tendering. Hence, to 
reduce this uncertainty, organizations could try to influence the composition of their clientele. 
Market segmentation and a focus on output lead to a propensity to help the clients easiest to 
serve, which could bring about a selection of individuals with not only greater capabilities and 
resources, but also ‘soft’ characteristics such as motivation, trust and perceived control.
 Scholars suggest that network governance will make creaming less of an issue (Van Berkel, 
2010: 30). This assumption seems to relate to the inclusion of non-profit organizations in 
the delivery of activation services. These organizations are expected to be less occupied with 
individualistic behaviour, competition and outputs, and more with human development 
and holistic approaches to social integration (Lindsay et al., 2014). What is neglected, 
however, is that network governance often demands more from service users. The more 
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organizations depend on the efforts of their clients – which are difficult to control – the more 
motivation becomes important. Moreover, in practice, performance indicators and targets 
are nowadays widely used for monitoring the output of local service providers – not only 
within marketized arenas (Van Berkel, 2010). Consequently, within network governance 
too, selection could occur.
Coercive measures, however, seems to counteract creaming. Activation programmes often 
include mandatory elements (Dingeldey, 2007). Using coercion implies that everybody 
should do their best to become job-ready, and there are few (or no) excuses. People who do 
not participate in work-first programmes or work-learn activities are considered ‘unwilling’, 
and should therefore have no right on privileges such as benefits. There are several reasons 
to make use of (the threat of ) sanctioning. It can be used as a gate-keeping function when 
workload is high (Lipsky, 1980). Sanctions can also be employed to make clients comply 
with the rules and to collaborate, and to ‘control’ the motivation of clients (Thorén, 2005). 
In this latter way, the use of force and obligation might actually help to reach those people 
who have little motivation, low trust and low perceived control. Hence, there could be a link 
between being motivated because of the threat of sanctions and/or because somebody told 
you to do so, and general motivation, trust and perceived control.
To summarize, self-selection and organizational selection potentially play a role within 
co-production. As a consequence, the participants of activation programmes could be those 
citizens who have sufficient capabilities and resources, who are already highly motivated, and 
who have high levels of trust and perceived control. Using force might involve those who are 
not motivated and have both low levels of trust and little perceived control.
Figure 1 illustrates four possible variables which could be related to organizational and 
self-selection. In order to investigate the model, a particular activation programme in a 
Dutch municipality is used as a case study, which suits an analysis of selection biases in the 
four concepts, but also illustrates the relation between extrinsic motivation, general motiva-
tion, trust and perceived control.
Figure 1. Selection mechanisms
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Case: work corporations
In the summer of 2011, several work corporations started operating in the municipality of 
Nijmegen, a middle-sized city in the Netherlands (see Fledderus, Broersma, et al., 2014). 
These work corporations aim at reemploying social assistance recipients at a considerable 
distance from the labour market by offering work, guidance and education. They can be 
best understood as a specific type of WISEs (Davister et al., 2004). Davister et al. (2004: 3) 
define WISEs as ‘autonomous economic entities whose main objective is the professional 
integration – within the WISE itself or in mainstream enterprises – of people experiencing 
serious difficulties in the labour market. This integration is achieved through productive 
activity and tailored follow-up, or through training to qualify the workers.’ Across Europe, 
more than 50 types of WISE have been identified (Nyssens, 2014). They differ in the way 
their participants are integrated, but also in financial structure, resources and objectives. 
What are the assets of work corporations?
Work corporations are entirely run by the beneficiaries under supervision, often with the 
support of professionals. The revenue earned by the participants is directly invested in the 
organizational costs of the work corporation. Thus, we can speak of a co-produced activation 
programme: without the efforts of the participants, the work corporation would not exist.
Work corporations have clear objectives: they should aim at personal development; 
the service or product delivered should have societal relevance (which may be interpreted 
broadly); and a work corporation should be able to be self-sufficient in the long term. The 
main goal of the programme is to get into a paid job within two years at the most.
The municipality takes care of recruiting participants, i.e. determining who is eligible 
to join. It also provides required facilities for the reemployment programme and monitors 
the output target (in terms of outflow of clients). The work corporation’s functions include: 
having the final responsibility for the selection of participants (they may reject participants 
for any reason); creating a personal reemployment programme / development plan for the 
participant; guiding the participant during the development process; and providing educa-
tion/training.
Beneficiaries can enter a work corporation in several ways. They can apply voluntarily 
through applying for vacancies, with or without the help of their job coach. The majority, 
however, have been summoned to join a so-called job market, where they visit stands of 
different work corporations, and afterwards have to fill in a form to request an interview with 
one of them. Welfare recipients are threatened with sanctions when they do not show up at 
the job market. Whether these sanctions are actually applied is at the discretion of the client’s 
job coaches. Indeed, clients have been punished for not participating in the job market. 
Nevertheless, when beneficiaries do show up and apply, they have the right to decline the 
job at the work corporation without being sanctioned. However, this is not something that 
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is stressed by the municipality and indeed, it turns out that there are quite a number of 
participants who believe they must participate in order to maintain the right to benefits.
When participants start working, they have to sign a contract where their rights and 
obligations are formulated; this also includes the fact that they could be sanctioned. Hence, 
participants could be extrinsically motivated by the threat of sanctions or by the persuasion 
of their job coach; but they could also be motivated by the content of the programme, by the 
social feature of the service or because they feel morally obliged.
To date (March 2013), 45 work corporations have emerged, of which 13 have more than 
five participants. Most of the investigated work corporations have their origins in delivering 
publicly funded non-profit services. For example, in one work corporation participants cook 
and serve food in a restaurant in combination with lower secondary vocational education; 
another guides participants who do maintenance in neighbourhoods; and a third work 
corporation is a furniture and decoration shop where people learn to work as a vendor.
Method and data
Data
The present study draws upon survey data retrieved from participants in seven of the 13 
larger work corporations in the municipality of Nijmegen. The questionnaire was devel-
oped specifically for this study using existing items about motivations (Alford, 2009a), trust 
(Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008), perceived control (Scholz et al., 2002) and capabilities and 
resources. To determine how we could adapt some of the items to suit the purpose of our 
study we interviewed the policy advisor of the municipality, the project leaders of the work 
corporations. Cognitive interviewing was applied, including thinking aloud and retrospec-
tive probing (Willis, 2005), to five participants with different (ethnic) backgrounds to test 
whether they could understand the questionnaire. The final version was approved by all 
work corporation managers.
Measures
Motivations
To account for the variety of motivations and potential combination of motivational factors 
to participate in an activation programme, items regarding general and specific motivations 
in the questionnaire were included. One question addressed the participant’s general motiva-
tion to participate in the programme on a scale from 1 to 4 (‘did not like to participate (at 
all)’ to ‘(very) much like to participate’). Based on Alford’s (2009a) distinction of motiva-
tions, context-specific statements were developed with which respondents could disagree 
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(completely) (1,2), neither agree or disagree (3) or agree (completely) (4,5). This included 
intrinsic motivations (‘the work I have to do is interesting’), outcome-related benefits (get-
ting a job or education), sociality (‘I want to have more contact with others’), normative 
motivations (‘people with a benefit have to do something’), and extrinsic motivations based 
on compulsion (‘somebody told me I had to participate’; ‘I was afraid my benefit would be 
stopped’).
Trust
Two broad types of trust are distinguished: particularized trust, which is aimed at a particular 
person, organization or institution, such as neighbours, (local) government or the service 
provider; and generalized trust, i.e. trust in people in general, or strangers. Respondents 
were asked to rate these forms of trust giving a number ranging from 0 to 10. Principal 
component analysis shows a clear distinction between those persons close to the respondent 
(neighbours, people in the neighbourhood and other participants) and organizations at a 
distance (government and the political system). Trust in managers of the work corporation 
and the municipality of Nijmegen double-loaded on these two dimensions, indicating that 
these neither fit the personal nor the abstract category. Therefore, these were kept as manifest 
variables. The mean for the ‘interpersonal’ factor was calculated (neighbours, people in the 
neighbourhood and other participants), which reported an alpha of .82. The same was done 
for trust in the political system and government (Pearson’s r 0.88).
For the measurement of generalized trust, a three-item scale was used (Reeskens and 
Hooghe, 2008). Again, the items were simplified to comply with the language proficiency 
of the population. The questions were phrased in the following way: ‘Are most people to be 
trusted or do you think most people are not to be trusted?’, ‘Do you think most people are 
honest or are most people dishonest?’, ‘Do you think people help each other often or do you 
think people only think about themselves?’. Respondents could choose a 10 for thinking 
people are completely to be trusted, honest and helpful and a 0 for the opposite. The scale’s 
alpha was .84 and the mean was determined.
Perceived control
Three constructs measured perceived control: self-efficacy, self-esteem and locus of control. 
These three are considered to be core self-evaluations and actually part of a broad personality 
trait (Judge et al., 2002). Self-efficacy refers to the belief in the effectiveness of one’s actions. 
Self-esteem entails the overall value one places on oneself as a person. Locus of control can be 
divided into internal and external control. ‘Internals’ believe they can influence many things 
that happen to them, whereas ‘externals’ feel events occur as a result of fate or luck.
Self-efficacy Three items from the validated GSE scale (Scholz et al., 2002) were slightly 
adapted to increase the comprehensiveness. Respondents had to say whether they ‘(not at all) 
agree’ (1,2) or ‘(completely) agree’ (3,4) to propositions such as ‘I have a solution for most 
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problems when I try’. The Cronbach’s alpha of the scale was .65 and a mean was computed 
to construct the latent variable.
Self-esteem The measurement of self esteem is based on the validated Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale (RSES) (Franck et al., 2008). From the original ten items, three items were 
selected and adapted slightly, involving questions such as ‘I feel satisfied with myself ’. 
Response options again ranged from 1 ‘(not at all) agreed’ to 4 ‘(completely) agreed’. Alpha 
of the scale was .64 and again means were calculated.
Locus of control Spector’s (1988) Work Locus of Control Scale was used as model for a 
context-specific measurement of locus of control. Two items dealt with the extent to which 
people feel their job search is affected by their own actions: ‘If I work hard (at the work 
corporation), I will find a job later on’ and ‘If I make enough efforts (at the work corpora-
tion), I am likely to find a job later on’. The variable ‘internal locus of control’ consists of the 
mean of these two items (4-point scale).
Capabilities and resources
To measure capabilities and resources, perceived health (1 very bad to 5 very good), number 
of social contacts (‘how many people do you have contact with outside the work corporation 
on a regular base’, 0-3, 4-9 or 10 or more persons), duration of unemployment (in years), 
and country of birth (the Netherlands, outside the Netherlands) were measured.
Sample
Seven work corporations were selected for the sample. The selection criteria were: a mini-
mum size of five participants; comparability in terms of internal organization (for instance, 
participants should have been working at the organization for at least one year). Furthermore, 
only those who had just started (for no more than four weeks) working in the period from 
September 2012 to January 2013 were invited to complete the survey. All of them (n=60) 
completed and returned the questionnaire.
A control group was set up to compare the results of the participants with non-partici-
pants. This group consists of participants who did apply for a work corporation, but did not 
start working there. This assured the same population (in terms of eligibility) was addressed. 
A €10 voucher was promised for taking the time to fill in the survey. Of the 100 surveys that 
were sent to members of the control group, 20 were returned, of which two could not be 
used because one did work at a work corporation and the other had a job already. The low 
response rate might be due to a lack of interest in the survey topic (what is in it for me?) and 
distrust in the intentions of the survey (although it was anonymous). This would imply that 
the control group consists of a selective group of non-participants, with higher levels of trust 
than the actual population.
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This is supported by the reasons given by the respondents for their non-participation. It 
appears that most of them actually did like the work at the work corporation. This seems to 
point at organizational selection. Indeed, the majority (11 of 18) note that either there was 
no vacancy at this moment (n=7); they were told that they did not suit the profile (n=2); 
or that they have not been called back by the work corporation (n=2). The other responses 
could be linked to self-selection (7 of 18). For instance, three mentioned that they would 
not get a paid job anyway, and another wrote that he thought work corporations are ‘a form 
of exploitation’. Two mention that they cannot combine it with the care for their children, 
and another two say that the work was physically too demanding.
It should be noted that this control group does not involve those who chose not to attend 
the job market or those who did not apply at all, even though they were familiar with the 
programme. The size of the first group is known. 56% (233) of the 413 social assistance 
recipients that were invited to the job market did not turn up. A proportion of this group 
might have good reasons why they could not attend: 35% (82) had let the municipality 
known that they were unable to come – this might be due to health or having to take care 
for others. The remainder, however, had not – and this might be due to a lack of motiva-
tion. Thus, a fairly large self-selection has already taken place before jobseekers apply to the 
work corporation. This means that we do not have a complete view on the self-selection 
mechanism.
Results
Descriptive analysis
Table 1 shows the background characteristics of the participants and the control group. 
Compared to all social assistance receivers in Nijmegen (in 2011), there is a slight over-
representation of men (55% compared to 48%). 53% were born in another country which 
does not differ much from the average in the population. The participants generally state 
that they are in good health (average 3.77). There is an overrepresentation of women in the 
control group, although the composition does not differ significantly from the participants’ 
group. The average age of the control group is slightly higher than the participants (45 versus 
41). Most statistics which measure capabilities and resources (born in another country, social 
contacts, perceived health and duration of unemployment) also hold more or less the same 
values between the groups. Hence, non-participation cannot be explained by factors that 
relate to capabilities or resources of clients.
Table 2 presents the motivations of the participants and control group. The original 
5-item scale has been dichotomized for presentation, where low stands for the lowest three 
categories (1, 2, 3) and high for the two highest (4, 5). It seems that the general motivation 
of participants is very high. 92% state they (very) much liked to enter the work corporation. 
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Only five of the 60 respondents said they were not eager to participate. Not surprisingly, 
almost all participants applied because they would like to get a job after the project (82%). 
Obtaining a diploma is also a main motivation for the majority (72%). Another reason men-
tioned often was getting in contact with others (78%). Hence, sociality is very important for 
most participants. This also suggests that many participants felt socially excluded as a result 
of being unemployed. Fewer respondents mentioned that the content of the work itself was 
an important motivator (73%). More or less the same amount agreed that their participation 
had to do with normative reasons: people on benefits have to do something (72%).
Table 1. Background characteristics
participants (n=60) control group (n=18)
Women (%) 45 67
Men (%) 55 33
Age (average in years) 41 45
Country of birth: Netherlands (%) 47 65
Country of birth: foreign (%) 53 35
Duration of unemployment: two years or less (%) 48 39
Duration of unemployment: more than two years (%) 52 61
Perceived health: (very) good (%) 62 59
Perceived health: (very) bad, not good / not bad (%) 38 41
Social contacts: 0-3 (%) 33 50
Social contacts: 4-9 (%) 37 33
Social contacts: 10 or more (%) 30 17
Table 2. Motivations of participants and control group
Motivations
participants (n=60) control group (n=18)
low (%) high (%) low (%) high (%)
General motivation 8 92 22 78
Getting a job 18 82 13 88
Work is interesting 27 73 40 60
Getting a diploma 28 72 53 47
More contact with others 22 78 40 60
People on benefits have to do something 28 72 33 67
Afraid of ending benefits 60 40 71 29
Somebody told me to 79 21 79 21
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Only 40% said they were afraid of cutbacks on their benefits. 21% indicated they joined 
because someone said they had to. Hence, only a minority participates because of external 
pressure. Interestingly, participants are motivated by different factors simultaneously. Even 
most of the respondents who indicated there was external pressure nevertheless found the 
work interesting (65.2% of people working because of fears of ending benefits; 71.4% of 
people participating because somebody told them to). Still, participants indicating there 
are no external motivations more often stated they joined because they thought the job was 
interesting (respectively 78.6% and 77.4%). This supports the crowding-out hypothesis, 
although the differences are not marked. In general, participants are highly intrinsically 
motivated.
Strikingly, perceived control is high among participants (Table 3). On a four-point 
scale, the mean of self-efficacy is 3.31, that of self-esteem 3.47 and that of internal locus of 
control 3.30. This suggests a typical group of users have indeed entered work corporations. 
The means of generalized trust and interpersonal trust are 6.60 and 6.56. These figures 
are relatively high: in the European Social Survey (ESS), the average generalized trust of 
Dutch unemployed individuals looking for a job is 5.44. Trust in government and politics is 
more similar to the average found in the ESS (4.25 compared to 4.50)5. Trust in the work 
corporation is very high (7.98), whereas trust in the municipality is somewhat lower (6.73).
4. Own calculations; the same three-item construct was used to measure generalized trust.
5. Own calculations; mean of ‘trust in parliament’ and ‘trust in politicians’.
Table 3. Trust and perceived control; means of participants and control group
participants (n=60) control group (n=18)
Trust
Generalized trust 6,60 (1,97) 5,26 (2,39)*
Interpersonal trust 6,56 (1,92) 4,22 (2,53)*
Trust in work corporation 7,98 (2,10) .
Trust in municipality 6,73 (2,52) 5,56 (2,55)†
Trust in government and politics 4,25 (2,93) 3,97 (2,83)
Perceived control
Self-efficacy 3,31 (0,57) 3,13 (0,43)
Self-esteem 3,47 (0,48) 3,37 (0,53)
Internal locus of control 3,30 (0,58) 2,97 (0,76)†
*<.05, † p<.10; Standard deviation within parentheses
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Comparison with control group
It appears that the non-participants are less motivated in general than the participants, when 
comparing the original 5-point scales (Mann-Whitney U 376.5, p<.05)6.This supports the 
expectation that intrinsic motivation is required to participate in co-production. Participants 
also seem to be more motivated by the prospect of getting a diploma (Mann-Whitney U 
303.5, p<.05), but there are no differences regarding the other reasons to join the pro-
gramme. This could mean that non-participants are not looking for a long-term investment, 
but for quick solutions to their precarious situation.
Differences are also found in the levels of interpersonal trust (Mann-Whitney U 247.5, 
p<.05), municipal trust (Mann-Whitney U 392.5, p<.10) and generalized trust (Mann-
Whitney U 336.0, p<.05), which are all higher for participants than non-participants (Table 
3). The level of trust in government and politics was the same for both groups. The internal 
locus of control is somewhat higher for participants than for non-participants (Mann-
Whitney U 372.0, p<.10). Yet, there are no significant differences between the two groups 
in relation to self-efficacy and self-esteem, whereas it was expected that this would be lower 
among the control group.
As said, because the group of non-participants is small and the non-response rate fairly 
high, there might be another selection effect (i.e. a particular group of non-participants 
completed the survey). Nevertheless, one would expect that, in particular, people with low 
levels of trust and perceived control would not respond to the survey. In fact, this would sug-
gest that levels of trust and perceived control might even be lower among non-participants 
than found here.
Apparently, there is a selection bias concerning trust and motivation. Does this mean 
that selection on motivation also leads to a selection on trust? And does the use of extrinsic 
motivators help to involve those who have low levels of trust? To compare levels of trust 
among poorly and highly motivated individuals, the variable general motivation is this time 
dichotomized between highly motivated (‘very much like to participate’) and the other three 
levels (‘did not like to participate (at all)’ and ‘much like to participate’), to create comparable 
groups. This time, the data of the participants and non-participants are combined, as we are 
now interested in the statistical relations between the variables, rather than the differences 
between the two groups.
Relation between motivations, trust and perceived control
Clearly, those who are highly motivated have higher levels of trust than less motivated 
participants, except for generalized trust (Mann-Whitney U tests, see Table 4). Thus, if 
organizations only pick out highly motivated persons, they will also select high trusters.
6. Mann-Whitney U was used because of non-normal distribution of variables in the control group.
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Individuals that are (highly) motivated by being afraid of having their benefits stopped 
are compared to those who did not state this was an important reason to join. Regardless of 
the type of trust, there are no differences between the two groups. Likewise, individuals who 
say they joined because somebody told them to do so do not have lower levels of trust than 
those who did not. Hence, using extrinsic motivators does not seem to attract participants 
with lower trust.
Regarding differences in perceived control regarding motivations, high general motiva-
tion appears to be related to high perceived control (Mann-Whitney U tests, see Table 4). 
Levels of self-esteem and internal locus of control are higher for individuals who are highly 
generally motivated compared to less motivated beneficiaries. Again, extrinsic motivations 
do not relate to perceived control, and do not counteract the selection bias under scrutiny.
Table 4. Trust, perceived control and motivations (n=78)
General motivation Afraid of ending benefits Somebody told me to
low high low high low high
Trust
Generalized trust
6,18 
(2,22)
6,57 
(1,93)
6,47 
(2,12)
6,28 
(1,91)
6,65 
(2,07)
6,67 
(2,07)
Interpersonal trust
5,68 
(2,27)
6,83 
(2,15)*
6,16 
(2,23)
5,85 
(1,85)
6,22 
(2,15)
6,17 
(2,04)
Trust in work 
corporation
7,48 
(2,28)
8,95 
(1,28)*
7,97 
(2,05)
7,68 
(2,25)
7,98 
(1,98)
8,25 
(2,22)
Trust in 
municipality
5,98 
(2,44)
7,63 
(2,52)*
6,44 
(2,24)
6,31 
(2,65)
6,52 
(2,34)
6,80 
(2,93)
Trust in government 
and political system
3,81 
(2,80)
5,13 
(2,96)†
3,88 
(2,47)
4,02 
(3,20)
4,19 
(2,69)
4,17 
(3,60)
Perceived control
Self-efficacy
3,20 
(0,54)
3,44 
(0,54)
3,29 
(0,53)
3,16 
(0,57)
3,31 
(0,53)
3,13 
(0,65)
Self-esteem
3,38 
(0,50)
3,62 
(0,44)*
3,47 
(0,51)
3,35 
(0,48)
3,46 
(0,48)
3,38 
(0,57)
Internal locus of 
control
3,11 
(0,60)
3,50 
(0,62)*
3,22 
(0,69)
3,23 
(0,53)
3,21 
(0,65)
3,27 
(0,56)
*<.05, † p<.10; Standard deviation within parentheses; n=60 for trust in work corporation
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Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we have investigated whether there is a selection bias within co-produced 
activation programmes. Background characteristics relating to the resources and capabilities 
of people, such as health, social contacts and ethnicity do not seem to determine whether 
people co-produce within work corporations or not. However, participants of work corpora-
tions have much more trust in their fellow citizens (in the neighbourhood), more trust 
in the municipality, more trust in people in general, and are intrinsically motivated to a 
higher extent than those who do not participate. This result, which resembles findings in 
the field of civic participation, is important since activation policies, and co-production 
in general, are expected to be beneficial in combating marginalization and fostering social 
cohesion (Anderson, 2009; Breidahl and Clement, 2010). If levels of trust are already high, 
this proposition would not be impossible, but difficult to become a reality.
The result that municipal trust is an important precondition for participation in the 
programme, implies that public officials (in the Netherlands the so-called ‘client manager’) 
benefit from gaining trust from clients if they would like them to become engaged in activa-
tion programmes. This is underlined by the finding that (municipal) trust relates to general 
motivation to join work corporations.
We also found that extrinsic motivations such as being afraid of cutbacks on one’s benefits 
and being told to participate are not negatively related to trust and perceived control. Users 
who have been forced by the municipality to apply for a work corporation nevertheless 
seem to be enthusiastic about the work corporation programme. People might need some 
persuasion to be convinced of participation. For some, the pressure from the municipality 
to apply for a work corporation can be harmonized with their own norms that one has to 
do something in return for benefits, or with the wish to find a job. Others might perceive 
initiatives such as work corporations as good opportunities for increasing their chance of 
securing a regular job, even though they are mandatory.
Although it might be regarded as positive that extrinsic motivators do not necessarily 
affect the relation between the user and the municipality and work corporation in terms of 
trust, we can also conclude that they are unable to counter the selection biases that occur 
within co-produced activation services. Thus, it remains the question whether co-production 
is an effective strategy to engage vulnerable citizens.
Biased participation within co-production may be a problem for activation services, but 
this does not necessarily have to be the case for other public sectors. Take, for example, 
participants of a neighbourhood watch programme, who are actively involved in combating 
crime. As volunteers might be exposed to confrontations with suspects, selection on certain 
criteria might be necessary. It is likely and understandable that those who are responsible for 
selecting participants (e.g. police officers, public officials) will pick out willing, intrinsically 
motivated and cooperative citizens to join the neighbourhood watch. Likewise, in the case of 
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health care, it is not unlikely that a doctor will refrain from giving a patient the room to get 
involved in the treatment, if he or she thinks this patient lacks particular skills (e.g. because 
of mental disabilities). In these cases, selection might actually improve the outcome (safety, 
health) for disadvantaged individuals too.
But if we desire an inclusive approach and try to reach those groups who are at a distance 
from public services and government, we also need to know how to mobilize the less willing. 
This study has shown that participants of activation programmes are often motivated by 
several reasons simultaneously. Therefore, it will be difficult to determine which instruments 
could be used to overcome the selection bias. To complicate matters even further, it is prob-
able that users within different sectors might have other motivations than participants of 
co-produced activation programmes. Within activation programmes, the outcome is mainly 
private value, whereas in other cases, the outcome could also be group or public value (Al-
ford, 2014). Parents who participate in child care also produce value (high quality child care) 
for other parents. Residents who join a neighbourhood watch also produce value (neigh-
bourhood safety) for other residents. Citizens can be motivated by individual and collective 
benefits simultaneously too. For example, tenants of social housing cooperatives co-produce 
because they enjoy the social contacts, but also because they are able to rent at advantageous 
prices (Brandsen and Helderman, 2012). Comparative research across different sectors is 
needed to gain more insight into the process of motivating people to co-produce.
In the end, the key actors who are able to motivate users to co-produce are the front-
line professionals. They are able to influence how clients perceive the service offered, and 
therefore their willingness to participate (Alford, 2009a). The various reasons why users 
co-produce, shown by this study, illustrate how difficult it is to design accessible and success-
ful co-produced services.
5 
User co-production of public service delivery: 
exploring mechanisms and conditions for building 
trust
Fledderus, J. (2015b). Building Trust Through Public Service Co-Production. 
International Journal of Public Sector Management, 28(7), 550-565.
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Abstract
User co-production of public service delivery is expected to increase citizen’s trust in services, 
local government and society in general. This assumption is tested in a longitudinal mixed 
methods study, following participants of a co-produced activation programme for long term 
unemployed over time. The quantitative results show that trust in local government did not 
increase, whereas trust in the service and generalized trust both decreased. Unexpectedly, 
the programme was unable to increase perceptions of personal control and trust among 
participants. Qualitative interviews with managers and participants offer possible explana-
tions for this result, such as selection effects; the incapacity to foster users’ commitment 
to the organization; lack of organizational support; and unclear expectations about the 
responsibilities of the service provider and municipality.
79
Mechanisms and conditions for building trust | Chapter 5
Introduction
The ‘New Public Governance’ (NPG) seems to be at the heart of recent reforms of active 
labour market policies across Europe (Lindsay & McQuaid, 2009; Lindsay, Osborne, & 
Bond, 2014). Recognizing that the state is no longer able to address complex social problems 
alone, the NPG emphasizes network-based approaches to promote the participation of 
people dependent on unemployment benefits or social assistance in work. Key characteristics 
of NPG-type arrangements are therefore inter-agency cooperation, partnerships with non-
governmental agencies, decentralization, and a role for users as co-producers in the delivery 
of activation services (Lindsay et al., 2014). Whereas most empirical work focuses on the 
former aspects, such as interorganizational relations or professionals (Aiken and Bode, 2009; 
Lindsay et al., 2014; Van Berkel, 2014), little empirical work is devoted to effects of user 
co-production within activation services. This chapter attempts to bridge this gap. Specifi-
cally, it delves into the assumption that public trust is fostered when users are involved as 
co-producers of service delivery.
NPG-based reforms are believed to be a mean to ‘restore’ public trust by emphasizing the 
importance of the process of service delivery and incorporating the affective and value-based 
side of trust (Fledderus, Brandsen, et al., 2014; Taylor-Gooby, 2008). In contrast, reforms 
building on the principles of the New Public Management (NPM), have focused exces-
sively on rational foundations of trust, by promoting consumerism, the use of performance 
targets, and competition. Although case study research in other sectors has indeed given 
some support for the potential of co-production to build trust (Bovaird and Löffler, 2012; 
Ostrom, 1996), such studies are unfortunately unable to systematically answer the question 
whether co-production leads to trust in service delivery, (local) government and society. To 
answer this question and to study the effects of co-production longitudinal research design 
is needed.
However, longitudinal designs are far from unproblematic, especially due to the chance 
on dropouts. Also, the limited scale of co-production initiatives and the vulnerability of us-
ers restrict the possibilities for statistical analysis and increase the chance of panel mortality. 
Despite these difficulties, the urge to fill the research gap regarding the relation between 
co-production and trust led to the design of a longitudinal mixed methods research project 
on the effects of a co-produced programme for unemployed social welfare recipients. This 
research led to unexpected results. Before analysing and discussing these findings, the theo-
retical and methodological backgrounds are described.
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Trust and co-production of activation
Trust can be defined as ‘the belief that others, through their action or inaction, will contrib-
ute to my/our well-being and refrain from inflicting damage upon me/us’ (Offe, 1999: 47). 
This chapter focuses specifically on trust in local government and public service organiza-
tions (PSOs), since it is in this context ‘where misplaced trust will damage the citizens’ 
interests and where the citizen as service-user faces uncertainty’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2008: 289). 
Additionally, users’ trust in other citizens – generalized trust – is considered in this study too, 
as it is an important indicator for social cohesion (Putnam et al., 1994).
Taylor-Gooby (2008) argues that NPM-induced reforms have focused too much on the 
cognitive dimension of trust, emphasizing service outcomes and objective standards. Such 
an approach ignores the affective dimension of trust, which is rather elicited through the 
interaction between service staff and users. As this interaction is central to co-production, it 
can be expected that NPG-type arrangements are beneficial for the building of trust (Fled-
derus, Brandsen, et al., 2014). Co-production would ideally lead both users and professional 
staff to identify with each other’s goals and effectively understand and value the other’s 
interests, with affective trust as result (Fledderus, Brandsen, et al., 2014; Lewicki et al., 
2006). Additionally, an important feature of the NPG is the involvement of third sector 
organizations (TSOs), which are believed to foster voice and co-production. This is because 
they entail social goals, and emphasize ‘trust between producers and consumers by mini-
mizing or eliminating opportunistic behavior’ (Pestoff, 2009: 136). Indeed, research shows 
evidence that TSOs providing activation services can have positive effects on social outcomes 
such as self-efficacy and social capital through high levels of user participation (Hazenberg 
et al., 2014; Ho and Chan, 2010).
Needham (2008: 223) also concludes that co-production ‘can be a therapeutic tool 
(building trust and communication between participants, allowing bureaucrats and citizens 
to explain their perspective and listen to others)’. This leads to the basic premises of this 
study: user participation in a co-produced activation programme will lead to an increase in 
users’ trust in the service provider (H1), an increase in users’ trust in local government (H2), and 
an increase in users’ generalized trust (H3). However, to identify specific mechanisms that 
explain how co-production could increase these three types of trust, it is useful to define 
co-production and to separate individual and collective forms of co-production.
Co-production is defined here as an arrangement where both clients and ‘regular’ producers 
contribute a mix of activities at the point of delivery of public services (Fledderus, Brandsen, 
et al., 2014; Ostrom, 1996). Co-production is viewed as a deliberate action of the service 
provider to increase users’ activities that are aimed at specific outcomes. The focus is on participa-
tion at the delivery phase. This means that it differs from participation in formulating and 
designing policies and/or services (cf. Bovaird, 2007), although these forms of participation 
may occur simultaneously.
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Co-production could take place both at the individual and the collective level (Bovaird, 
2007). Individual co-production is primarily focused at gaining private value and described 
the relation between a single user and a service provider (e.g. the PSO as a whole, or a single 
professional). Collective co-production takes place when a group of users participate in the 
delivery of a service. It adds complexity with regards to attaining outcomes, as users become 
dependent on the efforts of fellow users. For example, free-riding behaviour might be a 
source of frustration for other users (Ostrom, 2000).
Individual co-production might build trust because users increase their perceptions of 
control, as they are able to influence the service process through their involvement. An 
important element of perceived control is the feeling of self-efficacy, which refers to the 
experience of competence. During co-production, people learn particular skills and tech-
niques and are able to apply these qualities. Such enactive mastery is the strongest way to 
perceive competence (Bandura, 2001). Repeated experiences lead a person to discover his/
her level of performance capability, whereas repeated success in performing a task increases 
the perception of one’s ability to perform that task. Furthermore, experiencing having influ-
ence over the outcome of a service will decrease feelings that outcomes depend on external 
factors, such as luck, fate, or religion. This refers to one’s locus of control: internal versus 
external (Rotter, 1966). For example, a user who is actively involved in his/her activation, 
will be more likely to experience competence and internal control over his/her chances on 
the labour market. When the user develops a strong belief there may be a solution for his/her 
unemployment, the relation with the service provider is also likely to improve (Fledderus, 
Brandsen, et al., 2014). Other research has also shown that people are more likely to trust 
their managers in organizational contexts that promote perceived control (Deci et al., 1989). 
Hence, it is hypothesized that an increase of users’ level of perceived control leads to an increase 
of users’ trust in the service provider (H4a). Also, people with high levels of perceived control 
will feel less vulnerable in daily life and therefore feel less risk in trusting others (Fledderus, 
Brandsen, et al., 2014). This leads to the expectation: an increase of users’ level of perceived 
control leads to an increase of users’ generalized trust (H4b).
Collective co-production often takes place within small, cohesive groups, in which it is 
relatively easy to build trust relationships (Ostrom, 2000; Pestoff, 2009). According to Ho 
and Chan (2010: 42), TSOs and social enterprises in particular ‘could contribute to the 
building of social capital by pro viding an opportunity for disadvantaged and marginalized 
groups to expand their social networks and develop social trust, which facilitates cooperation 
for mutual benefit’. Joint interests and common backgrounds (e.g. the same neighbourhood, 
disease, or social-economic status) among the service users may give rise to social recognition 
and trust (Aiken and Bode, 2009). Ostrom (1996: 1082) also showed that co-production 
can generate ‘social capital in the form of urban residents learning how to work with each 
other and with public agencies’. She argued that ‘the experience of co-production also 
encourages citizens to develop other horizontal relationships and social capital’ (Ostrom, 
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1996: 1083). Ultimately, these factors may lead to the creation of trust networks, which 
are characterized by their shared identity and closed nature (Tilly, 2005a). A strong trust 
network is recognized by high levels of trust of participants in fellow participants. It can be 
expected that when a trust network to which a user belongs becomes stronger, trust of that user 
in the service provider increases (H5a). Furthermore, it could be that positive experiences with 
other, unfamiliar citizens spill over to citizens in general. In other words, it is hypothesized 
that when a trust network to which a user belongs becomes stronger, generalized trust of that user 
increases (H5b). However, it must be noted that the closed character of trust networks could 
also make it less easy for trust to go beyond the ‘in-group’ (Brandsen and Helderman, 2012).
The final hypothesis is about an expected ‘spill-over’ effect of trust in the service provider 
to trust in the (local) government: an increase in user trust in the service provider leads to an 
increase in user trust in (local) government (H6). Increasingly, activation services are delivered 
by organizations that are at arms’ length of (local) government, such as agencies, private 
companies or TSOs (Van Berkel, 2010). Here, we assume that users of public services also 
perceive the government to be responsible for the service, although this does not necessarily 
have to be the case (cf. Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2003). To summarize, co-production 
might lead to an increase in perceived control and trust in fellow users, which possibly 
results in trust in the service provider, local governments and generalized trust. Addition-
ally, the literature on co-production mentions a number of conditional factors that seem to 
be important for a positive experience of co-production. Again, these factors relate to the 
individual and the collective level.
Conditions for achieving outcomes through co-production
At least two conditions for the success of co-production have been discussed in the literature. 
The first refers to the individual level: motivation. The second refers to the organizational 
level: organizational support.
Individuals might have very different reasons to co-produce (Fledderus and Honingh, 
forthcoming; Van Eijk and Steen, 2014). Many scholars argue that co-production should 
be a voluntary act in order to have positive outcomes (Bovaird, 2007; Brudney and Eng-
land, 1983): it should not be imposed from above, but it should come from citizen’s own 
initiative. Alford (2009b) discerns different voluntary motivations that users could have 
for co-production. When people believe they will enjoy the act of co-production, they are 
intrinsically motivated. Such motivation is likely to lead to active involvement, which is 
crucial for effective collective action (Robertson and Tang, 1995). But users could also want 
to co-produce out of a desire for a sense of belonging (sociality), or out of normative reasons 
(i.e. I have to do something in return for my benefit). When co-production is the result of 
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extrinsic motivations, such as material rewards or the fear for sanctions, it will less likely lead 
to outcomes such as self-efficacy or trust.
Secondly, co-production is more likely to be to create trust when users are sufficiently 
facilitated and supported by the service provider and government (Hazenberg et al., 2014). 
Ostrom (1996: 1078) argues that successful co-production will be thwarted when respon-
sibilities between citizens, public agencies and governments are not clearly defined; and by 
‘top-down administrative command as the style for decision making’. Thus, the activities of 
service users and service providers should be effectively coordinated on the one hand; and 
both users and professionals should have a voice in decisions regarding the provided service 
(Cepiku and Giordano, 2013). Furthermore, co-production requires substantial resources 
from the service provider. As Bovaird and Löffler (2012: 58) argue, ‘co-production may be 
“value-for-money” but it usually cannot provide value without money’. It remains the ques-
tion whether organizations are eager to facilitate and support users in co-production efforts, 
as co-production potentially gives rise to organizational uncertainty (Fledderus et al., 2015).
Figure 1 outlines the theoretical model of this study, including the potential social out-
comes of co-production and conditional factors for success.
The case of work corporations in the Netherlands provides an excellent opportunity to 
explore the relation between co-production and trust. It presents a clear break with past local 
traditions, moving towards a policy based on NPG characteristics (for a detailed analysis of 
the emergence and organization of work corporations, see Fledderus, Broersma, et al., 2014). 
It entails the involvement of TSOs in the delivery of activation services and importantly, it 
demands high levels of co-production.
Co-production
Trust in service provider
Trust in local government
Generalized trust
Trust in fellow users
Perceived control
Organizational 
support
Motivation
Figure 1. The relation between co-production and trust
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Case description
Work corporations are examples of a local, innovative activation policy where beneficiaries 
are given an active role, partly running the organization, with the ultimate goal of returning 
to the regular labour market. Work corporations started running in Dutch municipality 
(Nijmegen) in 2011.
Work corporations are non-profit organizations offering learn-work trajectories of one or 
two years to social assistance recipients. They are supposed to become self-sufficient. In order 
to generate income, they heavily rely on the efforts of the participants. A work corporation 
can therefore be seen as a form of collective co-production between participants and its staff. 
To give an example: there is a work corporation where participants learn how to work in a 
restaurant and how to serve customers, while at the same time they earn money by actually 
running the restaurant. In September 2012, a total of 45 work corporations were operating 
in the city, serving almost 200 beneficiaries. Because there are some differences in man-
agement and organization between the work corporations, the influence of organizational 
support can be assessed.
Participants can apply voluntarily (through applying on vacancies), but they can also be 
coerced by the municipality to apply. The role of motivation as possible conditional factor 
can therefore also be analysed. Some have been summoned to join a so-called job market, 
where they visit stands of different work corporations, and afterwards have to fill in a form 
to request an interview with one of them. In case they do not show up at the job market 
or apply for a work corporation, they could face repercussions, such as temporary cuts on 
their benefits. When they start working, they conclude a contract where their rights and 
obligations are formulated; this also includes that they could be sanctioned, e.g. when they 
frequently do not show up for work. It also involves the right on a bonus (i.e. a financial 
incentive), of 100 Euros per month, to be paid after six months of work, on top of their 
benefit.
Methods and data
Methods
This study employs a mixed method design, combining a longitudinal survey design and 
in-depth qualitative interviews. Participants of a specific sample of work corporations 
were asked to fill out a standardized questionnaire (paper and pencil). Additionally, semi-
structured interviews with managers, policy makers and participants were carried out.
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The sample
Seven work corporations were selected for the sample (see table 1). The selection criteria were: 
a minimum size of five participants (to be able to include collective aspects); comparability 
in terms of internal organization (for instance, the organization should be running for at 
least one year, in order to rule out start-up problems); and comparability with respect to the 
duration of the programme (at least one year, in order to measure long-term effects). In total, 
109 participants worked at these seven work corporations (September 2012). Those who 
had just started (for no more than four weeks) working in the period from September 2012 
to January 2013 were invited to complete the survey (paper and pencil). All of those who 
were invited completed the questionnaire (n=60 at t0). After a half year, the respondents 
were asked to repeat the survey (t1). At this point, one third of the sample (20) dropped 
out of the service because of various reasons (sickness, lack of motivation, family problems). 
After one year, only a small percentage (20%) still worked at the work corporation (t2). 
The other respondents either dropped out, or found a job or other activities to pursue. The 
characteristics of the dropouts provide already valuable information about the effects of the 
programme. This will be outlined in the results section.
Table 1. Overview of the quantitative and qualitative data
Organization
Survey respondents (n) Interviews
T0 T1 T2 Participants Project leaders Policy makers
Local government 3
WoCo1 5 2 . 5 2
WoCo2 9 5 . 5 2
WoCo3 13 8 2 5 1
WoCo4 6 3 . 4 2
WoCo5 3 3 . 3 1
WoCo6 16 13 9 5 2
WoCo7 8 6 1 5 1
Total 60 40 12 32 12 3
Operationalization of quantitative measures
The items in the survey intended to measure concepts such as motivation, perceived control 
and trust. The survey was tested by the use of cognitive interviewing, including thinking 
aloud and retrospective probing, to five participants with different (ethnic) backgrounds to 
test whether they could understand the questionnaire.
General motivation was measured by the question: ‘how much do you like to work at this 
work corporation’ with a scale from 1 (‘do not like at all’) to 4 (‘very much like to’).
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Perceived control was measured by two interrelated concepts: general self-efficacy (GSE) and 
internal locus of control (ILC) (Judge et al., 2002). GSE was measured by the mean of five 
items, based on the validated general scale of self-efficacy (Scholz et al., 2002). Respondents 
had to say they ‘not (at all) agreed’ (1,2) or ‘(completely) agreed’ (3,4) to propositions such 
as ‘I have a solution for most problems when I try’. The Cronbach’s alpha of the scale was 
average, reaching .69 (t0) and .62 (t1).7 ILC consisted of the mean of two questions address-
ing whether getting a job depends on the participants own hard work or not (4-point scale), 
based on the validated Work Locus of Control Scale (Spector, 1988).
 Respondents were asked to rate different forms of trust giving a number on a Likert-scale 
ranging from 0 (low trust) to 10 (high trust). Principal component analysis shows a clear 
distinction between those persons close to the respondent (such as fellow participants) and 
institutions at a distance (government and the political system). Trust in the service provider 
(i.e. managers of the work corporation) and trust in local government (i.e. municipality of 
Nijmegen) double-loaded on these two dimensions, indicating that these neither fit the 
personal nor the institutional category. Therefore, these were kept as manifest variables. The 
presence of a trust network is measured by trust in fellow participants of work corporations 
(single item). For the measurement of generalized trust, a validated three-item scale was used 
(Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008). Scale’s alpha was good, reaching .75 (t0) and .76 (t1).
The differences between t0 and t1 are analysed using the Wilcoxon Signed-ranked test, 
eliminating the possibility that a small number of extreme differences will distort the results. 
To examine the mechanisms of perceived control and trust networks, Pearson correlations 
were calculated on the proportional difference scores of the relevant variables. The differences 
between t1 and t2 are excluded, as too little respondents were left over, possibly resulting in 
a selection effect.
Qualitative study
The conditions that affect the relation between co-production and trust can be found on 
both the organizational and the individual level. Therefore, interviews were conducted 
with managers of the work corporations and policy makers, and with participants of work 
corporations (Table 1).8 They were semi-structured around factors defined in the theoretical 
model, but left enough space for conditions that were not theoretically defined. To be able 
to inductively develop new theoretical ideas, the Constant Comparative Method (CCM) 
(Boeije, 2002) is useful. CCM starts with open coding within a single interview, where 
quotes are labelled and frequently compared with other quotes, looking for similarities and 
7. The relatively low Cronbach’s alpha is probably due to the textual adaptations of the scale that had to be made in 
order to improve the comprehensibility of the questions, in particular for non-native respondents.
8. 10 of the 32 interviewed participants were also included in the survey. The other 20 interviews were conducted 
after analysing the first results of the survey and the initial interviews.
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differences. Then, interviews are compared in-between and coding and categorization is 
adapted to the result of this comparison. The final categorizations are analysed in order to 
find underlying themes or typologies.
Results
Quantitative results
Table 2 shows the differences in social outcomes between t0 and t1, as well as the differences 
between participants who continued the programme and those who dropped out within six 
months. Interesting to see is that almost all means have decreased, whereas an increase was 
expected. Significant negative changes are found for trust in the work corporation and gen-
eralized trust. This means that hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 are disconfirmed. Looking at perceived 
control (GSE and ILC) and trust in fellow participants, the same trend can be witnessed. 
Trust in fellow participants also significantly dropped.
Table 2. Wilcoxon signed-ranked tests for T0 to T1 changes and differences between participants 
(n=40) and dropouts (n=20)
Dependent variable
Intervention
phase Mean ± (%) SD
Mean
dropout SD
General motivation Time 0 3,45 -2,03% ,64 2,75* ,46
Time 1 3,38 ,63 . .
GSE Time 0 3,38 -0,01% ,46 3,40 ,45
Time 1 3,35 ,41 . .
ILC Time 0 3,34 -8,99%* ,62 3,23 ,47
Time 1 3,04 ,67 . .
Trust in fellow 
participants
Time 0 7,77 -6,69%† 1,94 6,90 2,04
Time 1 7,25 1,98 . .
Trust in service 
provider
Time 0 8,67 -6,80%† 1,51 6,65* 2,48
Time 1 8,08 1,92 . .
Trust in local 
government
Time 0 7,44 -5,52% 2,26 5,35* 2,50
Time 1 7,03 2,65 . .
Generalized trust Time 0 6,82 -5,01%† 1,68 6,18 2,43
Time 1 6,48 1,47 . .
* p<.05, † p<.10; GSE=General Self-Efficacy, ILC=Internal Locus of Control
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The bivariate analysis (Pearson correlations, table 3) shows that an increase in ILC or GSE 
does not relate to an increase in trust in work corporations.9 Hypothesis H4a is therefore re-
jected. Hypothesis H4b is also disconfirmed: change in perceived control does not correlate 
with positive change in generalized trust. The positive correlation between change in trust in 
participants and change in trust in work corporations conforms to hypothesis H5a: when the 
trust network of users becomes stronger, trust in the service provider increases.10 Hypothesis 
H5b is also confirmed: the higher the trust in participants, the higher the generalized trust. 
It seems to be that the collective mechanism of co-production explains differences in trust 
better than the mechanism of perceived control.
Table 3. Pearson correlations for changes in trust and perceived control (n=40)
ΔTrust in work
corporations
ΔTrust in local 
government
Δ Generalized trust
Δ ILC ns. ,361* ns.
Δ GSE ns. ns. ns.
Δ Trust in participants ,644* ns. ,701*
Δ Trust in work corporations . ,530* ,479*
* p<.05, ns=not significant; GSE=General Self-Efficacy; ILC=Internal Locus of Control
The spill-over effect from trust in the service provider (H6) indeed seems to exist: when 
trust in the work corporation increases, trust in local government also increases significantly. 
This suggests that the effect of a change in trust in participants will indirectly affect trust in 
local government through trust in work corporations.
Even though there are no positive differences at the aggregate level, the patterns are differ-
ent at the user level: even though most of the participants show negative changes in trust at-
titudes, some participants show positive changes. This concurs with Breidahl and Clement’s 
(2010) research, which found that for some people, activation services are positively related 
with an increase in factors such as self-esteem, but for others they are negative. Hence, we 
need in-depth information about the experiences of participants to understand how the 
programme really affects them.
Also, when we look at the means in absolute terms, it is not that big of a surprise that 
there has not been an increase for the respective variables. The means of the measured indica-
tors at the beginning of the project are relatively high. This has been described and analysed 
9. Proportional changes in perceived control and different types of trust could not be explained by background 
characteristics such as age, gender and ethnicity (Pearson correlation, p>.10).
10. It must be noted that this can also point at a reverse effect: the more people trust the staff of the work corpora-
tion, the more likely a context is created where users trust each other.
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in an earlier article (Fledderus and Honingh, forthcoming). In this article, it was shown 
that the participants of work corporations have significant higher levels of trust and motiva-
tion than individuals who were invited to join, but (were) refused. This selection effect is 
exacerbated because the levels of trust and motivation are also lower for the dropouts of the 
programme, leaving the work corporations with participants with the highest levels of trust 
and motivation (Table 2).
What conditions might explain why the programme does not reach the expected out-
comes? The analysis of the qualitative data may provide answers. Several themes were dis-
tilled from the interviews with participants and organizational actors. Quantitative evidence 
is added to the qualitative reporting whenever relevant.
Qualitative results
Theme A – Motivation
Supporting the theoretical model, an important theme that arose from the interviews is the 
motivation of participants to enter the work corporation. Even though many respondents 
were obliged to apply for a work corporation, most of them stated that they liked the work 
they had to do and regarded it as an opportunity to do something about their unemployed 
status. However, some participants felt they did not have a choice and perceived the work 
corporation as a ‘punishment’ (Participant20_WoCo1). The managers of the work corpora-
tions often mentioned that intrinsic motivation was a criterion for participation for two 
reasons: motivation as a condition for a ‘successful’ programme, and motivation to work 
hard in order to generate income for the organization.
The survey results show that a decrease in general motivation is related to a decrease 
in trust in fellow participants and in the work corporation (Pearson correlation, p<.05). 
Furthermore, there is less often a decrease in ILC, trust in the work corporation and local 
government among participants who still liked the work they did at t1 (t-test, p<.05).
Applying for the work corporation felt like a burdensome duty, but [the work corporation] 
appeared to be something really good for me. (Participant36_WoCo4)
You are juggling with two balls: on the one hand, you want to invest in the development of 
participants, on the other hand you have paying customers. (Manager15_WoCo1)
Theme B – Support
The analysis showed the importance of participant’s perceptions of ‘support’ from the envi-
ronment during their programme, in line with the theoretical model. This support can take 
on different forms: showing your interest in participants as a manager of municipal worker; 
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provision of an official educational programme; adaptation of work hours for personal 
circumstances; or simply giving support to daily work activities by providing work clothing 
or tools. Interesting to note is that the financial bonus of 100 Euros per month was rarely 
mentioned as a supportive element.
Lack of support leads to the feeling of being ‘left to their fate’ (Participant26, 31, 32), 
and suspicion towards the purpose of the programme. 10 of the 32 interviewed participants 
stated they believe that the work corporation primarily exists for the sake of the (owners/
employees of the) work corporation or municipality, and/or said they are being used as cheap 
employees. The survey analysis shows the negative effect of lack of support. Participants 
who are dissatisfied with the efforts of their supervisors (at t1) show more often a decrease 
in their levels of ILC, trust in fellow participants, and trust in the work corporation (t-test, 
p<.05). Also, dissatisfaction with the work hours is related to a decrease in trust in the work 
corporation and municipality (t-test, p<.05).
If I was not able to get a diploma, I would have said right in their faces: you take advantage 
of the people. Because they just let you work here without pay, they make big money on you, 
that’s the truth, and then you do not even get a job. Yes then you take advantage of people. But 
now, I don’t experience that, because you get something in return. (Participant25_WoCo7)
Theme C – Commitment
One of the themes that emerged from the data was ‘commitment’. This refers to (the lack of ) 
a sense of identification and involvement with the work corporation and other participants 
(cf. Barnes, 1999; Robertson and Tang, 1995). Participants with high commitment cared 
about their tasks and the quality of their work and were prepared to take on more respon-
sibilities. Furthermore, these participants are sensible for the lack of commitment of other 
group members. Such free-riding is strongly disapproved.
Commitment is especially strong when participants can relate to other group members, 
and is encouraged when management is perceived as horizontal. Perceptions of equality 
and equal treatment foster a sense of ‘we are all in the same boat’ (Participant1_WoCo3). 
Contrarily, when a distance between the manager(s) and the participants is experienced, 
commitment will be less strong.
That commitment is important for a positive experience of co-production is underlined 
by the survey results, which show that those who feel that the work they do is important 
are less likely to drop in levels of ILC (t-test, p<.05), although there are no effects on trust.
I feel that everybody has their piece of responsibility. After all, we do it all together. [...] Look, 
I find it very disturbing when [another participant] is texting in the shop. I don’t think 
that’s right. And then I will report that [to the manager], but I find that very annoying. 
(Participant27_WoCo5)
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Theme D – Role of work corporation and municipality
Managers expressed their concerns about the chances of reemployment. Barriers to re-
employment included the vulnerable background of the participants, but also the lack of 
vacancies in the particular labour market sector and the economic situation in general. This 
concern was also present among participants. They said that it would be hard – in spite 
of the programme – to get a regular job because of the economic crisis, their employment 
history, educational level, or age. Although a few recognized that it is also not easy for the 
institutions to find suitable jobs, and that it remains their individual responsibility, other 
respondents expected more efforts from the municipality and the work corporation to help 
them becoming employed. Actually, some participants felt that because they put so much 
time and energy in cooperating with the programme, they should be rewarded for this. This 
view was strengthened when they were promised by the managers that they would do their 
utmost to find a job for the participants. The disappointment at the end of the programme 
could be a barrier for reaching positive outcomes.
You commit yourself for 100 percent, even if it’s sometimes difficult, and then you are be-
ing sent from pillar to post. You don’t get anything in return, only misery is what you get. 
(Participant15_WoCo2)
Discussion
A reason for the incapacity of work corporations to increase perceived control and trust 
could be that the levels of the indicators were already relatively high (Fledderus and Hon-
ingh, forthcoming). It also appeared that the dropouts at t1 have lower levels of trust – in 
local government, the service provider, and government – than those who stayed in the pro-
gramme. These findings seem to contradict other research: Hazenberg et al. (2014) actually 
find that organizations comparable to work corporations) are better able to include ‘socially 
excluded’ individuals than for-profit organizations. However, research on co-production 
does point at the problem of ‘self-selection’, arguing that disadvantaged citizens may be held 
back by lack of knowledge and other resources to participate in service delivery (Clark et al., 
2013, on safety; Jakobsen and Andersen, 2013, on education). Yet, there is less attention in 
co-production literature to the fact that organizational selection may play a role too, leav-
ing risk selection as a typical characteristics of quasi-market arrangements (cf. Van Berkel, 
2014). This research indeed suggests that the focus on outputs and self-sufficiency resulted 
in selecting highly motivated and more skilled individuals.
The bivariate analysis shows that especially the collective mechanism of trust networks 
has a relation with trust at different levels. Although correlations are unable to reveal more 
complex relations between variables (e.g. mediation and interaction) the interviews revealed 
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that the interaction with other users is important for individual experiences. For instance, 
the presence of less motivated users could affect the attitudes of motivated users when the 
management style focuses on the former group. One participant said: ‘They [the managers] 
did not have trust in me. They continuously keep an eye on you, and yeah, it is like, I don’t want 
to call it a prison camp, but the fact that you are unemployed is your fault and here you are 
punished.’ (Participant14_WoCo1).
Also, the work corporations might have been unable to build strong trust networks 
because the structure did not foster a sense of commitment. Service users are willing to put 
effort into the organization when they know their efforts are being ‘rewarded’. This requires 
credible leadership: managers should convince co-producers that the goals set are realistic, 
that participants are rewarded as promised, and that this will bring them benefits (Robertson 
and Tang, 1995: 72). There may be a relation between commitment and managerial sup-
port: managers who are personally involved with users’ activities, who are being helpful, 
and whose leadership style is less hierarchical, are more likely able to create a feeling of 
reciprocity among the group of participants. This is in line with Wilson (1994), stating that 
co-production is incompatible with a great power distance between users and professional 
staff.
In order to build commitment, organizations could use ‘recruitment and selection 
processes designed to bring into the system individuals whose values are congruent with 
those of current organizational members’ (Robertson and Tang, 1995: 71). Participants 
who felt that their fellow participants came from similar backgrounds were indeed more 
committed to the organization – it fosters a sense of ‘shared identity’ (Barnes, 1999). This, 
however, brings again a tension between constituting a homogenous and closed community 
and excluding particular citizens from co-production (Brandsen and Helderman, 2012). 
Commitment may further be promoted by a long-term cooperation between individuals, 
allowing norms to be built and recognized (Robertson and Tang, 1995: 72–73). When this 
leads to a motivation to collectively sanction those who do not conform to these norms, it 
will increase commitment to the group. Indeed, the work corporations where the composi-
tion of the group was less frequently altered showed higher levels of commitment than work 
corporations with less stable groups.
Other research on collective co-produced services shows that commitment is particularly 
high when users are given a voice in the design and delivery of services (Brandsen and Hel-
derman, 2012, on housing cooperatives in Germany; Pestoff, 2009, on parental childcare in 
Sweden). According to Pestoff (2009), a main advantage of co-production is the possibility 
of users to communicate with the ‘regular’ providers about their preferences. The interviews 
revealed that there was little space to co-produce beyond a ‘basic’ level – i.e. carrying out 
your tasks, providing services or making products in order to generate income. Participants 
were hardly given a voice in shaping their personal programme or in the work content. 
93
Mechanisms and conditions for building trust | Chapter 5
Hence, the ‘voice option’ was underdeveloped, possibly thwarting the chance to develop 
feelings of personal control (Simmons, 2011) and affective relations (Taylor-Gooby, 2008).
The absence of a more participatory structure might be a result of the managerial focus 
on outputs and self-sufficiency. This could have led to a shift from the work corporations’ 
original integrative orientation towards generating income and getting people back to work 
as soon as possible (Aiken and Bode, 2009). Work corporations were unable to resist the 
top-down demand to emphasize re-employment and measurable targets. Aiken and Bode 
(2009) find similar results in Germany and the UK, and have called this process ‘killing 
the golden goose’. To illustrate this, one participant told that he was refused to engage in 
an educational programme (which would be beneficial for his job chances), and stated that 
the reason for this was that the management needed him on the work floor, being more 
experienced than other participants (Participant18_WoCo1). When co-producing users 
experience little attention for their personal progress, feelings of exploitation could grow. 
Such feelings do not foster a belief that others will contribute to your wellbeing – as trust 
was defined in this study.
Conclusion
The findings of this research indicate that co-production of public service delivery does 
not necessarily lead to the expected increase in trust in service delivery, trust in (local) 
government and in generalized trust. The fact that similar studies actually point at positive 
outcomes of high user participation (Hazenberg et al., 2014) leads to the logical yet compel-
ling conclusion that it is not co-production as such, but the way co-production is organized 
and managed that determines its ultimate outcomes. Particularly, attention must be paid to 
the interaction with other users, which seems to be crucial for the building of public trust. 
Yet the external validity of an in-depth, but small-scale study may be limited. Additional 
research is ultimately needed to find out whether these conditions are also important for 
different sectors and services. The results presented in present study may assist to construct 
a sophisticated theoretical model to test their generalizability.
Such a model should take a multilevel approach, including the interaction between the 
individual, the organizational, and the institutional level (Fledderus et al., 2015). At the 
individual level, motivations to co-produce play a key role, which are affected by self- and or-
ganizational selection. Particularly interesting is the fact that users of (activation) services are 
often confronted with multiple role expectations; sometimes they are regarded as partners, 
then as a consumers, but they still face coercive strategies (Newman, 2007: 371).
Processes at the organizational level play an important role in determining the motivation 
of users. PSOs – and in particular the street-level staff – often have the possibility to employ 
particular selection procedures, determining which individuals are allowed to co-produce 
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and which not (Fledderus and Honingh, forthcoming; Van Berkel, 2014). There is a tension 
between balancing the group composition (to foster commitment) and exclusion of others, 
which in turn may lead to distrust.
Furthermore, organizations differ in their willingness and capacity to provide support to 
citizens who co-produce (Ostrom, 1996). The impact of (lack of ) support might depend on 
the expectations users have about the role of the service provider – a condition that emerged 
from the analysis. When users feel that the service provider is highly responsible for the 
outcome/outputs of the service, lack of support will probably have a more negative impact 
on trust than when users feel that they themselves are largely responsible (Fledderus, 2015a).
The institutional level, finally, also plays a crucial role in understanding the effects of 
co-production (Fledderus et al., 2015). Institutional pressures may not only determine the 
organizational goals, but also the internal structure of organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). This, in turn, influences the extent to which users can actually exert influence over 
the service, rather than just participate.
In order to test this model, future research may want to focus on comparative research 
– between sectors, countries and/or organizations. Finally, in spite of its challenges, large-N 
research is necessary to find out which factors provide the best explanations for the relation 
between co-production and trust.
6 
Does user co-production of public service delivery 
increase satisfaction and trust? Evidence from a 
vignette experiment
Fledderus, J. (2015a). Does user co-production of public service delivery increase 
satisfaction and trust? Evidence from a vignette experiment. International Journal 
of Public Administration, 38(9), 642-653.
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Abstract
Whereas it is assumed that involving users in the delivery of public services yields more posi-
tive evaluations of those services, this study shows that levels of satisfaction and trust are not 
necessarily positively affected by such user co-production. An experimental vignette design 
among students (n=174) is used to analyse the differences concerning trust in and satisfac-
tion with service providers between co-produced and non co-produced public services. In 
some cases, the results suggest, co-production actually leads to less satisfaction and trust. 
This might be explained by the self-serving bias, which states that co-producers take credit 
for success but blame service providers for failure.
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Introduction
Citizens are increasingly becoming co-producers of public service delivery. Patients engage 
in making decisions about their preferred lifestyles and medical treatment (Baggott, 2005; 
Fotaki, 2011) and welfare recipients become job-ready by actively participating in reemploy-
ment programs (Alford, 2009a). Also at a collective level, users co-produce services. Tenants 
plan and manage social housing through housing cooperatives (Brandsen and Helderman, 
2012); to combat crime and to fight antisocial manners residents cooperate with the 
police in neighbourhood watch schemes (Fleming, 2005); and volunteers in care services 
supplement the resources of professional staff, such as parents in child care (Pestoff, 2006). 
Co-production is supposed to increase satisfaction with and trust in public services and 
government, because it gives users more control over the services they use (Bovaird, 2007; 
Levine, 1984; Pestoff, 2009).
However, in their widely cited article, Bendapudi and Leone (2003) specify this claim by 
suggesting that co-producing clients tend to blame the service provider for poor outcomes, 
while in the case of better than expected outcomes, clients give more credit to themselves. 
This is known as the self-serving bias, which refers to ‘a person’s tendency to claim more 
responsibility than a partner for success and less responsibility for failure in a situation in 
which an outcome is produced jointly’ (Bendapudi and Leone, 2003: 15). Hence, when 
co-production leads to outcomes worse than expected, the service provider is blamed rather 
than the client him- or herself. Yet, when the outcome of co-production is successful, users 
might attribute this success partly to themselves, resulting in less satisfaction with the service 
provider compared to a situation without co-production. This leads to the counterintuitive 
expectation that whatever the outcome may be, co-production would at best reach the same 
and at worst poorer satisfaction levels as compared to ‘regular’ service delivery.
Bendapudi and Leone (2003) investigated customer co-production of goods and private 
services and provided evidence for the self-serving bias. Surprisingly, studies about the 
prevalence of this psychological effect regarding the co-production of public services seem 
to be lacking. There are at least two reasons why such a study would be relevant. First, 
an important difference between private and public services is that in case of the latter, 
clients can also be involved collectively instead of individually – such as in the case of a 
neighbourhood watch. This complicates the problem of self-serving, because success cannot 
only be attributed to one resident alone, but also to fellow neighbours. Second, current 
research on co-production of public service delivery often highlights successful cases (e.g. 
Ackerman, 2004; Bovaird and Löffler, 2012; Fung, 2006). Therefore, comparisons between 
the evaluation of clients between co-produced services and ‘traditionally’ produced services, 
and comparisons between different outcomes (positive vs. negative) remain absent in current 
literature.
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By adding trust as a dependent variable, this study makes a third contribution to the 
existing literature. Trust is regarded as an important outcome of public policies and services. 
It is seen as crucial for legitimacy of policy and democracy as a whole (Bouckaert and Van 
de Walle, 2003; Putnam et al., 1994; Thomas, 1998). Importantly, different factors seem 
to play a role in constituting trust than those that constitute satisfaction. Several authors 
argue that satisfaction relates mainly to the evaluation of outcomes, whereas trust mainly 
relates to the evaluation of the service delivery process (Herian et al., 2012; Rothstein and 
Stolle, 2008; Van Ryzin, 2011). In short, the argument is that when the process is perceived 
as inclusive, participatory and impartial, trust will be fostered. Co-production is believed to 
elicit such values. Thus, higher levels of trust are expected when people co-produce.
This research explores the relationship between co-production of public service delivery 
and user trust and satisfaction, and it is among the first to address the potential self-serving 
bias in this context. Two questions are addressed:
(1) To what extent does co-production of public service delivery increase satisfaction with 
and trust in service providers?
(2) To what extent does the evaluation of public service delivery differ between individual 
and collective co-producers?
The study follows the design of Bendapudi and Leone’s (2003) research, namely a vignette 
survey. The vignettes they used to analyse the self-serving bias are adapted by replacing goods 
and private services with examples of public services. The study is structured as follows. First, 
the concept of individual and collective co-production is introduced. Subsequently, this 
concept is linked to the self-serving bias, and expectations are derived from theory. In the 
next section, the methodology is explained, followed by the results. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of these results and a conclusion.
Theoretical background
Defining co-production
The concept of co-production originated from research on urban service conducted by Eli-
nor Ostrom and her colleagues in the 1970s. Among their main conclusions was the notion 
that many public services are not delivered by one public organization, but instead rely on 
several public and private actors. Importantly, they found that for successful public services, 
the contribution of time and effort by the users of these services is of vital importance. They 
developed the term co-production to describe the possible relationship that exists between 
the ‘regular’ producer (such as street-level police officers, schoolteachers, or health workers) 
and ‘clients who want to be transformed by the service into safer, better educated or healthier 
persons’ (Ostrom, 1996: 1079; see also Parks et al., 1981, for an overview). Spurred by this 
research, co-production was seen by scholars as an alternative to ‘traditional’ service delivery, 
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where regular producers allocate goods and services while employing ‘standard operating 
procedures’, and where the role of service is restricted to providing feedback (Brudney and 
England, 1983). Co-production regards service users as active participants in the delivery 
process.
During the 1980s and 1990s however, the alternative of market provision was preferred. 
This included managerialism, privatizing services and contracting out (Hood, 1991). By 
adopting the private sector logic of producing goods, marketization preserved the boundary 
between the client as customer receiving the service and the regular producer providing the 
service. Emphasis was put on exit: by giving customers more options to choose between pro-
viders, service quality and user satisfaction was supposed to be enhanced. Recently, however, 
the goods-logic of marketization has been criticized for, inter alia, not addressing the role of 
users in the service delivery process (Osborne et al., 2013). The past few years, co-production 
has again been recognized as a promising (or even inevitable) strategy to improve service 
delivery, in academia as well as in public policy (Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006; Pestoff et al., 
2012). Most important in respect to this study, is the believe that co-production increases 
satisfaction with and trust in public service delivery (Fledderus, Brandsen, et al., 2014).
Co-production is defined here as an arrangement where both clients and ‘regular’ producers 
contribute a mix of activities at the point of delivery of public services. In a way, every service 
can be regarded as co-production: there is no teaching without listening to the teacher, 
and there is no medical service without adhering to doctor’s prescription. However, in this 
paper, we view co-production as a deliberate action of the service provider to increase users’ 
activities that are aimed at specific outcomes. Thus, services could have different levels of user 
involvement. To specify what we understand by co-production, we follow the definition 
of co-production by Brudney and England (1983). First, co-production is only considered 
within the stage of service delivery, which is also depicted as co-delivery (Bovaird, 2007). 
This excludes co-production of the process of formulating and designing policies and/or 
services. According to Boyle and Harris (2009: 17), this limitation actually denotes the 
real nature of co-production: it ‘is the antidote to the idea that we endlessly need to ask 
people’s opinion, before handing the service back to the professionals to deliver, since people 
will be involved in delivery as well’. To others, co-delivery should complement other stages 
of participation or vice-versa (Percy, 1984; Pestoff, 2009). However, especially when users 
are involved in co-delivery, a self-serving effect could be expected. When co-production is 
restricted to decision-making or consultation, it will be relatively easy for users to blame 
service failure (i.e. not reaching the expected outcome) on the service provider, as they are 
still responsible for delivery. Likewise, in such a situation it will be relatively difficult to take 
credit for success. Also, trust could be expected to be higher when users are involved in the 
delivery of services, compared to a situation where users are engaged in co-decision making, 
but are neglected in the actual implementation phase.
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A second specification of the definition of co-production refers to the inclusion of only 
‘positive’ and ‘active’ co-production: user activities that are consciously aimed at improv-
ing the (outcome of ) service (Brudney and England, 1983). On the contrary, ‘negative’ 
co-production entails ‘citizen activities that have a detrimental impact on community condi-
tions, such as vandalism, littering, youth gangs, and the like’ (Brudney and England, 1983: 
62). ‘Passive’ co-production refers to not undertaking certain actions, for instance refraining 
from littering or not helping the police with solving crimes (Brudney and England, 1983: 
62). These forms of co-production are outside the scope of our definition.
A third specification relates to the distinction between compliance and voluntary coop-
eration. Service users might co-produce because they fear sanctions when they refuse to do 
so. For example, within activation services, job-seekers are often required to perform certain 
activities, such as job application courses. Although mandatory co-production could some-
times be a strategy to include vulnerable service users (Fledderus, Brandsen, et al., 2014), in 
this study co-production is restricted to voluntary cooperation. It can be expected that in the 
case of obligatory behaviour, success will be less easily assigned to the regular producer. This 
will decrease the chance of the presence of a self-serving bias and thus provide a stricter test.
The last specification or rather an extension of the concept separates individual and 
collective (or community) co-production (Bovaird, 2007; Brudney and England, 1983). 
Individual co-production entails single user participation, which is primarily focused at 
gaining private value. However, co-production frequently includes an (organized) group of 
users. When residents form a neighbourhood watch to assist the police, they co-produce col-
lectively. The value created in such a situation is not only private, but it produces safety for a 
larger group (Alford, 2014). When group or public value is created through co-production, 
the impact of the efforts of a single user is much less straightforward compared to individual 
co-production. This might have an influence on how users attribute success and failure, and 
thus on the prevalence of the self-serving bias.
Co-production is argued to yield more positive results than ‘passive’ delivery of services. 
Two of these positive effects are considered to be trust and satisfaction, which will be de-
scribed in the following paragraphs.
The benefits of co-production: trust
Both levels of trust and satisfaction are used to assess the evaluation of services and policies 
by users. Although they are often statistically correlated, they measure distinct concepts. 
Trust can be defined as ‘the belief that others, through their action or inaction, will contrib-
ute to my/our well-being and refrain from inflicting damage upon me/us’ (Offe, 1999: 47). 
While satisfaction seems to relate directly to the outcomes of services, trust lies much closer 
to the evaluation of the process of services (Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2003; Van Ryzin, 
2015). Processes might matter to citizens as much as do outcomes. Processes entail different 
beneficial aspects such as fairness, respect, and honesty, whereas there may also be negative 
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aspects, such as red tape. Van Ryzin (2011) argues that such process characteristics have an 
impact on trust, and they are (presumably) elicited when users becomes part of the delivery 
process. Participation gives users more information about the process and it provides them 
with voice, which increases perceptions of inclusiveness, fairness and honesty (Herian et 
al., 2012). Co-production enhances users’ impression that professionals or public officials 
have respect for their capabilities. Furthermore, users are believed to value control over the 
services they receive, and they often would like to be more involved (Löffler et al., 2012; 
Pestoff, 2009).
Specifically, co-production will give people the feeling that their actions actually have 
an impact: because I join a neighbourhood watch, my neighbourhood is safer. This so-
called self-efficacy will decrease users’ feeling of risk, vulnerability and dependence, which 
has a positive influence on trust (Fledderus, Brandsen, et al., 2014). The more self-efficacy 
is increased, the less individuals refer to external causes of events (such as inferior services, 
or ‘the crisis’). Consequently, one can argue that co-production leads to users who feel less 
alienated from policies and services, because they will feel they can have an influence on their 
processes and outcomes. In health care, it appears that encouraging patient involvement 
indeed increases patients’ sense of control over their illness condition, builds effective rela-
tionships with physicians, and improves the perception of patients of professional support, 
which all positively affects trust in the physician (MacStravic, 2000; Ouschan et al., 2006; 
Pontes and Pontes, 1997).
Additionally, collective co-production could foster the creation of trust networks. Net-
works could be seen as a form of governance which mainly takes place when multiple actors 
are mutually dependent (Kickert et al., 1997). In networks, cooperation therefore the need 
to build trust is crucial. Trust is fostered through intensive levels of interaction (Considine 
and Lewis, 2003). This is especially visible in research on cooperatives. For instance, parental 
cooperatives in Swedish child care achieve high levels of parental involvement (Vamstad, 
2007, 2012). These centres show dense networks which include rights and obligations for 
engaged parents. Also, housing cooperatives exist, which are able to actively engage their 
residents in and around their near living environment (Brandsen and Helderman, 2012). 
They could be described as integrated communities where particularly in the older coopera-
tives social bonds and family ties still play a role. In both cases, trust among participants 
is particularly high. Yet, these cooperatives are run by citizens themselves, and there is 
little involvement of public bodies. It remains a question whether collective forms of co-
production also lead to more trust in public service providers. For instance, when a city 
park is maintained by a group of users, who collaborate with municipal workers, does trust 
increase in the municipality? When it is assumed that users value the involvement in public 
services, then this could be expected indeed.
The aforementioned arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
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H1: Users have more trust in the public service provider when they co-produce compared to users 
who do not co-produce, regardless of service outcome.
The benefits of co-production: satisfaction
Increasing the involvement of users in service delivery is expected to have a direct impact on 
the quality of the service, specifically on the outcome of the service (Bovaird and Downe, 
2008). Because users are often more knowledgeable of the content, costs and limitations of 
local services, the service quality will be enhanced (Brudney and England, 1983: 63). Also, 
‘by emphasizing user input into the productive process, co-production improves resources 
efficiency, making front-line providers and their managers more sensitive to user needs and 
preferences’ (Needham, 2008: 223). Especially beneficial for quality are so-called positive 
sum models, where both citizens and providers collaborate, instead of zero-sum approaches, 
where citizen contributions replace those of providers (Needham, 2008). Furthermore, the 
more users act as a collective, the more resources can be put into the delivery process, which 
enhances service quality. Hence, it is expected that outcomes are better achieved when users 
co-produce than when users are not involved in the service delivery.
However, it could very well be that in spite of client involvement, the desired outcome 
is not produced. For example, a patient does his upmost best to comply with the treatment 
for his illness but does not get any better. In such a case, disappointment about the out-
come could be turned against him- or herself (Hirschman, 1982). This especially will occur 
when people feel that the outcome is not achieved because of their own lack of capabilities 
(Bandura, 2001). On the other hand, people may be assured of their own capabilities, and 
feel the service provider (or other contextual variables) is the main cause of the detrimental 
outcome. When users are hardly involved in the service delivery, the latter perception will 
always prevail, as the service provider – not considering other contextual factors – is the only 
factor to blame for the outcome.
When co-production leads to the expected success, satisfaction with the service provider 
is thus expected to increase – assuming that the absence of co-production leads to unsuccess-
ful outcomes. But there is also the possibility that both options are able to achieve successful 
outcomes.
Consider two cities, both having troubles with keeping their municipal parks clean. City 
A chooses to increase their maintenance services, delivered in-house by municipal workers 
without the involvement of citizens. City B opts for a cooperative solution where residents 
work together with municipal workers to keep their park clean. Both options have the 
desired effect: the parks become cleaner. In which city is users’ satisfaction in the municipal-
ity higher? Proponents of co-production would probably go for City B. However, when 
the self-serving bias is taken into account, the picture could be very different. This will be 
addressed in the next section.
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Self-serving bias
As mentioned earlier, the self-serving bias refers to ‘a person’s tendency to claim more 
responsibility than a partner for success and less responsibility for failure in a situation in 
which an outcome is produced jointly’ (Bendapudi and Leone, 2003: 27). In contrast, when 
an outcome is produced solely by another party (e.g. a public organization), all the credit or 
blame for the outcome goes to this party. This means that when success is the outcome, users 
who co-produces give less credit to the provider for this result and are therefore less satisfied 
with the regular service provider than their counterparts who do not co-produce.
Several explanations for this effect have been proposed (Bradley, 1978). Motivational 
models state that people attribute failure to external factors because they like to protect their 
self-esteem or their public image; and they appoint success to themselves because it boosts 
their self-esteem or public image. Non-motivational models point at individuals’ expecta-
tions. Individuals might expect success more than failure, and people are more likely to 
ascribe expected outcomes to themselves than unexpected outcomes. Another explanation 
is that people who experience an increase in success are more likely to perceive a relation 
between response and outcome than individuals who experience (constant) failure. Most 
evidence however seems to support the motivational tendency of people to protect or en-
hance their self-image (rather than their public image) (see Knee and Zuckerman, 1996, for 
an overview).
The self-serving bias does not always seem to occur. When interpersonal activity consists 
of a powerful and a powerless actor, the former will be more likely to take blame for lack 
of success (Zuckerman, 1979). People feel responsible to take care for the weak, similar to 
a doctor who has the duty to help a patient. Persons with power can also afford to be more 
generous. Supporting this argument, studies have shown that teachers are less likely to show 
self-serving attribution, because their self-confidence is not threatened by giving credit to 
the student for their success or taking blame for their failure (Ross et al., 1974). Users of 
public services – especially social services –are however, in general, relatively powerless (as 
opposed to professionals or public officials). Hence, it will be more important for them to 
increase their self-image than for powerful actors. Therefore, the self-serving bias can indeed 
be expected when they co-produce.
Thus, when a service leads to successful outcomes – such as better health, safer neighbour-
hoods or higher quality education – co-producers are expected to be less satisfied with the 
service provider than service users who do not co-produce. Sometimes, a service might, 
unexpectedly, lead to even worse outcomes: a treatment of a doctor went wrong, or a rede-
signed university course has become actually poorer than the previous one. The self-serving 
bias entails that a user is less likely to take responsibility for the bad outcome, regardless of 
his or her participation in the process. Thus, for both co-production and ‘traditional’ service 
delivery, satisfaction will be the same (i.e. low) when failure is the outcome.
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In some circumstances, a public service is delivered, but the situation has not been im-
proved, nor has it been deteriorated. Since users expect an enhancement of the particular 
problem the service was provided for, this still will be perceived as failure. When there are 
high expectations for success, bad outcomes will be attributed to external factors (Harvey 
et al., 1974). Consequently, maintaining the status quo (the problem still exists, but did 
not become worse) is expected to lead to the same evaluation of the service, regardless of 
co-production.
This leads to the following hypotheses:
H2: When the outcome of a service is success, a user who co-produces is less satisfied with the public 
service provider than a user who does not co-produce.
H3: When the outcome of a service is deterioration, a user who co-produces as satisfied with the 
public service provider as a user who does not co-produce.
H4: When the outcome of a service is maintaining the status quo, a user who co-produces as 
satisfied with the public service provider as a user who does not co-produce.
Self-serving bias and collective co-production
Collective co-production complicates the problem of self-serving. In this case, users are not 
only able to blame (or give credit to) the regular service provider, but also to their fellow co-
producers. What does this mean for the influence of the self-serving bias on user satisfaction? 
A first expectation can be derived from social identification theory, which states that when 
people are appointed to a group, they will favour and defend that group (Tajfel, 1982). They 
like to make attributions which boost the reputation of their group, because it is regarded 
as part of the self (Sherman et al., 2007). Therefore, individuals want to identify themselves 
with successful groups, not with unsuccessful groups. When groups are perceived negatively, 
people want to distance themselves from these groups. This again could mean that in case of 
collective co-production and success, credit is given for the group and not for the provider, 
resulting in lower satisfaction with the public service provider. Bad outcomes will then not 
result in differences in satisfaction between collective co-production and non co-production. 
They are expected to be attributed to the regular service provider (just as is expected in the 
case of individual co-production), because users would like to protect the positive image of 
the group, especially when they are highly committed (Ellemers and Barreto, 2003).
Second, self-awareness appears to be a factor which influences the occurrence of the self-
serving bias (Zuckerman, 1979). When people are focused on the activities of other persons 
(i.e. when self-awareness is low), they are more likely to attribute success to these persons, 
while individuals tend to attribute failure more often to external factors when subjects are 
focused on themselves (i.e. when self-awareness is high). When users co-produce together 
with other users, self-awareness can be expected to decrease. This could mean that attribu-
tion of success will be shifted from the user himself towards other users. Satisfaction with 
the public service provider will again be lower than when users do not co-produce. In case 
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of failure, however, – in contrast to social identification theory – less self-awareness implies 
that collective co-production leads to higher satisfaction with the service provider compared 
to non co-production. In other words, because users are more focused on the group of users, 
failure will be more likely attributed to the group, not to the service organization.
There is considerable evidence for the negative impact of negative evaluation of one’s 
group on one’s self esteem (Ellemers and Barreto, 2003). Therefore, we follow social iden-
tification theory that users will try to protect the image of their group. This leads to the 
following hypotheses:
H5: When the outcome of a service is success, users who collectively co-produce are less satisfied 
with the public service provider than users who do not collectively co-produce.
H6: When the outcome of a service is deterioration, users who collectively co-produce are as satis-
fied with the public service provider than users who do not collectively co-produce.
H7: When the outcome of a service is maintaining the status quo, users who collectively co-
produce are less satisfied with the public service provider than service users who do not collectively 
co-produce.
Methods
The study follows the design of Bendapudi and Leone’s research (2003). Their study was 
based upon a survey among students with six vignettes of the purchase of goods and private 
services. Bendapudi and Leone (2003) explain that the use of projective scenarios is common 
practice in the marketing and psychology literatures. Such vignettes have little influence of 
social desirability effects and have good external validity. Furthermore, they note that even 
if subjects put themselves in someone else’s shoes, adopting an ‘observer’ stance rather than 
a ‘actor’ stance, it would represent a conservative study of the self-serving bias, because 
studies have shown that the effect is reduced when events related to another instead of to 
oneself are described. Moreover, it is known that children and older people tend to show 
more attributional biases, while adolescents and adults show them less (Mezulis et al., 2004). 
Therefore, using students as subjects also implies a more conservative test of the potential 
presence of a self-serving bias.
For this study, six scenarios were developed too, but this time they described experiences 
with public service delivery. The survey was distributed through e-mail amongst students of 
Public Administration and Political Science (n=174, 88 men, 86 women, mean age 21.2). 
Students received an email with a link to the online survey. A small lottery incentive (a 50 
Euro voucher) was included.
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Designing the vignettes
Each scenario represents one of six possible manipulations: two levels of client participation, 
non co-production versus co-production, and three outcome levels: an improvement of 
the situation, status quo of the situation, or a deterioration of the situation. Furthermore, 
three scenarios of co-production entail collective co-production, whereas the other three 
consist of individual co-production. All students received six scenarios but the conditions 
were randomly assigned. The scenarios describe the experiences of different students (with 
male names for male respondents and female names for female respondents). Students were 
asked to put themselves in the student’s shoes and indicate how they thought the student 
would respond in each setting. After the outcome was presented, students gave an evaluation 
of the service provider in terms of satisfaction and trust as if they were the student (e.g., 
‘how satisfied with the general practitioner do you think Esther is?’, ‘how much trust does 
Esther have in the general practitioner according to you?’). Respondents had to rate the 
public service provider on a 0 (‘not satisfied at all’, ‘does not trust at all’) to 10 (‘completely 
satisfied’, ‘trusts completely’) scale.
A few considerations were made before constructing the vignettes. Whether the self-serving 
bias is elicited depends on salience of the problem. When people do not care about the outcome, 
it is of little value to attribute success to their ability. If failure is the outcome, people will easily 
attribute this to their lack of ability, as it is not of any importance to the individual (Zucker-
man, 1979). Therefore, each scenario consists of a problem that concerns the student. This also 
improves the believability of the vignettes, because people are more inclined to co- produce 
when they are aware of a shortfall in public performance on outcomes (Parrado et al., 2013).
Table 1. Description of the vignettes
I. Situations (common to all subjects)
A.  Bart is suffering from a physical complaint. He meets his general practitioner and he explains 
what his symptoms are.
B.  Jeroen is graduated and has been looking for a job quite a while. Because he receives a benefit from 
the municipality, he has a talk with his client manager at the municipality about finding a job.
C.  Mark rents a room from the students housing corporation. He is regularly disturbed by the litter 
at the porch of his building. One day, he meets the caretaker of his building and speaks to him 
about his complaint.
D.  Lately there have been quite some burglaries in the neighbourhood where Thomas lives. They 
also tried to break-in at Thomas’ place. The police have organized a meeting to talk about the 
safety of the neighbourhood. Thomas attends this meeting.
E.  Tim just followed a course of his educational programme. The students’ educational committee, 
of which Tim is a member, evaluates the course with the lecturer. It appears that the both the 
lecturer and the students agree that the content of the course is outdated.
F.  There is a lot of litter in the park that Dennis often visits. He complains about this at the 
municipality. A municipal worker says they have been informed about the rubbish.
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Furthermore, following Bendapudi and Leone (2003), the scenarios were developed in such 
a fashion that the actual process of service delivery runs as expected: in each scenario, there 
was a problem which gets handled as promised (with or without user participation), but only 
the outcome is different. This design enables to compare evaluations between individual, col-
lective co-production and non co-production scenarios, and also evaluations between levels of 
outcome.In Table 1, the different vignettes are described. The first three (A, B, C) are examples 
of individual co-production, with the following problems: health, unemployment and house 
litter. The last three (D, E, F) are scenarios in which users collectively co-produce to solve 
problems with burglaries, the quality of a university course and park litter.
Table 1. Description of the vignettes (continued)
II. Manipulation of co-production (between subjects)
A1.  The general practitioner prescribes a treatment.
A2.  The general practitioner provides information about the complaint and asks Bart what kind of 
treatment he prefers. Together, they agree to a treatment plan.
B1.  The client manager says that the municipality informs Jeroen about new job possibilities.
B2.  The client manager says that Jeroen is eligible for a learn-work programme. Within this 
programme of 32 hours per week, Jeroen will receive additional education and job experience. 
Jeroen decides to take part.
C1.  The caretaker announces to pay more attention to cleaning the porch.
C2.  The caretaker says he has not enough time to clean everything so often, but points to the 
possibility to receive discount on your service costs if students help for two times per month with 
cleaning the building. Mark is interested and accepts this offer.
D1. The district police officer announces that there will be more often patrolled in the neighbourhood.
D2. The district police officer talks about Citizen Net. If residents sign up to Citizen Net, they will be 
notified after something has happened, for instance a burglary, and they are able to provide tips 
to the police. Thomas, together with other residents, signs up for Citizen Net after the meeting.
E1. The lecturer announces to reform the course next year.
E2.  The lecturer asks a few students, including Tim, to reform the course. The participating students 
will also take part in lecturing as student-assistants next year. Tim decides to participate together 
with other students.
F1.  The municipality announces in a letter to residents that live around the park that more garbage 
bins will be placed and there will be more regular cleaning.
F2.  During a meeting with residents that live near the park the municipality asks visitors to help 
cleaning the park due to insufficient resources. The municipality takes care of material, such 
as garbage bags and trash pickers, and will dispose waste. The visitors take care of a cleaning 
schedule. Dennis, together with other regular visitors, decides to participate.
III. Manipulation of outcomes (between subjects)
A. Complaint gets worse, remains the same, disappears.
B. Gets no invitations for job applications, gets a few job applications without success, gets a job.
C. Litter gets worse, remains the same, is much less.
D. Burglaries increase, remain the same, decrease.
E. Course quality gets worse, remains the same, improves.
F. Litter gets worse, remains the same, is much less.
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Manipulation check
A small focus group of students was constituted to pre-test the probability of the scenarios 
and the comprehensiveness of the questions. After this, the survey was tested for probability 
and co-production levels (n=42; this test-survey was completed by students who did not par-
take in the final survey) to assure that respondents were able to identify with the vignettes’ 
subjects, and to validate the manipulation (co-production versus non co-production). Table 
2 shows the results of this testing. Probability was measured by a 1 (‘not at all probable) to 7 
(‘very probable’) scale. For all the scenarios where no co-production takes place, probability 
is good (average 5.55).
Probability is lower when it comes to co-production (average 4.80). This is not surprising: 
in reality, co-production is also a less developed strategy than service delivery by profession-
als or public officials alone. Especially in both the litter vignettes, probability is low. The 
focus group revealed that students think students are not easily inclined to clean, although 
they do think this might happen among older residents in particular neighbourhoods. 
Co-production, also measured by a 1 (‘not at all involved’) to 7 (‘very much involved’) 
scale, was significantly higher in the co-production scenarios than in the other cases (mean 
co-production 6.02, mean non co-production 3.22, p <.01), which validates the intended 
manipulation.
Results
For each outcome (improvement, status quo, deterioration) satisfaction and trust levels 
were compared across non-co-produced services and co-produced services. The correlation 
between trust and satisfaction was generally high, varying between moderate (.68) and 
extreme (.90) correlations in the different vignettes. This means that in some cases, there 
Table 2. Involvement and probability of the vignettes
Probability Involvement
NCP CP NCP CP
A. Health problem 6 .65 (.64) 6 .00 (.88) 3.87 (1.84) 6 .16 (.60)
B. Unemployment 5.25 (1.33) 5.05 (1.29) 3.35 (1.60) 5 .73 (.98)
C. House litter 5.46 (1.56) 3.67 (1.53) 2.21 (1.14) 5.72 (1.27)
D. Burglaries 5.25 (1.19) 5 .61 (.85) 2.42 (1.34) 5 .61 (.61)
E. Course quality 5.58 (1.02) 4.65 (1.47) 4.42 (2.06) 6 .65 (.49)
F. Park litter 5.12 (1.07) 3.81 (1.68) 3.04 (1.59) 6 .25 (.68)
NCP= no co-production, CP= co-production; averages on seven point scales; standard deviation with-
in parentheses
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is hardly any empirical difference between measures of trust and satisfaction. Yet, as not 
all correlations are extreme, and we expected a conceptual difference between trust and 
satisfaction, we started with multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). This procedure 
reduces potential type 1 errors that could occur when choosing for multiple ANOVAs for 
the two dependent variables instead. When the MANOVA tests did not show a significant 
effect of co-production on the combined variable of trust and satisfaction across different 
outcome levels (p<.05), we did not look at the differences between trust and satisfaction. 
When a significant effect was found, we continued to analyse the differences between trust 
and satisfaction by employing ANOVAs.
As already suggested by the high correlation between trust and satisfaction, the ANOVAs 
did not show many differences in the effect of co-production on the two measures of service 
evaluation. This can be observed when comparing the satisfaction and trust levels in Table 3, 
which presents the results of the ANOVAs. Perceived trust seems to follow the same pattern 
as feelings of satisfaction, with only a few exceptions.
Hypothesis H1 stated that because trust is related to the process of service delivery, and 
co-production is supposed to be valued by users, trust should be higher in cases of co-
production than in cases of traditional service delivery, regardless of the outcome. Actually, 
in not a single case, trust is higher among co-producers than among non-co-producers. In 
half of the cases trust is lower in public services when they are co-produced; in the other half 
trust is as high as when they are not co-produced.
The same result is found for satisfaction levels. When the outcome entails an improve-
ment of the situation, in three of the cases (house litter, burglary and park litter), satisfaction 
with the service provider is lower when users have co-produced than when no co-production 
took place. This could mean that in these circumstances, people take credit for success, re-
sulting in lower satisfaction. For the health problem, unemployment and course quality, no 
differences in satisfaction are found. Here, no self-serving bias can be observed. Hypothesis 
H2 is thus partially confirmed, partially disconfirmed. While the lower satisfaction levels 
of one of the three cases of individual co-production could be explained by a self-serving 
bias, this is true in two of the three cases when it concerns collective co-production. Indeed, 
partially supporting H5, collective co-production results in a self-serving bias, because suc-
cess is probably attributed to the group, instead of to the service provider.
H3 predicted that when the outcome is a deterioration of the problem, there will be no 
differences in satisfaction between co-production and non co-production. This appears to be 
the case in two cases (health problem and course quality). In four of the six cases, satisfaction 
with public service delivery is lower when the outcome is bad after co-production compared 
to non co-production. Hence, most of the evidence refutes H3. Also expectation H6, stating 
that when deterioration is the result there are no differences in satisfaction between collective 
co-production and non co-production, is proven false in two of the three cases (burglary and 
park litter).
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Propositions H4 and H7 say that there are no differences in satisfaction between indi-
vidually and collectively co-produced and traditionally provided services when the outcome 
involves maintaining the status-quo. This is confirmed in the unemployed, house litter and 
course quality cases. In the burglary and park litter examples however, users are less satisfied 
with public service delivery when they have co-produced. When users are asked to co-produce 
with their doctor and the health problem remains the same, people are more satisfied than 
when they are not asked to co-produce. This is the only case where co-producers are more 
positive about public service delivery than passive clients.
Analysis
The results showed that co-production did not lead to higher satisfaction and trust rates 
compared to non co-production. Also, there were no clear patterns in the differences be-
tween individual and collective co-production. Thus, whereas Bendapudi and Leone (2003) 
evidently showed that user involvement leads to less satisfaction with successful services 
compared to non-involvement, it is less definite in present study. The self-serving bias could 
only partially explain the results. To gain more insight in these unexpected results, a member 
check was held with eight students who participated in the survey was convened to discuss 
possible alternative explanations. Member checks are used to increase the internal validity, 
usually in quantitative research. During a member check, respondents are asked whether 
they agree with description, interpretations and conclusions of the researcher(s) (Swanborn, 
1996). This possibly leads to new insights, for instance by checking whether other unmea-
sured variables, besides the manipulation, have had an impact on user evaluations of the 
service provider. The information gathered from the member checks are integrated in the 
analysis below.
In three of the six cases, co-producers were less satisfied with the service provider. Two 
of these cases, the housing and park litter vignettes, were defined as not very probable in 
the survey testing. In the focus group, students argued that cleaning public space is not 
the responsibility of citizens. People might take more responsibility for success when they 
actually feel the service provider is solely responsible for the service and they should not 
be co-producing. Still, the burglary case was perceived as probable, but did show lower 
satisfaction. The focus group revealed that in this case, as well as in the litter cases, the 
presence of the regular service providers is less visible than in the other cases. In the health 
care vignette, the doctor still carries out his job; in the educational course example, the 
teacher is still actively involved; and in the unemployment case, the municipality puts effort 
in organizing a reemployment programme. In the three cases where satisfaction was lower, 
the local authorities were much less present. This probably gave students the feeling that they 
were left alone and therefore took credit for success.
Chapter 6 | Does co-production increase satisfaction and trust?
112
Often, poor outcomes as a result of co-production led to low satisfaction with public 
service delivery, while no differences with traditional delivery were expected. This might 
be explained by the fact that the study design did not manipulate the process: each time, 
the service was delivered as promised. Therefore, when people do not co-produce, and the 
situation worsens, they might not blame the organization (because it did what it promised), 
but think of external conditions. For example, in the negative outcome of the burglary case, 
the police did patrol more often, so the police cannot be blamed for not being present more 
often. On the other hand, in the co-production case, the negative outcome did not mention 
efforts of the police. Hence, when people co-produce and the service fails, people might feel 
that the service provider was actually not involved enough, which is reflected in low satisfac-
tion. This explanation is actually in line with the self-awareness hypothesis: the less people 
are aware of their own efforts, the less they will show a self-serving bias. Consequently, 
service providers would be able to diminish the self-serving bias by emphasizing the mutual 
character of co-production: both the ‘regular producer’ and the user provide resources e.g. 
time, efforts, money) to improve the quality of the service. Service providers should make 
sure they remain visible in the process of co-production.
Public service providers which make use of co-production might also want to invest in 
establishing a close relationship with users. As said, research has shown that people are less 
likely to demonstrate the self-serving bias when the bond with the partner is stronger. When 
individuals work together with friends rather than strangers, they are more eager to share 
credit as well as the blame (Campbell et al., 2000).
Discussion
A vignette design was used to investigate differences in satisfaction and trust between co-
produced and non co-produced services. Such an experimental setting has clear advantages, 
but it has also some limitations. In this section, these limitations are discussed and some 
directions for future research are suggested.
The co-production vignettes described a situation where students were always willing to 
be involved in the service delivery. In practice, citizens are not likely to co-produce with a 
service provider without some knowledge about or connection with that service provider. 
Specifically, co-production probably cannot take place without trust between the professional 
and the user: for instance, students will not engage in cleaning their flat if the caretaker has 
never spoken to the tenants before; a teacher will not activate students if he or she never 
engages in a dialogue with the class. In other words, a certain amount of trust probably must 
exist before users co-produce. When there is mutual trust, users are probably less inclined to 
take all credit for success and none for failure. Unfortunately, the design of this study makes 
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it difficult to imitate a personal relationship with professionals or public officials. Hence, the 
self-serving bias might be less present in practice than shown in this study.
The study did not incorporate personal characteristics, which might influence the occur-
rence of the self-serving bias. As already mentioned, (young) adults show less attributional 
biases than children and the elderly. Although theory suggest that women are more likely 
to attribute failure internally and success externally than men, meta-analysis only finds this 
effect during adulthood (i.e. 25-55 years old) (Mezulis et al., 2004). Also in present study, 
satisfaction and trust levels between women and men were compared, but only few, non-
systematic, significant differences were found. Also psychological traits, such as high internal 
locus of control, high self-esteem and high self-efficacy might lead to a higher self-serving 
bias (Silver et al., 1995; Tennen and Herzberger, 1987; Zuckerman, 1979). As it is likely that 
healthy academic students boast more positive self-evaluations than average clients of welfare 
services, this would imply that in reality, self-serving bias would actually be less pronounced.
The salience of particular issues may also be different for students than for other publics. 
For instance, highly educated citizens may desire less support from the government when 
they are unemployed and job seeking than lowly educated citizens. The salience of a certain 
issue thus likely determines the propensity to co-produce in the first place. In the vignettes, it 
was tried to clearly state the salience of the problem for the student, but it was not measured 
whether the respondents indeed perceived this salience. Furthermore, as mentioned, when 
users do co-produce, but the salience is low, they are less concerned with attributing success 
to themselves (Zuckerman, 1979). Future research should incorporate perceived salience 
and draw upon a broader public than students, to analyse differences in the propensity to 
co-produce (within different sectors) between students and the general population.
Furthermore, the presence of a self-serving bias within co-production of public service 
delivery might differ between countries. Heine and Lehman (1997) argue that in collectivist 
cultures, the bias is less likely to occur compared to individualistic cultures. In countries such 
as Japan, Korea and Thailand people are less prone to overemphasize the uniqueness of one’s 
own success. In individualistic cultures, a meaningful cultural entity relies on the identifica-
tion and confirmation of the self, while in collectivist cultures self-enhancement relies much 
more on shared expectations and norms. Furthermore, there could be country differences 
when it comes to expectations of public service delivery. In highly developed welfare states, 
citizens might expect much more of governments in terms of quantity and quality of services 
than citizens in less developed countries. When expectations are low, people are less inclined 
to make self-serving attributions (Zuckerman, 1979).
Surprisingly, the process of co-production does not lead to more trust. Apparently, being 
involved in the delivery of services is not valued by users. The theory that participation in 
public services gives users feelings of fairness, respect and inclusiveness is not supported. 
In this study, the service user was not presented with a choice; the user just decided to 
co-produce. It might be that giving users an explicit choice between ‘traditional’ delivery 
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and co-production, increases perceptions of fair procedure, honest and respectful service 
providers. Choice may also mitigate the self-serving bias (Bendapudi and Leone, 2003). Ad-
ditionally, choice increases the role for motivations. When people choose for co-production, 
they are likely to be motivated to be involved in service delivery and they will not only value 
the process (in terms of trust), but will also be less inclined to take credit for success and will 
more easily take some blame for failure (Arkin et al., 1976).
Finally, this research uses relatively simple measurements of satisfaction and trust. Future 
research might use multiple item scales to improve the reliability of these measures. This 
could also improve the empirical distinction between the two concepts, in order to reveal 
differences in the effect of co-production. Furthermore, in reality, people evaluate public 
services on a whole array of characteristics (e.g. the length of a queue, politeness of civil 
servants, or general attitude towards the public sector). To gain more insight in conditions 
of satisfaction and trust-building through co-production, qualitative studies among specific 
cases (e.g. particular group of users, different sectors, and various intensities of activity) 
could be very useful.
Conclusion
This research explored the relationship between individual and collective co-production 
of public service delivery and user trust and satisfaction, and addressed the potential self-
serving bias in this context. This study has shown that even when the process runs smoothly, 
co-production does not necessarily lead to higher satisfaction or trust. Service users do not 
seem to value participation in service delivery, as proponents of co-production, who regard 
it as a possibility to renew democracy, assume (Pestoff, 2009). Claims that collective co-
production is a better strategy to build trust than individual co-production (e.g. Needham, 
2008) are also not supported.
Yet, the idea that co-production is an alternative strategy which should be preferred above 
traditional (or market-type) delivery increasingly finds its way into the literature (Pestoff et 
al., 2012) as well as into policy formulation, especially in the UK (Boyle and Harris, 2009; 
Löffler et al., 2012). For instance, the idea of the Big Society leans on the idea that ‘we need 
to draw on the skills and expertise of people across the country as we respond to the social, 
political and economic challenges Britain faces’ (Cabinet Office, 2010). In the Netherlands, 
the idea of a ‘participation society’ was coined in the Kings’ speech of 2013, denoting that 
‘everybody who can, is asked to take responsibility for his or her own life and environment’ 
(King’s speech, the Netherlands, 2013). Thus, in times of austerity, governments seek possi-
bilities to increase the input of citizens in order to preserve the quantity and quality of public 
services. The question is: can the search for efficiency be combined with higher satisfaction 
with and trust in public service providers – or government as a whole? This study suggests 
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that there might be a trade-off between these two outcomes: when people co-produce they 
might still expect the presence and involvement of the service provider.
In particular this study has shown that further research is needed to investigate how 
the division in responsibility between the ‘regular producer’ and service users affects their 
satisfaction and trust. This study implies that poor outcomes will be blamed on government 
because co-producers might feel left alone by government when the service fails. How much 
can government leave to users and how strong must their supportive role be in order to gain 
positive evaluations? The missing link, we suggest, is knowledge about the conditions which 
affect people’s appreciation of the process of co-production. Without understanding these 
conditions, regarding co-production as the best alternative for public service delivery could 
be inappropriate. Comparative qualitative as well as quantitative research should focus in 
particular on the motivations of citizens to co-produce, of their expectations about the role 
of the service provider, and their expectations of the co-production process as a whole.

7 
Conclusion and discussion
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Introduction
The goal of this study has been to critically assess the expectation that co-production of 
public service delivery is able to foster trust in service delivery, trust in (local) government 
and generalized trust. This has been one of the arguments that governments and service 
providers have used to increase the involvement of users in service delivery. Now that co-
production is increasingly embraced as a key driver for public service reforms, it is necessary 
to enhance our knowledge about this topic. Therefore, this study attempted to answer the 
following research question: to what extent does co-production of public service delivery by users 
lead to trust in service delivery, trust in (local) government and generalized trust; and by which 
mechanisms and conditions can this relationship be explained?
In the following section, the research question will be answered by systematically answer-
ing the formulated sub questions. After this, the theoretical and methodological innovations 
of the study are discussed. Then, the theoretical and methodological gaps that still remain are 
described. This chapter ends with the practical implications of the study.
Answers to the research questions
Whereas the relation between co-production and trust has been mentioned frequently, no 
efforts have been made to explicate why this relation would exist. Chapter 2 takes on this 
challenge by answering the question: What are mechanisms described in the literature that can 
explain the relation between co-production and trust? Two explanations were identified, one at 
the individual level and another at the collective level. The mechanism at the individual level 
states that co-production may lead to self-efficacy. When users co-produce, the expectation 
is that they will develop a sense of control – not only over the service, but over their own 
actions in general. This is particularly fostered through face-to-face interaction with profes-
sional staff, which allows users to negotiate experience and outcomes with personnel, gaining 
influence the service delivery in turn. Hence, an increase in perceived control relates to a 
perception of professional support and responsiveness, which is believed to be beneficial for 
trust in the service provider. Also, people with high levels of perceived control will feel less 
risk in trusting other citizens.
The second mechanism, at the collective level, holds that co-production may lead to the 
creation of trust networks. Collective co-production stands for co-production where multiple 
users co-produce simultaneously for a shared cause. Collective co-production may enhance 
intensive levels of interaction within a small and cohesive network of users. It requires 
cooperation between users, who often pursue the same goals. For instance, housing coopera-
tives try to uphold high quality of the buildings and living environment by high levels of 
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co-production (Brandsen and Helderman, 2012). The same background of users and the 
familiarity among users is expected to increase trust among users.
The theoretical elaboration in chapter 2 also points at possible barriers for these mecha-
nisms to take place. For instance, the creation of trust networks among users may be benefi-
cial for generalized trust, but it could also be that trust does not expand beyond the level of 
the network – closed communities may increase ‘bonding’ trust rather than ‘bridging’ trust. 
The problem of motivation is also mentioned: why would users co-produce in the first place? 
Could it be that some people are more eager to co-produce than others?
Furthermore, an important conclusion of the theoretical elaboration in chapter 2 is that 
in order to study the effect of co-production on trust, a multi-stage model needs to be 
adopted. It is not sufficient to only assess the evaluation phase, it is also necessary to gain 
insights in the initial and process phase.
Chapter 3 expands this approach by also taking into account the different levels of ac-
tors involved in co-production. This means not only focusing on the user side, but also by 
taking into account the position of public service organizations (PSOs): what compels actors 
to pursue co-production? Commonly, it is taken for granted that organizations profit from in-
volving users as co-producers: it could reduce costs and increase responsiveness, for instance. 
This chapter contributes to the discussion by showing that this might not be the case. An 
uncertainty approach was adopted, which started from the assumption that users as well as 
organizations desire and benefit from reducing uncertainty. It was argued that co-production 
might indeed lead to a reduction of uncertainty for users. For PSOs, however, co-production 
might well mean an increase in uncertainty. This could be an obstruction for public service 
organizations to allow users to act as a genuine partner in service delivery. When the options 
to co-produce are limited, restricted or only symbolical, this may have a negative effect on 
the building of trust in general. PSOs might respond differently to this uncertainty, depend-
ing on the institutional context. Specifically, strategies to deal with uncertainty may differ 
according to the level of discretion that staff of PSOs is allotted or the level of bureaucratic 
control. Thus, this chapter points at the importance of the organizational practice and the 
institutional context in order to understand the effects of co-production.
One of the possibilities to reduce uncertainty is to make use of selection procedures in 
order to attract those users which are more likely to conform to the organizational goals. 
However, this might lead to a selection effect: the inclusion of a particular group of users 
– those with high levels of motivation, often well-educated, native and healthy – whereas 
less-equipped citizens are excluded from co-produced service delivery. In the literature, how-
ever, co-production is praised for its possibility to ‘empower’ vulnerable citizens (Needham, 
2009; Wilson, 1994). This leads to the first empirical, descriptive sub question what are 
the characteristics of users involved in co-production? Chapter 4 discusses and investigates this 
issue. Next to organizational selection, this chapter points at the possibility of self-selection: 
those who are more motivated and trusting will also be more likely to initiate or compelled 
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to co-production. By comparing participants of a co-production activation programme 
(work corporations) with citizens who did not participate, it is indeed shown that high 
levels of motivation and trust predict the willingness to co-produce. Other characteristics, 
such as health and ethnicity did not matter. This is a very important result, as it affects the 
possibility for co-production to build trust: when it is already high, it becomes more difficult 
to increase. This could also mean that the causal relation between co-production and trust 
is reversed: trust is required for users to co-produce, and is not necessarily the result of 
co-production.
Furthermore, it may lead to the exclusion of those citizens who would actually profit 
the most from successfully co-produced services. This could have negative consequences for 
either the users who abstain from co-production or the users who do co-produce. First, those 
who are excluded could suffer from inequality in quality of services (when co-produced 
services reach better outcomes); or from the possibility that PSOs are mostly responsive 
towards the needs of the users who co-produce, as they have the most direct contact with 
PSO staff. Second, those who are co-producing may feel that while they are concentrating 
their efforts on the delivery of the service, others profit from these efforts (i.e. free-riding). 
Thus indeed, before addressing the process and effects of co-production, it is necessary to 
study the initial phase to understand who are involved in co-production.
Chapter 5 continues the empirical research initiated in chapter 4, addressing the explana-
tory question: what are mechanisms and conditions that explain the relation between co-pro-
duction and trust? Is co-production, regardless of possible selection effects, still able to foster 
trust? To answer this question, it takes into account the insights from chapter 2 and 3. This 
involves testing whether the mechanisms of self-efficacy and trust networks can be found in 
practice, and scrutinizing conditional factors that determine whether co-production takes 
place and has effect. The conditional factors included factors at the individual level (e.g. 
motivation), the organizational level (e.g. organizational support), and the institutional level 
(e.g. goal pressures). By following participants of work corporations over time, it was shown 
that self-efficacy did not increase and that trust networks were not fostered. Importantly, 
trust at different levels decreased significantly instead of the expected increase. This result 
alone is already important, as it raises awareness that co-production will not always produce 
the expected outcomes.
Furthermore, it appeared that changes in trust in other users were stronger (positively) 
related to changes in trust in the service provider and generalized trust than changes in 
self-efficacy. This indicates the importance of studying the interactions between users in 
cases of collective co-production, rather than focusing on individuals solely. The study also 
revealed important conditional factors that might determine whether co-production leads to 
trust or not, such as motivation, organizational support, commitment and space for higher 
levels of user participation. When motivation to co-produce diminishes, trust will less easily 
be improved. The same counts if support for co-productive efforts is lacking, or if commit-
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ment to the co-production is low. In case of the work corporations, organizational support 
was often not optimal, commitment to the service was relatively low, and there were little 
possibilities for users to become involved in service design (i.e. ‘voice’), possibly explaining 
why trust generally did not increase.
Another suggested explanation for the decrease in trust among participants of work 
corporations was the disappointment that arose among the participants when they got closer 
to the end of the programme. It then became clear that it is extremely difficult for them to 
return to the labour market, even though they had put many efforts into the programme 
during quite some time. An important question is then: to what extent does the evaluation 
of co-produced services depend on the result of the service? Chapter 6 delves into this issue. 
Previous studies in the field of service management (Bendapudi and Leone, 2003) suggested 
that co-producing individuals might blame the organization for negative outcomes, whereas 
positive outcomes are attributed to themselves. This self-serving bias predicts that, assuming 
the outcome of the service is successful, satisfaction with and trust in the service provider will 
be lower in the case of co-production compared to services that are delivered by an organiza-
tion solely. This is because in the latter case, users cannot but attribute the success to the 
organization, whereas in the former, users also take some credit for themselves. In a vignette 
experiment, the presence of this psychological effect was indeed shown for co-production of 
safety and litter removal, but not for co-production of health, education, and reemployment 
services. Still, in none of the cases, trust and satisfaction in the service provider was higher 
for co-production than no co-production.
A focus group in which the experiment results were discussed provided explanations for 
the finding that the self-serving bias was stronger in some of the cases. The most plausible 
explanation seemed to point at the experienced support of the PSO. When the visibility 
and involvement of the PSO was believed to be low, they were stronger blamed for negative 
outcomes and less rewarded for positive outcomes. This is in line with what was found in 
chapter 5.
An answer to the general research question can now be formulated. Three parts can be 
distinguished in the research question. First, to what extent does co-production lead to trust 
in public service delivery, (local) government, and generalized trust? This study found that 
the experience of co-production may actually lead to a decrease in trust in public service 
delivery, in trust in (local) government, and in generalized trust. Second, which mechanisms 
can explain this relationship? Theoretically, co-production could enhance feelings of self-
efficacy on the one hand, and it could create trust networks among users on the other hand. 
Empirical research shows that the collective mechanism of trust networks seems to relate 
more strongly to changes in trust in service delivery and generalized trust than the individual 
mechanism of self-efficacy. Third, under which conditions does co-production lead to trust in 
service delivery? The study found that a positive relation between co-production and trust 
is highly dependent upon the motivations and commitment of users, the organizational 
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practice (including giving support to users and providing users with options for voice) and 
the institutional context (including the institutional pressure on PSOs to deliver outcomes 
that are difficult to unite with co-production). The fact that current research often focuses on 
appealing and successful case studies might have led to an incomplete view on the possible 
pitfalls of co-production. Both theoretically and empirically, the picture seems to be more 
complex than often assumed.
Theoretical, methodological and practical contributions
In this section, the contributions of this study to the research field of co-production are 
discussed, in terms of theory, methods, and practice. Specifically, it deals with the questions: 
what were the knowledge gaps at the beginning of this study? What did this study contribute 
to these knowledge gaps? And what does this mean for future research?
Theory
Current research on co-production often focuses on a single stage of the service delivery 
chain. Particularly, there seems to be much attention for the initial phase, in terms of ques-
tions on motivation (Bovaird et al., 2015; Van Eijk and Steen, 2014) and distributional 
biases (Clark et al., 2013; Jakobsen and Andersen, 2013; John, 2009). Other research has 
focused on the process of co-production (Bovaird and Löffler, 2012; Cepiku and Giordano, 
2013; Isett and Miranda, 2015; Meijer, 2011). Finally, only little research revolves around 
the outcomes and outputs of co-production (Marks, 2009; Vamstad, 2012). Importantly, 
the interplay between the three stages (initial, process, and evaluation) is often neglected.
Also, most research on co-production fails to integrate the coexisting processes that 
take place at the different levels (the individual, the organizational, and institutional). For 
example, research on the initial phase mostly focuses at the individual level (the motivations 
of users, the distribution bias of users), but only exceptions mention the role that PSOs have 
at this point (Alford, 2009a). Scholars working on the process stage of co-production either 
put emphasis on the individual experiences (Pestoff, 2006), on how it affects professional 
staff in their interaction with users (Cepiku and Giordano, 2013), and in rare cases on 
the influence of the institutional environment on co-production (Joshi and Moore, 2004; 
Tuurnas et al., 2014). Sparse research on the evaluation stage of co-production does combine 
effects at the individual and organizational level (Marks, 2009; Vamstad, 2012), but devotes 
little attention to the institutional context. This is a serious flaw, since this study showed that 
all levels may have a large impact on the design and practice of co-production, and therefore 
on the effects on co-production.
A first insight of adopting a multistage/multilevel approach was that studying the effects 
of co-productions fares well by having a multidisciplinary framework. For instance, some 
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disciplines are clearly better for explaining phenomena at the individual level, whereas other 
are more suited for phenomena at the organizational level. Thus, social cognitive theory has 
been used for explaining individual level and group processes; organizational theories for 
the behaviour of organizations that are confronted with user involvement; and institutional 
theory for the influence of the institutional environment on the behaviour of organiza-
tions and users. Such a multidisciplinary theory was pursued to understand all the processes 
that take place at different stages and levels of the service delivery chain. For instance, the 
psychological attribution theory on the self-serving bias was necessary to understand the 
evaluation of co-produced service delivery by citizens. Yet, to grasp the reaction of PSOs to 
institutional pressures, institutional theory was needed, whereas psychological theories are 
less useful here.
Second, the multistage approach has indeed provided a better view on the relation be-
tween co-production and trust. The incorporation of the initial stage showed that high levels 
of motivation and trust are already important for the initiation of co-production. This also 
means that there is a relatively high risk that these levels drop when expectations are not met. 
Taking the process stage into account led to insights in the interaction between users and 
between users and professional staff. This study showed the importance of the supportive 
role of professional staff and the ability of staff to create a sense of community. Assessing 
the evaluation stage, finally, provided important information about attribution mechanisms. 
The latter research on the evaluation stage, in particular the self-serving bias, showed that 
even if co-production leads to desired results, it does not automatically mean that the rela-
tion between citizens and service providers – and ultimately government – improves. It 
seemed to be that especially in the cases where the service provider was less present, the 
self-serving bias was stronger. This finding supports the assumption in this study that it is 
vital to incorporate the process stage of co-production: in the end, users’ evaluation of their 
co-production experience depends for a large part on who is involved and what happened in 
the process, not so much on the actual result.
Third, this study showed the complexity of the involvement of three levels (user, PSO and 
institutional context) in co-production. In particular, the uncertainty approach (chapter 3) 
has proven to be very helpful as a diagnostic tool for possible dilemmas in the implemen-
tation of co-production. Uncertainty about the characteristics of participants, combined 
with an institutional pressure to perform, could explain the work corporations’ selection of 
motivated and trusting participants. It could also explain why work corporations hardly gave 
participants the possibility to have a say about the internal organization and programme. 
This, in turn, negatively affects citizens’ possibility to actually gain some control over the 
service delivery.
One could wonder whether there is some kind of optimum of redistribution of control 
between users and public service providers. Joshi and Moore (2004: 40) seem to indicate 
that this is a zero-sum game: ‘where co-production occurs, power, authority and control of 
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resources are likely to be divided (not necessarily equally), between the state and groups of 
citizens in an interdependent and ambiguous fashion’. This could mean that PSOs might 
desire to frustrate or limit co-production even though there might be benefits for users, 
because it might be beneficial for the organization. This was evidently shown in the case of a 
work corporation participant, who said that he was prohibited from taking courses because 
this would improve his job chances. Because of his skills, he was needed on the work floor 
(see chapter 5).
The insights provided by the multistage/multilevel approach of this study also lead to new 
questions. For instance, whereas this study focused on the role of organizations in a rather 
generic way, future research can benefit from paying more attention to the specific role of the 
professional in co-production. Because of the direct interaction they have with co-producing 
users, they can have the most impact on building a close relation with the user (Needham, 
2008). Although this study shows professional staff can also frustrate the co-production 
process, more research is required to understand under which conditions professionals 
genuinely engage users in service delivery (Brandsen and Honingh, forthcoming). This can 
build on literature on the discretion service deliverers have and how they cope with this 
freedom (Lipsky, 1980). Specifically, literature on professionalism shows that professionals 
in the context of public services function differently depending on the institutional context 
(Brandsen and Honingh, 2013; Noordegraaf, 2007).
Furthermore, the finding that building commitment among users to the public service is 
important will benefit from more theoretical embedding. Organizational commitment is a 
concept that has been researched often, although not so much in the public sector context 
(Steijn and Leisink, 2006). Public Service Motivation (PSM) theory may be useful here 
(Perry and Wise, 1990). Attempts have already been made to apply PSM (an individual’s 
predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions) 
to the study of co-production (Van Eijk and Steen, forthcoming). It is argued that people 
with high levels of PSM also show ‘citizenship behaviour’ outside the workplace (Houston, 
2006). Van Eijk and Steen (forthcoming) thus state that citizens with high levels of PSM 
will more likely engage in co-production of public service delivery. This premise could be 
extrapolated to the process stage – users with high levels of PSM might also be more likely 
to show high levels of commitment. This is worthwhile to investigate, as it will provide more 
information on how commitment to the service is fostered during co-production.
Methods
In the period this study was conducted, the methodological variety in studies on co-production 
has been vastly improved, including natural experiments (Jakobsen, 2013), Q-methodology 
(Van Eijk and Steen, 2014), and large-N surveys (Parrado et al., 2013). However, at the be-
ginning of this study, most research on co-production represented rather static case studies, 
and still, most studies remain cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. Also, most research 
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focuses on those who are already involved in co-production, whereas little is known about 
those who do not co-produce. Furthermore, most studies on co-production focus on data 
collection at one level of analysis (user or organization) and rarely combine quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Finally, still too often successful, innovative examples of co-production 
are studied, which makes it impossible to compare co-production with non co-production, 
or successful co-production with less successful co-production.
This study dealt with some of these shortcomings. First, it used a longitudinal design, 
which is necessary if it is acknowledged that all stages are important for understanding 
the effects of co-production. One has to follow co-producers over time to explain how co-
production affects their experiences and evaluations in the end (see above). Furthermore, in 
order to know who is involved in co-production, it does not suffice to ask about people’s 
motivations to co-produce. It is also necessary to know which citizens are not involved. This 
group exists of two types of users: those who are excluded but are eligible to co-produce; and 
those users who prematurely decide to stop with co-production. An analysis of both these 
group – those who never started and the dropouts – provides a lot of information about 
the factors that make co-production a positive experience for users. Motivation and trust 
appear not only to be predictors for engaging in co-production, but also for the sustain-
ability of co-production. People with lower levels of motivation and trust are more likely to 
discontinue co-production. This points at the issue of causality: can trust be an outcome of 
co-production, or is it more viable to regard it as an independent variable?
Second, the study used a combination of qualitative data and quantitative data, assembled 
at different levels, which is crucial against the background of a multilevel approach. For 
instance, the interviews with the organizational level exposed dilemmas of the managers, 
which were often not recognized by the participants. The other way around, the managers 
were generally more positive about their support and about the effects of work corporations 
than the participants. The surveys and interviews with participants helped to shape a com-
plete picture of the relation between co-production and trust. Furthermore, the quantitative 
data clearly showed that most trust levels decreased, whereas this would have been difficult 
to assess in qualitative interviews. In contrast, the interviews revealed important information 
about the experience of users, which would have been difficult, if not impossible to reveal 
with the help of a questionnaire.
Third, for a good understanding of the evaluation stage, it was necessary to compare co-
produced services with non co-produced services, and services with good and bad outcomes. 
Probably due to the difficulty to design this in practice, such research has – to the author’s 
knowledge – not been done before. Therefore, an experimental method was used. Definitely, 
such a method has its drawbacks, but it proved to be extremely helpful for exploring effects 
of co-production, which otherwise could not be studied.
The methodology used in the study also exposed some difficulties in researching co-
production. A first problem concerns the accessibility of respondents. The background of 
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the users of work corporations, which often involved precarious histories, posed a threat for 
the accessibility for the researcher. The willingness of the managers to cooperate was very 
helpful in this respect. They could motivate the users to fill in the survey and participate 
in an interview. Admittedly, some participants only took part in the research because they 
were told to do so. This may have an impact on their answers, but more importantly, this 
increased the importance for the researcher to clearly communicate his independence of the 
organization and municipality. By stressing this frequently and by conducting the interviews 
at an appropriate location (e.g. a separate room), participants seemed to feel comfortable 
and speak out freely. In other service sectors, however, the accessibility of users may be less 
difficult. For instance, one can easily compare parents who co-produce in child care and 
parents who do not (Vamstad, 2007); or compare elderly who assist in their own care with 
elderly who do not (Wilson, 1994). Also, the organizational staff in these sectors usually has 
less power than in the case of activation services.
Another challenge is to deal with dropouts – users who prematurely decide to stop with 
co-production. Dropout rates are likely to be high for social services, again because of the 
vulnerable background of service users. A substantive size of respondents is thus needed if 
comparisons between continuous co-producers and dropouts are to be made. Also, one needs 
to pay attention to keeping track of those who stop co-producing. This proved to be difficult 
in the case of work corporations (no contact details, difficult personal circumstances). When 
done properly, it will provide interesting knowledge about the conditions for sustainable 
co-production. The reasons for dropout may differ per sector. In health and social care, co-
production may stop as a result of deteriorated health; in education co-production may end 
when time is lacking; in safety, people may co-produce less when the effect remains unclear.
However, in order to design valuable comparisons between sectors, research on co-
production must focus on a good measurement of co-production. In the study on work 
corporations, co-production was more or less considered as an inherent characteristic of 
the programme. In the vignette study, levels of co-production were manipulated, which 
was checked by the question ‘how much is … involved in solving the problem’? Although 
this question suited the design of this study, in other cases, a more objective measure might 
be necessary. Also, a measure of co-production could help to distinguish the level of co-
production in different stages of service delivery (e.g. involvement in design, implementa-
tion, delivery or evaluation).
In the same vein, future research could pay attention to the development of valid mea-
sures of satisfaction and trust. The survey for participants of work corporations primar-
ily used single-items of trust. With, single-items, internal consistency reliability cannot be 
tested. However, taking into account the target group, the questions had to be rather simple. 
Selnes (1998) also argues that trust can be understood as a unidimensional construct that is 
directly accessible to the respondent. In contrast, multidimensional measures of trust often 
use sources of trust as measures (cf. Grimmelikhuijsen, 2009). The vignette study however 
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showed that simple measurements of these concepts display too much similarity. It would be 
good to develop multiple items to obtain discernable measures of satisfaction and trust. Also, 
even if trust is regarded as a unidimensional construct, it would be interesting to see whether 
there are differences in the way co-production affects different sources. Following the theory 
in this study, co-production would particularly have in impact on the affective dimension of 
trust, and not so much on the cognitive dimension of trust.
Although the vignette study was not able to discriminate between satisfaction and trust, 
it did prove to be a fruitful tool to compare more and less successful cases of co-production. 
In practice, this would be almost impossible to design. Experimental studies are inexpensive 
and perfectly suited to test particular mechanisms. The next step is to see whether the results 
can also be found in practice. Natural experiments could be very useful here. Indeed, there 
have been attempts to set these up (Jakobsen, 2013). Such studies are incredibly valuable for 
understanding the effects of co-production for citizens.
Finally, as mentioned above, the relationship between co-production and trust is not one-
directional. The methods in this study were insufficient to fully tackle this issue of causality. 
Does co-production lead to trust or is trust a condition for co-production? Or could there 
be a vicious circle: high trust leads to co-production, which leads to even higher trust? The 
same accounts for the mechanisms of perceived control and trust networks. For instance, ac-
cording to other studies, self-efficacy is a predictor for the willingness to co-produce, rather 
than a result of co-production (Bovaird et al., 2015; Parrado et al., 2013; Van Eijk and 
Steen, 2014). Experiments or more advanced longitudinal designs could help to deal with 
the problem of causality.
Practical implications
High hopes are placed upon co-production by governments across the globe. For instance, 
the OECD stated that co-production could lead to more satisfaction and possible cost 
reduction (OECD, 2011). A report from the British Trade Union Congress notes that co-
production could foster
... greater ability to get to the root of issues and develop tailored solutions; increased 
innovation and efficiency of services when they are built around the users’ needs; greater 
user satisfaction; creation of more cohesive communities with greater sense of local 
ownership; building confidence and capacity of individuals and communities; better use 
of public resources (Trade Union Congress, 2013: 7).
Although there is public debate about the desirability and the actual implementation of 
co-production, in general, governments seem to be taking a very positive stance towards 
co-production.
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Importantly, there seem to be a few policy assumptions about co-production (see Chapter 
1), which this study can now challenge on solid theoretical and empirical grounds. Table 
1 can be regarded as a tool for practitioners to explicitly and critically address these policy 
assumptions. It consists of several questions that can be posed during the design and imple-
mentation of co-production, highlighting potential barriers for successful co-production. 
They are systematically ordered along the three phases of service delivery (initial, process, 
and evaluation) and the three levels of actors (users, PSOs, and institutions).
One of the assumptions identified in Chapter 1, and related to the initial phase, was that 
citizens are intrinsically motivated to co-produce. This research, in line with other recent 
work (Bovaird et al., 2015; Van Eijk and Steen, 2014), shows that users can have very 
Table 1. Questions for practitioners dealing with co-production
User PSO Institutional
Initial phase What is the background 
of potential co-
producers? What could 
be the motivations of 
users to co-produce? 
Could there be risks for 
users to co-produce, e.g. 
health or financial risks?
Are there specific users 
that the PSO want to 
target for co-production? 
Is it necessary to 
motivate users to co-
produce? Is cooperation 
between users important 
and what does this mean 
for the composition 
of users? How does 
co-production affect the 
internal organization?
What kinds of 
instruments are 
available to use to 
elicit co-production? 
Is there support for 
co-production from 
stakeholders?
Process phase What kinds of 
contributions will users 
be able to give? What 
are their skills and 
resources? How much 
influence do users have 
over the design and 
implementation of the 
service?
How are users supported 
in their co-productive 
efforts? How can their 
sense of commitment be 
elicited?
How much discretion is 
there available for users 
and professional staff to 
deviate from standard 
procedures?
Evaluation phase To what extent can users 
be held responsible for 
outcomes/outputs?
To what extent can the 
PSO be held responsible 
for outcomes/outputs? 
How will be dealt with 
disappointed users after 
negative outcomes/
outputs?
Which outcomes/
outputs do stakeholders 
desire? Are these 
congruent with what 
users and PSO desire?
PSO=Public Service Organization
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different reasons to participate in co-production. For PSOs involved with co-production, it 
can be quite important to understand the variety of motivations.
First, it could be desirable for PSOs to prevent that users with particular motivations will 
co-produce. It was advantageous for the work corporations that users showed some motiva-
tion to do the daily tasks and willingness to find a job. Also in other sectors, it could be 
positive for the service to withhold particular users. For example, when residents co-produce 
neighbourhood safety with the police, it could be dangerous when participants have other 
motives than to serve the community (e.g. racism, personal conflicts with other residents) 
(Fledderus, Broersma, et al., 2014). This insight is important, as it is often assumed that 
organizations always desire users to co-produce.
Second, a good view on the motivations of users can help to make more effectively use of 
policy instruments to elicit co-production. When it appears that most users are motivated 
by individual, instrumental reasons, it makes sense to attract users by material incentives. 
However, when it is important that users are intrinsically motivated, or that cooperation 
between users is at stake, such instruments might not have the intended effects. Indeed, 
whereas intrinsic motivation and trust were important for sustainable participation in work 
corporations, the policy instruments used to elicit participation aimed at very different 
motivations. Thus, the financial bonus was rarely regarded as important, and the contract 
(which can actually be regarded as a display of distrust) was perceived as trivial at best and 
led to fierce resistance at worst.
Obviously, the intentional use of instruments to determine who is and who is not in-
volved in co-production leads to a selective group of users. This could also be the result 
of self-selection, as explained in chapter 4: those who have more resources, who are more 
motivated and more trusting will be more eager to co-produce. Although there seems to be 
an assumption that everybody is involved in co-production equally, it is thus more likely 
that most forms of co-production are characterized by distributional biases. The lack of 
representation does not necessarily have to be a problem. More similarities between users 
will, for example, be beneficial for the commitment in the following process phase. It can 
actually be a strategy for PSOs to ‘match’ potential users to an existing group of users. Yet, 
it could mean that disadvantageous citizens are less likely to co-produce, leaving them with 
fewer possibilities to have an influence on the delivery of public services.
An assumption related to the process phase is the premise that co-production automati-
cally leads to users having an influence on the design and implementation of the service. In 
practice, co-production could mean high levels of participation during service delivery, but 
little control over other aspects of the service. This is what happened at the work corporations. 
Providing users the possibility to be involved in decisions about the way co-production is 
given shape could lead to high levels of personal control and strengthens trust between user 
and provider. However, PSOs should then also analyse what kind of contributions users are 
able to give, what their skills and resources are, and how these inputs can be supported by the 
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organization. Also, it should be clear for PSOs how much space there is for their professional 
staff to deviate from standard procedures, as they must be able to do so when users provide 
suggestions that do not fit the regular process.
Finally, in the evaluation phase, a common policy assumption is that in the case of 
equal outcomes, co-produced services will lead to better evaluations by citizens than non 
co-produced services. This study has indicated, however, that this depends on the ideas that 
citizens hold about the division of responsibilities between user and service provider. When 
the service leads to successful outcomes, users may well attribute this success to themselves. 
They could actually blame the service provider for all the efforts they had to put in them-
selves. Of course, this will depend for a large part on the process phase and the question of 
support and commitment. And what happens when the service does not lead to the expected 
outcomes? An important question for PSOs in this respect is to which extent the users, and 
to which extent the PSO can be held responsible. In practice, it will often be difficult for 
governmental agencies to blame citizens for failing services.
Interestingly, in the case of work corporations, it were the (characteristics of ) users who 
finally were believed to be responsible for disappointing results (in terms of regular employ-
ment). Specifically, in an evaluation report of the municipality (published after the research 
period), it was stated that the low amount of ‘success’ was partially due to the participants’ 
distance to the labour market and personal problems, such as debts, child care and housing 
(Gemeente Nijmegen, 2015). Very little attention was paid to the way the organizations 
managed the co-production of users or to the supportive role that the municipality could 
have played (for instance on the issues of debts and child care). Several participants of work 
corporations having clear organizational problems were quite astonished to hear these results 
(personal communication). For them, it felt that the fact that they are still unemployed was 
completely their fault, leading to feelings of disappointment and distrust in the municipality.
At the institutional level, problems in the evaluation phase can arise when stakeholders, 
PSOs, and users have different ideas about the definition of successful outcomes. In the case 
of the work corporations, many of the users were happy just because they participated, the 
work corporations focused both on reemployment and personal development, whereas the 
municipality mostly focused on reemployment (or putting people off benefits). Each actor 
will then also evaluate other outcomes; or the same outcomes differently. In order to prevent 
conflicts that arise as a result of this, it would be good for PSOs to explicitly address the 
desired outcomes with both users and stakeholders.
By addressing the questions in Table 1, practitioners will be able to overcome some of the 
potential barriers that co-production of public service delivery entails. Without doubt, co-
production could have very positive effects for the relation between citizens, service delivery 
and government. However, when co-production is not carefully designed and implemented, 
it might just as easily damage rather than build trust.
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Summary
Involving citizens in the delivery of public services – known as co-production – is regarded 
as a way to improve service quality and trust of citizens in service delivery, government 
and generalized trust. Although governments increasingly implement policies stimulating 
co-production, empirical research to support the relationship between co-production and 
trust is scarce. Therefore, is seems fair to say that in its present form this remains ideological 
assumption. In order to critically assess this expected relationship, the main research ques-
tion of this study is: to what extent and under which conditions does co-production of public 
service delivery by users lead to trust in service delivery, (local) government and generalized trust; 
and by which mechanisms can this relationship be explained?
Chapter 2 aims to identify mechanisms described in literature that can explain the rela-
tion between co-production and trust. Co-production is defined here as as an arrangement 
where both clients and ‘regular’ producers contribute a mix of activities at the point of delivery 
of public services. Trust is defined as the belief that one will contribute to your well-being and 
refrain from inflicting damage upon you. It is argued that co-production might be able to 
address the identification-based form of trust that was neglected in previous modes of gov-
ernance. Instead of maintaining trust by authority or contracts and exit, trust is maintained 
by direct participation in service delivery and close interactions between citizens and service 
providers. Specifically, this direct participation would provide users with a sense of control 
over the service, leading to a sense of self-efficacy – the perception that you are capable 
of solving your own problems. People who perceive more control over their life are also 
expected to feel less risk in trusting others, because they feel they are less dependent on the 
conduct of others. Also, co-production would potentially lead to the building of so-called 
trust networks. When users co-produce together with other users (known as collective co-
production), integrated communities could develop, characterized by clear boundaries and 
shared connections among participants (i.e. users and professional staff). The close coopera-
tion within such networks would foster trust among the participants. Potentially, this spills 
over to citizens outside the network – generalized trust –, but boundaries may be so strong 
that this creates distrust towards outsiders of the community. In order to investigate whether 
the mechanisms of perceived control and trust networks could explain the relation between 
co-production and trust, a longitudinal design is proposed that includes all the three stages 
of service delivery (the initial, the process, and the evaluation phase).
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical examination of the impact of co-production for users 
and organizations by posing the question: what compels organizations and users to pursue 
co-production? An uncertainty approach was adopted to argue that whereas co-production 
might lead to a reduction of uncertainty, for organizations, co-production might well mean 
an increase in uncertainty. This could be an obstruction for public service organizations to 
allow users to act as a genuine partner in service delivery. When the options to co-produce 
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are limited, restricted or only symbolical, this may have a negative effect on the building of 
trust in general. Public service organizations might respond differently to this uncertainty, 
depending on the institutional context. This is because the institutional context determines 
for a large part the level of discretion that is allotted to the staff of PSOs and the level of 
bureaucratic control. When there is more discretion and less bureaucratic control, PSOs 
may be more likely to accept uncertainties that come along with co-production. In this 
institutional context, there is space for a dialogue between users and professional staff, where 
the uncertainties and possible risks can be discussed and negotiated. When there is little 
discretion and more bureaucratic control, there will be less room for a dialogue. The PSO 
would rather attempt to decrease uncertainties as much as possible. One of the strategies to 
do so is to deliberately select on the characteristics of co-producers.
Chapter 4 discusses and investigates this issue of selection: the inclusion of a particular 
group of users – often well-educated, native and healthy – whereas less-equipped citizens are 
excluded from co-produced service delivery. Next to organizational selection, this chapter 
also points at the possibility of self-selection: those who are more motivated and trusting 
will be more likely to initiate or compelled to co-production. By comparing participants of a 
co-production activation programme (work corporations) with citizens who did not partici-
pate, it is indeed shown that motivation and trust play an important role in the willingness 
to co-produce. Other characteristics, such as health and ethnicity did not matter. This might 
affect the possibility for co-production to build trust: when it is already high, it becomes 
more difficult to increase. Also, it may lead to the exclusion of those citizens who would 
actually profit the most from successfully co-produced services.
Chapter 5 continues the empirical research initiated in chapter 4, addressing the ex-
planatory question: what are mechanisms and conditions that explain the relation between 
co-production and trust? Is co-production, regardless of possible selection effects, still able to 
foster trust? To answer this question, it takes into account the insights from chapter 2 and 3. 
This involves testing whether the two mechanisms can be found in practice, and scrutiniz-
ing conditional factors – at the individual, organizational, and institutional level – that 
determine whether co-production takes place and has effect. By following participants of 
work corporations over time, it was shown that perceived control did not increase and that 
trust networks, in terms of trust in other participants, were not fostered. Importantly, trust 
at different levels decreased rather than increased. This result alone is already important, 
as it raises awareness that co-production will not always produce the expected outcomes. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that the collective mechanism of trust networks seems to 
relate more strongly to changes in trust in service delivery and generalized trust than the 
individual mechanism of self-efficacy.
The study also revealed important conditional factors that might determine whether 
co-production leads to trust or not, such as motivation, support and commitment. When 
motivation to co-produce diminishes, trust will less easily be improved. The same counts if 
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organizational support – ranging from emotional to material support – for co-productive 
efforts is lacking, support that can range from material to emotional. Commitment is im-
portant too – if users feel responsible for the co-produced service, it has a positive influence 
on their trust in service delivery.
One of the suggested explanations for the decrease in trust among participants of work 
corporations was the disappointment that arose among the participants when they got closer 
to the end of the programme. It then became clear that it is extremely difficult for them to 
return to the labour market, even though they had put many efforts into the programme 
during quite some time. An important question is then: to what extent does the evaluation 
of co-produced services depend on the result of the service? Chapter 6 delves into this issue. 
By looking at previous studies in the field of service management, it became clear that co-
producing individuals might blame the organization for negative outcomes, whereas positive 
outcomes are attributed to themselves. Because of this self-serving bias, satisfaction with and 
trust in the service provider will be lower when users successfully co-produce compared to 
successful services that are delivered by an organization solely. In the latter case, users cannot 
but attribute the success to the organization, whereas in the former, users also take some 
credit for themselves. In a vignette experiment, the presence of this psychological effect was 
indeed shown for co-production of safety and little removal, but not for co-production of 
health, education, and reemployment services. Nevertheless, in none of the cases, trust and 
satisfaction in the service provider was higher for co-production than no co-production. It 
seemed to be that especially in the cases where the service provider was less present the self-
serving bias was stronger. Again, this result can be interpreted as a warning for implementers 
of co-production. Even if co-production leads to desired results, it does not automatically 
mean that the relation between citizens and service providers – and ultimately government 
– improves.
The main conclusion of this study is that a positive relation between co-production 
and trust in service delivery, (local) government and society is highly dependent upon the 
motivations of users, the organizational practice and the institutional context. The fact that 
current research often focuses on appealing and successful case studies might have led to an 
incomplete view on the possible pitfalls of co-production. Both theoretically and empiri-
cally, the picture seems to be more complex than often assumed.
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Samenvatting
Het betrekken van burgers bij publieke dienstverlening – bekend als coproductie – wordt 
gezien als een manier om de kwaliteit van diensten en het vertrouwen van burgers in dienst-
verlening, overheid en samenleving als geheel te verhogen. Hoewel overheden steeds vaker 
beleid implementeren waarin coproductie gestimuleerd wordt, is er maar weinig empirisch 
onderzoek naar de relatie tussen coproductie en vertrouwen. Het lijkt er daarom op dat 
deze verwachting eerder een ideologische aanname dan de realiteit is. Om de verwachte 
relatie tussen coproductie en vertrouwen kritisch te onderzoeken, is de hoofdvraag van deze 
studie: in hoeverre en onder welke condities leidt coproductie van publieke dienstverlening door 
gebruikers tot vertrouwen in dienstverlening, (lokale) overheid en algemeen vertrouwen en hoe 
kan deze relatie verklaard worden?
Hoofdstuk 2 heeft als doel om mechanismen te onderscheiden die in de literatuur be-
schreven worden als mogelijke verklaring voor de relatie tussen coproductie en vertrouwen. 
Coproductie wordt hier gedefinieerd als een arrangement waar zowel gebruikers als ‘gewone’ 
dienstverleners een mix van activiteiten bijdragen op het moment van dienstverlening. Vertrouwen 
wordt gedefinieerd als het geloof dat iemand bijdraagt aan je welzijn en zich ervan weerhoudt 
jou schade toe te brengen. Coproductie heeft de potentie om zogenoemde ‘identification-
based’ trust te beïnvloeden, een vorm van vertrouwen die in eerdere bestuursarrangementen 
is genegeerd. Voorheen werd vertrouwen behouden met behulp van instrumenten zoals de 
autoriteit van de professional, het werken met contracten en keuzevrijheid voor burgers. Met 
coproductie wordt vertrouwen echter eerder gevormd door directe participatie in dienst-
verlening en nauwe interacties tussen burgers en dienstverleners. Deze directe participatie 
zou mogelijk de gebruikers van diensten een gevoel van controle over de dienst geven, wat 
leidt tot een gevoel van self-efficacy – de perceptie dat je in staat bent om zelf problemen op 
te lossen. Dit leidt tot het eerste mechanisme. Als individuen meer controle over hun leven 
ervaren, dan wordt verwacht dat ze ook minder risico ervaren om anderen te vertrouwen, 
omdat ze het idee hebben minder afhankelijk te zijn van het gedrag van anderen. Naast dit 
mechanisme op individueel niveau, is er ook een mechanisme op collectief niveau te on-
derscheiden. Als gebruikers met andere gebruikers coproduceren (collectieve coproductie), 
dan kunnen er hechte gemeenschappen ontstaan, die zich karakteriseren door een hechte 
scheiding tussen de groep en buitenstaanders en gedeelde banden tussen de deelnemers 
van de gemeenschap (bestaande uit de gebruikers en de professionele staf ). De nauwe sa-
menwerking tussen gebruikers onderling en gebruikers en dienstverleners leidt mogelijk tot 
vertrouwen van gebruikers in medegebruikers en dienstverleners. Ook kan dit vertrouwen 
overgaan in vertrouwen in mensen in het algemeen, al kan het ook zijn dat in het geval van 
een zeer hechte gemeenschap, er wantrouwen ontstaat ten opzichte van buitenstaanders. Om 
te kunnen onderzoeken of deze twee mechanismen een verklaring bieden voor de relatie tus-
sen coproductie en vertrouwen, wordt in dit hoofdstuk een longitudinaal model voorgesteld 
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waarin drie fases van dienstverlening worden onderscheiden: de initiële fase, de procesfase 
en de evaluatiefase).
Hoofdstuk 3 biedt een theoretische verklaring voor de impact van coproductie voor 
gebruikers en organisaties aan de hand van de vraag: wat zorgt ervoor dat organisaties en 
gebruikers willen coproduceren? Vanuit een aanpak gebaseerd op onzekerheid wordt be-
argumenteerd dat coproductie voor gebruikers kan leiden tot minder onzekerheid, maar 
dat het voor organisaties juist kan leiden tot meer onzekerheid. Dit kan organisaties ervan 
weerhouden om gebruikers als een echte partner toe te laten tot de dienstverlening. Wanneer 
de opties voor gebruikers om te coproduceren beperkt zijn, worden tegengehouden of slechts 
symbolisch zijn, dan kan dit een negatieve invloed hebben voor vertrouwen. Organisaties 
reageren echter verschillend op de onzekerheid die met coproductie samengaat. Dit is waar-
schijnlijk voor deel afhankelijk van de institutionele omgeving. De institutionele omgeving 
bepaalt namelijk gedeeltelijk de discretie voor professionele dienstverleners en de mate van 
bureaucratische controle. Meer discretie en minder bureaucratische controle zorgen er waar-
schijnlijk voor dat de onzekerheden rond coproductie min of meer geaccepteerd worden. 
In deze institutionele context kan een dialoog ontstaan tussen gebruikers en dienstverleners 
over deze onzekerheden en tot welke risico’s dit kan leiden voor beide partijen. Als er sprake 
is van minder discretie en meer bureaucratische controle, dan is er minder ruimte voor een 
dergelijke dialoog. De dienstverlenende organisatie zal eerder geneigd zijn om de onzekerhe-
den zoveel mogelijk in de kiem te smoren. Eén van de strategieën om dit te doen, is door het 
bewust selecteren op kenmerken van de coproducerende gebruikers.
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat in op deze strategie van selectie. Het kan zijn dat een specifieke groep 
burgers coproduceert, bijvoorbeeld hoogopgeleide, autochtone en gezonde individuen, 
terwijl burgers met een kwetsbaardere achtergrond minder vaak de mogelijk krijgt van or-
ganisaties om te coproduceren. Het is ook mogelijk dat er een zelfselectie ontstaat: personen 
die meer gemotiveerd zijn en al meer vertrouwen hebben in de overheid of dienstverlenende 
organisaties zijn misschien ook eerder geneigd te coproduceren. Om dit te onderzoeken, zijn 
deelnemers van een gecoproduceerde reïntegratiedienst (werkcorporaties) vergeleken met 
individuen die wel gesolliciteerd hebben voor deelname, maar niet hebben deelgenomen. 
Hieruit bleek dat motivatie en vertrouwen inderdaad een grote rol spelen in de bereidheid 
om te coproduceren, terwijl achtergrondkenmerken zoals etniciteit en gezondheid er niet 
toe deden. Dit heeft een invloed op de mogelijkheid van coproductie om vertrouwen te 
creëren: als het al hoog is, wordt het lastiger te verhogen. Het kan ook leiden tot uitsluiting 
van burgers die juist het meeste kunnen profiteren van succesvol gecoproduceerde diensten.
Hoofdstuk 5 sluit aan op het empirische onderzoek in hoofdstuk 4. In dit hoofdstuk 
wordt de vraag gesteld: wat zijn mechanismen en condities die de relatie tussen coproductie en 
vertrouwen kunnen verklaren? Kan coproductie, ondanks de bevinding dat er een selectie-
effect optreedt, alsnog vertrouwen verhogen? Om hier een antwoord op te kunnen geven, 
wordt gebruik gemaakt van de inzichten van hoofdstuk 2 en 3. Dat betekent ten eerste dat 
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de twee mechanismen (ervaren controle en vertrouwensnetwerken) zullen worden getest en 
ten tweede dat conditionele factoren – op het individuele, organisatorische en institutionele 
niveau – die bepalen of coproductie van de grond komt dan wel effect heeft, worden onder-
zocht. Een groep deelnemers (n=60) van een zevental werkcorporaties zijn gevolgd over de 
periode van een jaar met behulp van vragenlijsten en semigestructureerde interviews. Ook 
zijn de managers van de werkcorporaties en beleidsmakers ondervraagd. Uit dit onderzoek 
is gebleken dat ervaren controle niet is gestegen en dat vertrouwensnetwerken ook niet zijn 
ontstaan. De belangrijkste bevinding is dat het gemiddelde niveau van vertrouwen – in 
de gemeente, de werkcorporatie en in het algemeen – eerder afnam dan dat het toenam. 
Dit resultaat is al interessant op zich, omdat het aangeeft dat coproductie niet altijd tot de 
gewenste uitkomsten leidt.
Uit dit onderzoek kwamen ook belangrijke conditionele factoren naar voren die mogelijk 
verklaren waarom coproductie leidt tot vertrouwen of niet: motivatie, ondersteuning en 
betrokkenheid. Het blijkt dat als motivatie om te coproduceren minder wordt, vertrouwen 
ook eerder afneemt. Hetzelfde geldt als de dienstverlener onvoldoende de coproductie 
ondersteunt (bijvoorbeeld materieel of emotioneel). Betrokkenheid is ook erg belangrijk: als 
gebruikers zich verantwoordelijk voelen voor de gecoproduceerde dienst, dan is dit positief 
voor hun vertrouwen in de dienst.
De teleurstelling van deelnemers van de werkcorporaties over de lage kans op uitstroom 
naar een betaalde baan was ook een mogelijke verklaring voor de afname in vertrouwen. 
Omdat verwacht werd dat het resultaat van coproductie minder belangrijk voor vertrouwen 
is dan het proces, roept dit de volgende vraag op: in hoeverre is de evaluatie van gecoprodu-
ceerde diensten afhankelijk van het resultaat van de dienst? Deze vraag wordt in hoofdstuk 6 
beantwoord. Eerdere studies op het gebied van service management en sociale psychologie 
geven aan dat bij coproductie sprake kan zijn van een self-serving bias. Dit houdt in dat co-
producerende individuen de dienstverlener verantwoordelijk houden voor slechte resultaten, 
terwijl ze positieve uitkomsten aan henzelf toewijzen. Door dit effect is het mogelijk dat bij 
een positieve uitkomst, tevredenheid en vertrouwen in de dienstverlener lager is wanneer er 
gecoproduceerd wordt in vergelijking met een dienst die alleen door een organisatie wordt 
verleend. In het laatste geval, is het vrijwel onmogelijk voor gebruikers om het succes niet 
aan de dienstverlener toe te wijzen, terwijl in het eerste geval zullen gebruikers ook een deel 
van het succes aan zichzelf bedelen. Een vignette-experiment liet zien dat de self-serving bias 
inderdaad optreedt bij coproductie op het gebied van veiligheid en het opruimen van vuil, 
maar niet bij coproductie van gezondheid, educatie en reïntegratiediensten. Een opmerkelijke 
uitkomst van deze studie is dat in geen van de gevallen het vertrouwen en de tevredenheid 
hoger was voor gecoproduceerde diensten dan voor niet-gecoproduceerde diensten. Dit laat 
zien dat zelfs wanneer coproductie leidt tot het gewenste resultaat, dit niet altijd leidt tot een 
betere relatie tussen burgers en dienstverleners – en uiteindelijk de overheid.
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De conclusie van deze dissertatie is dat een positieve relatie tussen coproductie en ver-
trouwen in dienstverlening, (lokale) overheid en samenleving voor een groot deel afhankelijk 
is van de motivatie van burgers, de organisatorische praktijk en de institutionele context. 
Het feit dat huidig onderzoek zich vaak focust op aantrekkelijke en succesvolle cases heeft 
mogelijk geleid tot een incompleet beeld van de mogelijke valkuilen van coproductie. Zowel 
theoretisch als empirisch lijkt de relatie tussen coproductie en vertrouwen complexer dan 
dikwijls wordt aangenomen.
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